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Theorizing about knowledge attributions has revolved almost exclusively around the 
problem of skepticism and knowledge attributions in everyday conversations. Sutton (2007), 
however, points out that Epistemic Contextualism seems to settle another field: “[i]t is 
sometimes suggested that courtroom proceedings provide a context that shows the context-
sensitivity of knowledge ascription truth-conditions” (p. 87). This dissertation is devoted to the 
evaluation of this contextualist suggestion (CS). Epistemic Contextualism claims that the 
correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the salience of error possibilities or the 
practical states of a knowledge attributor’s context of utterance. I interpret CS implies that the 
context of utterance is the context of litigation in which a knowledge attributor is at the moment 
of the attribution. A counter-example for CS is criminal cases in which the conviction of the 
defendant would meet the epistemic standards of all the knowledge attributors within and 
without the courtroom (e.g., police officers, the prosecutor, the judge, the jury). However, 
conviction is not guaranteed because it does not meet the invariant epistemic standards of proof 
fixed for conviction. My working hypothesis is that knowledge attributions have the purpose of 
stating that a cognitive agenda has been properly closed. Given that the object of knowledge 
attributions is cognitive agendas, the conditions under which knowledge is properly attributed 
depends on the nature of the cognitive agenda claimed to have been properly closed or advanced. 
This explains why, in the aforementioned cases, conviction cannot be secure, even if everyone 
within and without the court knows that the defendant is guilty. One of the closure conditions of 
conviction is the finding of the facts supporting conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Knowledge is not properly attributed to the trier of facts, and conviction is not secured, until such 
requirement is satisfied. My working hypothesis is also confirmed studying the function of 
	  
knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies instantiated by criminal investigations, in the 
attributions of testimonial knowledge as the most important source of legal knowledge, in the 
attributions of specialized knowledge by the trial judge, and in the attributions of group 
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Introduction 
In the last two decades, epistemic theorizing about knowledge attributions and denials 
has revolved almost exclusively around the problem of skepticism and knowledge attributions in 
everyday conversations.1 Sutton (2007), however, points out that Epistemic Contextualism seems 
to settle another field: “[i]t is sometimes suggested that courtroom proceedings provide a context 
that shows the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascription truth-conditions” (p. 87). This 
dissertation is devoted to the evaluation of this contextualist suggestion (CS). Perhaps, I can 
make sense of CS with the main standards of proof governing civil and criminal law, namely, 
preponderance of evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. As I interpret them, standards of 
proof are epistemic thresholds that legal agents are supposed to cross to obtain positive epistemic 
evaluations. Since “legal deliberations are not private beliefs but public judgments of guilt and 
innocence, liability or non-liability” (Goldman, 1999, p. 272), legal agents go through such 
epistemic thresholds publicly justifying their beliefs. The question is, what is the minimum 
threshold to cross in order to obtain a positive epistemic evaluation? A popular answer is that 
legal epistemic thresholds vary from one context of litigation to another. For instance, Larry 
Laudan in Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay on Legal Epistemology states that, “[i]n the 
civil law, that threshold is set at 50+ percent, or ‘more likely than not.’” (2006, p. 64). In the 
criminal context, differently, “we set the bar of proof … higher than the preponderance of the 
evidence … because we think that falsely convicting the innocent is worse than falsely acquitting 
the guilty” (Laudan, 2006, p. 65). If this is right, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions 
change from civil to criminal proceedings: the former are lower than the latter. Therefore, CS 
seems to be right. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Following the relevant literature, I will use the expression “attribution” and “ascription” 
interchangeably. 
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I have different motivations to adopt legal contexts as a field of philosophical study for 
knowledge attributions. First, in legal proceedings, knowledge attributions and denials seem 
extremely volatile as it is shown by direct examinations and cross-examinations where skillful 
attorneys influence the fact-finder to change knowledge attributions for denials. Second, in 
recent debates, knowledge is not only attributed to individuals, but also to groups. So Goldman 
(2004) states: “In common parlance, certainly, organizations are treated as subjects for 
knowledge attribution. In the wake of 9/11, there has been much commentary on what the C.I.A. 
and the F.B.I. did or didn’t know about terrorist plans before the event itself” (p. 12). Given that 
in legal proceedings both individuals (such as attorneys or witnesses) and groups (such as juries 
or tribunals) intervene, legal contexts provide a vantage point to study both sorts of knowledge 
attributions. Third, along with the discussions about knowledge attributions, contemporary 
epistemology is concerned with the different relations between knowledge and action (Fantl & 
McGrath, 2002; 2007; 2009; Hawthorne, 2004; Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Stanley, 2005). I 
want to explore these connections in one field where having or lacking knowledge has important 
practical consequences such as a verdict of conviction or acquittal. Finally, one of the main 
purposes of knowledge attributions is the evaluation of actions because we criticize and defend 
actions ascribing and denying knowledge. I submit that a natural scenario for these types or 
evaluations is the judgments of legal responsibility.  
The main incentive to incorporate philosophical accounts of knowledge attributions to the 
field of law is legal security. In legal proceedings, verdicts are the consequence of two main 
elements, specifically, the knowledge of facts under litigation, and the legal material (e.g., status, 
legal precedents, canons of interpretations) interpreting such facts (Goldman, 1999, p. 273). 
Broadly speaking, if the evidence at trial leads to the knowledge of the facts legally relevant, and 
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there is a legal consequence for those facts, then a verdict should follow. As a result, there would 
be a justified expectation of a specific legal decision when it is possible to correctly attribute 
knowledge to the legal agent deciding. In this resides the importance of correctly attributing 
knowledge in legal contexts: they allow for the justified anticipation of legal decisions. 
I want to be precise in that I will not focus on one specific legal system. Rather, I will 
understand legal proceedings as a general structure that defines roles, goals and actions to be 
performed in legal contexts. This methodological decision is inspired by John Rawls’s (1955) 
differentiation between “justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it” 
(p. 3). From his view, the following two questions asked by an inquisitive child to his father 
illustrate the point. 
(1) “Why was J put in jail yesterday?” 
(2) “Why do people put other people in jail?” 
While the answer for (2) would justify the institution of punishment itself, the response for (1) 
would provide reasons for a specific penalty inflected on J through a specific criminal procedure. 
If Rawls is right, then it is possible to differentiate concepts such as the adversary process (i.e., a 
procedural structure where the handling of evidence is a responsibility of the parties under 
litigation rather than an official’s obligation) from practices falling under it such as the American 
criminal procedure. I will devote this dissertation to concepts such as the former and not to 
specific applications such as the latter. 
Chapter 1 evaluates CS. I am going to start by clarifying the main concepts and 
motivations for the problem of knowledge attributions. Given that the debate around knowledge 
attributions does not take place in legal contexts, I will reconstruct such debate as if it would 
have taken place in legal scenarios. From my perspective, the main approaches to knowledge 
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attributions, Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invarianism (SSI), do not 
account properly for the practice of knowledge attributions in legal contexts. That is why I 
propose my agendivistic view. The word agentive refers to the performer, or agent, of an action. 
Given that my view is concerned with the agendas determining the actions agents are disposed to 
perform, I will name it Agendivism. Given that in Chapter 1 I present the philosophical debate 
anteceding this dissertation and the main concepts of my theory, this chapter sets up the rest of 
the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 will be devoted to the problem of the function of knowledge attributions in our 
cognitive economies. First, I will reconstruct the most influential response to the problem of the 
function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies: Edward Craig’s idea that the 
purpose of knowledge attributions is to flag approved informants (1990, p. 11). Second, I will 
study some counter examples and alternative accounts showing that it is possible to find 
knowledge attributions without approved informants, and approved informants without 
knowledge attributions. With this in mind, I will propose an agendivistic account of the function 
of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies. Such account will be corroborated by the 
ways in which criminal investigators advance or close the agendas of their investigations, 
attributing knowledge to witnesses, victims, undercover agents, and any other collaborators. 
Given that testimonial knowledge is one of the most important sources of knowledge in 
legal contexts, in Chapter 3, I will study the ways in which EC and SSI face the challenges posed 
by the dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony. Without being specific here, John Greco 
suggests that “[i]t can seem that any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or 
too easy, and that therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible” 
(forthcoming, p. 1). I will show that EC and SSI make testimonial knowledge too easy. That is, 
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they allow for incorrect knowledge attributions of testimonial knowledge. After this, I will 
provide an agendivistic account of testimonial knowledge dissolving the dilemmas of the 
epistemologies of testimony. 
In Chapter 4, I will focus on a specific problem of knowledge attributions in legal 
contexts, namely, the problem of expert testimony and knowledge attributions. Broadly 
speaking, according to the American law of evidence, the jury can only listen to the testimony of 
an expert at trial once the trial judge has decided if the expert has the specialized knowledge 
required for the clarification of the matter at issue. The problem is that, ex hypothesi, the trial 
judge does not have specialized knowledge to properly attribute knowledge to an expert. I will 
start explaining the legal context from which this problem arises. Second, I will reconstruct and 
evaluate the main theories accounting for the problem of expert testimony and knowledge 
attributions: the Deference-Education Account by Ronald Allen (1993; 1994; 2012), and the 
Epistemic Legal Contextualism by Alani Golanski (2001). Finally, I will propose an agendivistic 
theory of knowledge attributions of specialized knowledge for legal contexts.  
One important feature of knowledge ascriptions is that they attribute knowledge to 
individuals and to groups. The final chapter of my dissertation deals with two problems of group 
knowledge attributions in two legal groups. First, given the exclusionary rules of evidence, juries 
are supposed to exclude any irrelevant, potentially confusing, or illegally obtained evidence from 
their deliberations, but the jurors can individually take the excluded evidence into account. This 
could produce cases in which a jury is not epistemically justified in believing that p, but its 
individual jurors would be epistemically justified in believing that p. Second, groups using 
majoritarian procedures as a means to fix their collective beliefs, such as multi-agent courts, 
want to satisfy two conditions. On one hand, they want to be sensitive to the beliefs of their 
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members. On the other hand, they want their own sets of beliefs to be rational (List & Pettit, 
2002, p. 91). However, these desiderata are not always achievable because the majoritarian rules 
do not necessarily preserve group rationality. The problem is how to preserve group rationality 
without sacrificing the beliefs of the court’s members. My agendivistic view will also show its 
explanatory power for group knowledge attributions properly dealing with these cases. 
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Chapter 1: Knowledge Attributions in Legal Contexts 
 
1. Introduction 
I disagree with CS. To recall: 
CS: Courtroom proceedings provide a context that shows the context-sensitivity 
of knowledge ascription truth-conditions. 
In this chapter, I will present my arguments against CS. I intend to accomplish three objectives. 
First, I am going to reconstruct the main intuitions about knowledge attributions as if they were 
raised in legal contexts. Second, I shall show that the main theories of knowledge attributions, 
namely, Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), do not explain 
accurately knowledge attribution behaviors in legal proceedings. Finally, I aim to show that a 
theory centered on the agendas that agents try to close or advance is a better account of 
knowledge attributions than EC and SSI. The agenda I am going to advance in this chapter is the 
following. First, I will present the relevant contexts and the main motivations of the debate EC 
vs. SSI. Second, I will reconstruct CS as strongly as I can. Third, I will present a criticism against 
it along with a theory that accounts for knowledge and knowledge attributions in legal contexts 
better. Without more preamble, I will start clarifying the main concepts under debate. 
 
2. Epistemic Contextualism Vs. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism: What Is All This About? 
Given the increasing and complicated terminology around the problem of knowledge 
attributions, I want to start clarifying the relevant concepts and the main motivation for this 
debate. As I take it, there is a knowledge attribution when an agent, the attributor (A), asserts that 
another agent, the putative knower (K), knows that p. By the same token, there is a knowledge 
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denial when A asserts that K does not know that p. The problem of knowledge attributions is, 
then, whether A correctly asserts that K knows (or does not know) that p. Knowledge attributions 
and denials differ from other knowledge relations such as having or lacking knowledge, getting 
or not getting knowledge, detecting or not detecting knowledge, and so on. For this paper, it is 
important to differentiate the problem of knowledge attribution from the problem of knowledge 
possession, which is whether K knows that p. While the latter is a first-order knowledge relation, 
the former is a second-order (or meta-) knowledge relation. That is, the object of a knowledge 
attribution is a knowledge possession. In one sentence, the problem of knowledge attribution is 
not whether K knows that p, but under which conditions it is correct to assert that K knows that 
p. 
For instance, imagine my wife and I taking a childbirth preparation class before having 
our first baby. One of the topics covered in that class was the importance of immunization for 
newborn babies. Jones, who was also taking the class, vehemently argued that we should not 
vaccinate our future babies because vaccines are promoted to generate profits for 
pharmaceuticals. Someone challenged him assuring that illnesses, such as polio, rubella or 
diphtheria were not produced by pharmaceutical companies. Jones agreed, but replied saying that 
children’s immune systems could deal with most illnesses naturally. I thought this discussion 
was going to take forever, but luckily the class’s instructor cordially invited Jones and his 
opponent to continue their conversation at another moment. Driving home after class, my wife 
and I got stuck in a traffic jam. Not having anything better to do, we talked about Jones’s reasons 
against kids’ immunizations. One of my assertions during that conversation was: 
(1) Jones knows that polio is produced by a virus. 
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I thought that that was something everybody with an average level of education should know. 
My wife replied asserting: 
(2) Jones does not know that polio is produced by a virus. 
For her, (2) was the only way to explain Jones’s extreme position. The problem of knowledge 
attributions is to assess assertions such as (1) and (2). 
Traditional theories of knowledge (TTK) tackle the problem of knowledge attributions 
fixing a set of epistemic criteria that particular knowledge attributions must satisfy. These are the 
traditional factors for knowledge and include elements such as whether K believes that p, 
whether p is true, whether K has good evidence for p, the strength of K’s epistemic position, and 
so on. With this in mind, TTK establish three tenets for the evaluation of knowledge attributions.  
Exclusivity: The correctness of knowledge attributions only depends on traditional 
factors for knowledge. 
Incompatibility: Statements such as (1) and (2) cannot be correct at the same time 
if they refer to the same traditional conditions for knowledge. 
Supervenience: If two putative knowers K1 and K2 satisfy the same traditional 
conditions for knowledge, then if it is right to attribute knowledge 
to K1, it is right to attribute knowledge to K2 as well.  
For instance, having evidence is sometimes required for a correct knowledge attribution. This 
means, without referring to a specific evidentialist theory, that A correctly asserts that K knows 
that p when K’s evidence supports p. Practically, if Jones’s evidence supports the claim that 
“polio is produced by a virus,” then (1) is correct and (2) is incorrect. If the evidence condition 
does not hold, then (2) is correct and (1) is incorrect. 
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Some challenging theories suggest that TTK do not capture our intuitions about 
knowledge attributions in cases as the following. 
JONES 
Suppose we are interested in whether Jones, an ordinary non-medically trained 
person, has the general information that polio is caused by a virus. If his response 
to our question is that he remembers the [newspaper] reporting that Salk said it 
was, then this is good enough. He has performed adequately given the issue-
context. But suppose the context is an examination for [Smith’s] MD degree. Here 
we expect a lot more. If [Smith] simply said what Jones did, we would take him 
as being very deficient in knowledge. Thus, relative to one issue-context a person 
may be justified in believing h, but not justified relative to another context. 
(Annis, 1978, p. 215) 
In JONES, statements such as (1) and (2) seem to be compatible. In quotidian conversations, the 
memory of having read a newspaper stating something true provides enough justification for our 
knowledge, therefore (1) is right. However, the same source of information is insufficient for 
specialized domains, in which case (2) is right, as well. Therefore, Incompatibility is wrong. 
Additionally, JONES shows that it is possible to attribute and deny knowledge to two different 
putative knowers, even when they satisfy the same epistemic conditions. Jones and Smith have 
the same evidence for p, but while it is correct to attribute knowledge to the non-medically 
trained person, it is incorrect to do it to the MD student. Consequently, Supervenience is false. 
Finally, these variations in knowledge attributions do not depend upon purely epistemic factors. 
In JONES, the difference of knowledge ascriptions is a consequence of the change between an 
ordinary situation to a specialized domain, and, according to TTK, that is not a traditional 
epistemic factor. Then, Exclusivity is defeated.  
Shifty epistemologies claim to account better for these intuitions than TTK.1 Broadly 
speaking, they allow for the consistency of statements such as (1) and (2) in cases like JONES 
because, for them, knowledge ascriptions not only vary due to modifications of the traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I borrow this expression from (Fantl & McGrath, 2012, p. 55). 
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factors of knowledge, but also for the change of non-traditional factors such as salience of error 
possibilities and practical stakes. EC and SSI compete for being the best explanation for these 
contextual variations. I am going set up a general notion of these theories before presenting their 
relevant specificities. EC holds that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions and denials 
change according to the context in which these sentences are uttered. The reason for this is that 
the verb “to know” adopts different meanings according to the contexts in which this expression 
is used. In a non-trivial sense, “to know” is similar to adjectives such as “tall” or “flat.” In a 
regular conversation, we properly assert that a person who is 6 feet is tall, but when we are 
talking about NBA players we do not rightly assert that that person is tall anymore. In this case, 
the context of use fixes the standards of height establishing when a person is correctly asserted to 
be tall: while 6 feet is enough to be a correct tallness attribution in normal contexts, it is not 
enough for an NBA player to be described as tall. The reason for this is that, for the attributor of 
tallness, different factors are salient in an everyday conversation and in a conversation about 
NBA players. Practically, while assessing the height of a group of regular people, someone who 
is 6 feet meets the standard of tallness for the evaluator, yet this very same person seems not to 
be tall anymore if what is under evaluation is a group of NBA players because the standard is 
more demanding in this context of use. To emphasize, from this view, the context of attribution 
does not affect height itself, but the standards under which it is attributed. By analogy, the 
context of use for “to know” fixes the standard of knowledge establishing the correctness of a 
knowledge attribution. For instance, in JONES, the evidence Jones has for p is enough to rightly 
attribute knowledge to him in an everyday conversation, but not in a specialized one. As in 
“tall,” the reason for this is that what is salient for A is different in an everyday conversation and 
in the examination for an MD degree. 
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SSI, alternatively, denies that the meaning of the expression “to know” varies according 
to the context of use. This is why this view is Invariantist. It is “Subject-Sensitive” because, 
unlike EC, it locates the factors determining the correctness of a knowledge attribution in the 
subject, or putative knower, and not in the attributor. For example, in JONES, while the evidence 
held by Jones is enough for p, the evidence that Smith has is not enough. This is not because of 
the variations of meaning of “to know,” but because of the higher practical stakes of the MD 
student taking his exam. In this case, it is expected that Smith, as the subject of the attribution, 
rules out error possibilities that are not salient for Jones. For instance, as an MD candidate, Smith 
must know that secondary sources of information, such as newspapers, could be wrong, or 
whether Salk’s theory has been succeeded by another better account. This explains why, for SSI, 
it is right to attribute knowledge to Jones, but not to Smith. 
Shifty epistemologies justify their views proposing stakes-shifting cases.2 These are a 
pair of cases, usually identified as LOW and HIGH, in which the traditional factors for 
knowledge remain the same, but the non-traditional factors vary from one to the other. 
Specifically, Keith DeRose suggests a pair of bank cases where the strength of K’s epistemic 
position remains the same, but the practical interests at stake change (1992, pp. 913-914; 2009, 
pp. 1-2). Stewart Cohen designs an airport case (1999, p. 59) and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew 
McGrath a pair of train cases (2002, pp. 67-68) where K’s evidence for p does not change, but 
the salience of error possibilities vary. EC and SSI interpret these cases in two different and 
antagonistic ways. Below, I am going to present their interpretations pairing particular theories 
as they have been developed in relevant literature. The opposing accounts to be juxtaposed are 
Cohen’s EC vs. John Hawthorne’s SSI and DeRose’s EC vs. Jason Stanley’s SSI. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This term was suggested by (Schaffer, 2006, p. 87). 
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The first two theories interpret Cohen’s airport case. 
AIRPORT 
Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain flight to New 
York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They 
overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops in 
Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel agent and 
responds, “Yes I know it does stop in Chicago.” It turns out that Mary and John 
have a very important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. 
Mary says, “How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They could 
have changed the schedule at the last minute.” Mary and John agree that Smith 
doesn't really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with 
the airline agent. (Cohen, 1999, p. 58) 
This case is designed to show that even though K has the same evidence for p, contextual factors 
such as the salience of error possibilities produces changes in knowledge attributions. Three 
elements are important for the competing interpretations of this case. First, Smith’s self-
attribution of knowledge is represented by the following proposition: 
(3) Smith knows that the flight stops in Chicago. 
Second is Mary and John’s denial of knowledge: 
(4) Smith does not know that the flight stops in Chicago. 
Third, Smith’s evidence for the belief that the flight stops in Chicago is the same: the 
information written in Smith’s official flight itinerary.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Fantl and McGrath believe that in AIRPORT, it is not clear that Smith holds the same evidence 
that Mary and John had before talking to the airline agent (2002, p. 68, footnote 2). This inspires 
them to propose a new version of Cohen’s case. I am not including this case in my presentation 
in this section because most of the main debates about knowledge attributions include Cohen’s 
case. For future reference, I am quoting Fantl and McGrath’s case below. 
TRAIN CASE LOW 
You're at Back Bay Station in Boston preparing to take the commuter rail 
to Providence. You're going to see friends. It will be a relaxing vacation. 
You've been in a rather boring conversation with a guy standing beside 
you. He, too, is going to visit friends in Providence. As the train rolls into 
the station, you continue the conversation by asking, "Does this train make 
all those little stops, in Foxboro, Attleboro, etc.?" It doesn't matter much to 
you whether the train is the "Express" or not, though you'd mildly prefer it 
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This sameness of evidence, and the difference between (3) and (4) lead TTK to suggest 
that in AIRPORT there are two alternative possibilities. On one hand, (3) is right and (4) is 
wrong, and the standard for knowledge is low because it allows for Smith’s itinerary to be 
enough evidence for the belief that the flight stops in Chicago. On the other hand, (4) is right and 
(3) is wrong, and the standard for knowledge is high since it does not certify Smith’s itinerary as 
enough evidence. Regardless, the bottom line is that it cannot be the case that (3) and (4) are 
right at the same time. 
Cohen, endorsing EC, departs from this interpretation claiming that “[n]either standard is 
simply correct or simply incorrect. Rather, context determines which standard is correct” 
(Cohen, 1999, p. 59). By context, he understands “the contexts of ascription” (p. 57). That is, 
“things like the purposes, intentions, expectations, presuppositions, etc., of the speakers who 
utter these sentences” (p. 57). Specifically, Cohen suggests that the standard for the correctness 
of knowledge attributions depends on the salience of error to A (p. 61). Then, A correctly asserts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was. He answers, "Yeah, this one makes all those little stops. They told me 
when I bought the ticket." Nothing about him seems particularly 
untrustworthy. You believe what he says. 
Intuitively, in TRAIN CASE LOW, you have good enough evidence to know that 
the train stops in Foxboro. You are epistemically justified in believing that 
proposition. 
TRAIN CASE HIGH 
You absolutely need to be in Foxboro, the sooner the better. Your career 
depends on it. You've got tickets for a south-bound train that leaves in two 
hours and gets into Foxboro just in the nick of time. You overhear a 
conversation like that in Train Case Low concerning the train that just 
rolled into the station and leaves in 15 minutes. You think, "That guy's 
information might be wrong. What's it to him whether the train stops in 
Foxboro? Maybe the ticket-seller misunderstood his question. Maybe he 
misunderstood the answer. Who knows when he bought the ticket? I don't 
want to be wrong about this. I'd better go check it out myself." 
Intuitively, in TRAIN CASE HIGH, you do not have good enough evidence to 
know that the train stops in Foxboro. You are not justified in believing that 
proposition. When so much is at stake, a stranger's casual word isn't good enough. 
You should check further. (Fantl and McGrath, 2002, pp. 67-68) 
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that K knows that p if there is not a salience of error possibilities to A. This requirement is 
satisfied by Smith, but not by Mary and John in AIRPORT. For the latter, the importance of their 
meeting in Chicago increases the salience of error making (4) right, whereas for the former, no 
error seems to be salient. This makes (3) right. 
Hawthorne (2005), adopting an SSI approach, suggests that the salience of error 
possibilities should be located in K and not in A, as Cohen suggests. With this in mind, 
Hawthorne proposes a “subject-sensitive salience constraint” for the correctness of knowledge 
attributions (p. 159). For him, A correctly asserts that K knows that p if K thinks that p, and there 
is not a counter-possibility salient to K. Smith correctly attributes knowledge to himself because 
there is not a counter-possibility salient to him defeating his belief that the flight stops in 
Chicago. Mary and John, on the contrary, do not correctly assert (3). Justifying this, Hawthorne 
uses the idea that one cannot correctly assert what we do not know (2005, p. 160). Mary and 
John, ex hypothesi, do not know whether Smith knows that the flight will stop in Chicago, so 
they do not properly assert (3). Consequently, (4) is right. 
The second group of theories interpret DeRose’s cases. 
BANK CASE LOW 
My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at 
the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past 
the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on 
Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as 
soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be 
deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit 
our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the bank 
won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.’ I reply, 
‘No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s 
open until noon.’   
BANK CASE HIGH 
My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and 
notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on 
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Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning 
only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this 
case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our 
paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday 
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very 
bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife 
reminds me of these facts. She then says, ‘Banks do change their hours. 
Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?’ Remaining as confident 
as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, ‘Well, no, I 
don’t know. I’d better go in and make sure.’ 
Assume in both cases the bank will in fact be open on the Saturday and that there 
is nothing unusual about either case that has not been included in my description 
of it. (DeRose, 1992, pp. 913-914; 2009, pp. 1-2) 
These pair of cases is designed to show that even when K is in the same strength of epistemic 
position with respect to p, knowledge attributions change from LOW to HIGH. Specifically, 
BANK CASES LOW and HIGH are intended to show that the following propositions are 
correct. 
(5) DeRose knows that the bank will be open on Saturday in LOW. 
(6) DeRose does not know that the bank will be open on Saturday in HIGH. 
(7) If DeRose knows that the bank will be open on Saturday in LOW, he knows 
that the bank will be open on Saturday in HIGH. 
Some terminological precisions are required here. 
To be in a strong epistemic position with respect to p is “to have to a high extent the 
property or properties having enough of which is what’s needed for a true belief to constitute a 
piece of knowledge” (DeRose, 2009, p. 7). (7) does not specify how strong DeRose’s epistemic 
position is, but it claims that his epistemic position in LOW is comparable with the one he is in 
HIGH in such a way that if his epistemic position is strong in the first case, then it is strong in the 
second one, too. Now, if this equivalence of strength of epistemic position exists in these cases, 
why are (5) and (6) right? The general contextualist response is that “the truth conditions of 
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sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’ or ‘S does not know that p’ vary in certain ways according 
to the context in which the sentences are uttered” (DeRose, 1992, p. 194). DeRose’s specific 
proposal is that “requirements for making knowledge attributions true go up as the stakes go up” 
(p. 195). This is to say that A correctly asserts that K knows that p if A’s practical stakes are low. 
The relevant differences between the BANK CASES illustrate this idea. While being right in 
LOW does not carry any relevant consequences, several businesses depend on it in HIGH. Given 
this, when DeRose’s wife mentions the possibility of the bank being closed on Saturday in 
HIGH, she raises the standards for knowledge attributions. The reason for this increase is that in 
HIGH, unlike in LOW, DeRose has the burden of ruling out the possibility that the bank changed 
its office hours on Saturday, and he is aware of that while uttering his knowledge attribution. 
Stanley, hoisting SSI’s flag, suggests that A correctly asserts that K knows that p if p is a 
serious practical question for K, and K has evidence that reduces the probability of the negation p 
to a sufficiently low level (Stanley, 2005, p. 91). Two concepts call for clarification. First, 
Stanley stipulates that a proposition is a serious practical question “if and only if its truth or 
falsity would affect the preference ordering of the actions at my disposal” (p. 95). To illustrate, 
“[c]onsider the possibility that a large asteroid will hit the earth next week. If I were to discover 
this, this would have some effect on my plans. I would perhaps choose not to put off apologizing 
to my brother, and I may decide to shelve my plan to go on a diet. But, intuitively, it is still not a 
possibility that I need to take account of in my decision making” (p. 93). Second, the level of 
sufficiency of evidence for the reduction of the negation of a proposition is directly proportional 
to the cost of being wrong (p. 91). That is, when the cost of being wrong about p is low, the 
evidence required for the reduction of the negation of p is low, too. If the being mistaken about p 
brings a high rate of negative consequences, the evidence required for the reduction of the 
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negation of p is high. Putting all this together in the BANK CASES, in LOW, the chance of the 
bank being closed on Saturday is not a practical question for DeRose because it does not change 
the preference ordering of the actions at his disposal. Furthermore, if he is wrong and the bank is 
not going to open on Saturday, it does not bring any negative consequences. Therefore, the 
evidence DeRose needs to squelch the possibility of p being false is low. This explains the 
correctness of (5). Alternatively, in HIGH, the proposition that the bank will be open on Saturday 
is a serious practical question for DeRose; if it is false, this will change the actions he has at his 
disposal, for instance, “going to the bank on Saturday instead of Friday” (p. 97). Additionally, 
given that if the bank will not open on Saturday, DeRose will have to face several negative 
consequences; then, his evidence for ruling out the possibility of the bank’s new schedules is not 
enough. Therefore, (6) is right.   
 
3. The Contextualist Suggestion 
Now that I have clarified the theoretical background to be assessed in this chapter, I want 
to reconstruct the idea inspiring it: 
CS: Courtroom proceedings provide a context that shows the context-sensitivity 
of knowledge ascription truth-conditions. 
I believe that two cases by DeRose clarify CS. The first case was designed to show that EC deals 
properly with cases and SSI does not. According to DeRose, it seems that EC and SSI provide 
equally compelling explanations for their stakes-shifting cases. But EC breaks this tie in its favor 
accounting for third person knowledge attributions that SSI does not take into account. In his 
words, 
Fortunately, then, for the contextualist, we use third-person attributions and 
denials of knowledge in describing subjects who are no party to our conversation 
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in a way that demonstrates the same variation in standards that is displayed by our 
first-person talk of what we ourselves do and do not ‘know’, and, because of this, 
third-person pairs of cases are available that are about as powerful as are the best 
first-person cases. (DeRose, 2009, p. 61) 
Below, I will quote DeRose’s third-person-knowledge-attribution case that, from my perspective, 
illuminates CS. 
THELMA AND LOUISE 
Case Set-Up: The Office. Thelma, Louise, and Lena are friends who all 
work in the same office. Today is their day off, but, before getting an early 
dinner together, they decide to walk up to the office to pick up their 
paychecks. Thelma and Lena are also interested in finding out whether a 
certain colleague is at work, as they are involved in a small office bet with 
some other workers over whether the often-absent John would show up 
today. As they pass the door to John’s personal office, they see his hat 
hanging on the hook in hallway, which, in their long experience, has been 
a sure-fire sign that John is in fact at work. They also hear one working 
colleague shout to another, ‘Why don’t you clear that letter with John 
quick before you send it off?’ Satisfied that John is at work and that 
Thelma and Lena, who bet that he would be, are in a position to collect 
their winnings from some other office workers, the three friends pick up 
their checks, go out to dinner together, and then part company, Thelma 
going to a local tavern to meet other friends, and Louise and Lena each 
heading in different directions to go home. 
Thelma at the Tavern. At the tavern, which is renowned for the low 
epistemic standards that govern the conversations that take place within its 
walls, Thelma meets a friend who bet that John wouldn’t be at work, and 
so owes Thelma $2. Thelma says, ‘Hey, John was at work today. Pay up, 
sucker!’ When her friend asks, ‘How do you know?,’ Thelma replies, ‘I 
went up to pick up my paycheck this afternoon. His hat was hanging in the 
hall outside his office door, and I heard Frank telling someone to quickly 
check something with John before sending it off.’ Satisfied with Thelma’s 
evidence, the friend pays up. Then, wondering whether Lena will know to 
collect what she is owed by yet another worker, Thelma’s friend asks, 
‘Does Lena know that John was in?’ Thelma answers, ‘Yes, she was with 
me. She knows, too.’ Meanwhile ... 
Louise with the Police. Louise has been stopped by the police on her way 
home. They are conducting an extremely important investigation of some 
horrible crime, and, in connection with that, are seeking to determine 
whether John was at work that day. It emerges that they have some reason 
to think that John was at work and no reason for doubting that (other than 
the fact that he is often absent from work, which Louise already knows), 
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but as the matter has become so important to the case, they are seeking to 
verify that he was there. When the police ask her whether she could testify 
that John was at work, Louise replies, ‘Well, no, I never saw him. I could 
testify that I saw his hat hanging in the hall, which is a very reliable sign 
that he’s at work. And I heard Frank Mercer telling someone to check 
something with John, as if John were in. But I suppose John could have 
left his hat on the hook when he went home some previous day. And 
though it would be a bit strange for Frank not to know whether John was 
at work, especially that late in the day, I guess he could have been just 
assuming John was there because John was scheduled to work—and 
because his hat was in the hall. You should check with Frank. He at least 
seemed to know that John was in.’ When the police ask Louise whether 
Lena might know that John was in, Louise replies, ‘No. She was only at 
the office very briefly, with me, and didn’t see John, either. She has the 
same reasons I have for thinking John was there, but, like me, she doesn’t 
know that John was there.’ 
Assume that John was indeed at the office; that the police subsequently verify that 
with Frank and with a couple of other workers; and that, as luck would have it, 
Thelma’s claim at the tavern that Lena ‘knows’ that John was at work is made at 
exactly the same time that Louise tells the police that Lena ‘doesn’t know’ that 
Frank was at the office. And if you’re wondering what Lena is up to at that 
moment, she is walking home, thinking about the basketball game she plans on 
watching on the television, not thinking at all about her bet, and not even knowing 
about any police investigation into any horrible crime. (DeRose, 2009, pp. 4-5) 
As any other stakes-shifting case, this is meant to explain the consistency of two apparently 
contradictory propositions, namely, 
(8) When Thelma says at the tavern that Lena knows that John was at work, her 
claim is true. 
(9) When Louise tells the police that Lena doesn’t know that John was at work, 
her claim is true. 
What is claimed to be true in (8) is Thelma’s assertion that “Lena knows that John was at work,” 
and what is clamed to be true in (9) is Louise’s denial of such knowledge attribution. Remember 
that the general contextualist response is that “the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S 
knows that p’ or ‘S does not know that p’ vary in certain ways according to the context in which 
the sentences are uttered” (1992, p. 194). Two contexts of utterance are included in THELMA 
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AND LOUISE, to be specific, an ordinary conversation in a tavern and a criminal investigation. 
Thelma properly attributes knowledge to Lena given the low epistemic standards governing 
Thelma’s context of utterance. Alternatively, in the more demanding conversational context of a 
criminal investigation, Louise properly denies knowledge to Lena. 
Given that a criminal investigation is one of the parts of a legal proceedings, if I clarify 
the context of attribution of (9), I could understand better CS. First, Louise with the Police is a 
HIGH case. This means that it raises the epistemic standards of knowledge attributions in such a 
way that some of the ascriptions uttered in everyday conversations become false. That would 
have happened if Thelma had said to the police what she said at the tavern. How high are the 
epistemic standards in Louise with the Police raised? DeRose does not provide a specific answer 
for this question. Instead, he suggests that the raising of standards in HIGH cases depends on the 
two extreme cases they are departing from. On one hand, HIGH cases differ from LOW cases 
where a big number of everyday knowledge attributions are true. On the other, HIGH cases are 
different from skeptical scenarios in which all knowledge attributions are false. To put it slightly 
differently, HIGH cases have higher standards than the LOW ones, but lower standards than 
skeptical scenarios. This is confirmed by DeRose when he differentiates his stakes-shifting cases 
from Peter Unger’s case in which John (the main character) has the supposed knowledge that 
there is milk on the rug is challenged by the possibility of an evil demon deceiving him into the 
false belief that there is milk on the rug (Unger, 1984, pp. 50-51). For DeRose, “[t]o make the 
cases less philosophical and hopefully more convincing, my ‘high-standards’ … cases involved a 
more moderate hypothesis, the taking seriously of which seemed reasonable given practical, 
nonphilosophical concerns not present in the ‘low-standards’ case” (DeRose, 2009, p. 1, footnote 
1). Similarly, in talking about the importance of the correct design of HIGH cases, he states that 
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such cases “are still far more moderate than are the ethereal possibilities on which philosophical 
skeptics base their hyperbolic doubts (brains in vats, or whatnot), and do seem worth considering 
under the somewhat heightened scrutiny appropriate to HIGH” (DeRose, 2009, p. 56). If my 
interpretation is right, CS claims that legal proceedings impose higher epistemic standards for the 
utterance of truth knowledge attributions than the ones governing everyday conversations. In 
THELMA AND LOUISE, this is confirmed by the way in which the knowledge attribution to 
Lena is true in the tavern conversation, but not in the criminal investigation. Furthermore, for CS, 
legal epistemic standards are lower than the ones created in skeptical scenarios because in legal 
proceedings some knowledge attributions conveyed in ordinary conversations are true: the ones 
matching the standard of proper knowledge attributions in legal contexts. The result of this is 
that, according to CS, more knowledge attributions are true in legal proceedings than in skeptical 
scenarios. However, fewer knowledge attributions are true in legal proceedings than in everyday 
conversations. This legal increase of epistemic standards illustrated by THELMA AND LOUISE 
also occurs within legal proceedings. As in Louise with the Police, the epistemic standards are 
raised by the context of utterance of a criminal investigation, similar to the way that other 
procedural stages raise the epistemic standards making what is needed for uttering a truth 
knowledge attribution harder and harder. As an illustration, what an official attributing 
knowledge to an eyewitness requires for opening a criminal investigation is lower than what a 
prosecutor demands when he/she attributes knowledge to the same witness in drafting 
information for formulating criminal charges. In the same way, the knowledge attributed to a 
prosecutor making his opening statements at trial is lower than the one done by the fact-finder as 
a reason to convict the alleged defendant. 
There is another possible interpretation for CS exemplified by the following case. 
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DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Lawyer: Were there any zebras in the zoo on April 23? 
Me: Yes 
L: Do you know that? 
M: Yes. 
L: How do you know? 
M: I saw some there. 
L: So, you knew that they were zebras? 
M: Yes. 
L: Could you rule out the possibility that they were only cleverly painted 
mules? 
M: No, I suppose not. 
L: So, you knew that they were zebras? 
M: Is there any reason to think that they were painted mules, of all things? 
L: Just answer the question! 
Well, how should I answer the question? If there is no special reason to think they 
were painted mules then I certainly wouldn’t want to admit that I didn’t know 
they were zebras, but maybe I am just stubborn. Suppose I do admit it: 
M: I guess I didn’t know that they were zebras. 
L: Aha! The witness has contradicted his earlier claim. First he says that 
he knew; now he says he didn’t. Now which is it, Mr. DeRose? (1992, 
pp. 925-926) 
This conversation is meant to capture one objection against EC: if someone challenges the claim 
that K knows that p and K does not respond properly to this challenge, then the previous 
knowledge attribution was false. Practically, in DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
given that the witness could not rule out the possibility of the alleged zebras to be cleverly 
painted mules, then the claiming that “DeRose knew that there were zebras in the zoo on April 
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23” is false. Similarly, in BANK CASE HIGH, if DeRose does not know whether the bank 
closes on Saturday when his wife reminds him that they would be in a very bad situation if their 
paychecks were not deposited into their checking account before Monday morning, then he did 
not know before this reminder. The reason for this is, as it is pointed out for the lawyer in 
DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION, there is a contradiction between the knowledge 
attribution before the challenge and its denial after the challenge. The objection accounts for that 
contradiction claiming the falsehood of the previous knowledge attribution.  
DeRose responds to this objection denying that the knowledge attribution before the 
challenge was false. If the verb “to know” has different meanings in “K knows that p” before the 
challenge and in “K does not know that p” after the challenge, then they do not contradict each 
other. Clarifying his idea, DeRose analogizes “to know” with “here.” The second expression has 
a meaning when, at 9:00 am, I say “I am here” and I am in my house, and another meaning 
when, at 10:00 am, I say “I am here” and I am at the university. The former sentence does not 
contradict the latter because “here” in the first one means “my house” and here in the second one 
signifies “the university.” By the same taken, the statement “I am here,” when I was in my house 
does not become false when an hour later I say “I am here” and I am at the university. By 
analogy, “to know” adopts different meanings according to the context where knowledge 
attributions are uttered. When the possibilities such as cleverly painted mules, in DEROSE 
UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION, or the raising practical stakes, in BANK CASE HIGH, are 
posed, the meaning of “to know” changes. Therefore, the previous knowledge attribution and the 
posterior knowledge denial do not contradict each other, and the previous knowledge attribution 
is not false. DeRose reinforces this idea with his interpretation of DEROSE UNDER CROSS- 
EXAMINATION. 
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DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION* 
While standing in a bright yellow room, I said, “This room is yellow.” The lawyer 
then dragged me by the ear into a room in which all was gray and got me to say, 
“This room is gray,” and now he jumps all over me: “First he says, ‘This room is 
yellow;’ then he says, ‘This room is gray.’ Which is it?” The contextualist 
maintains that something very much like this has happened in my original 
dialogue with the lawyer (p. 926)  
Going back to my interpretation of CS, DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION and 
DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION* shows how contextual changes of epistemic 
standards operate with the interventions of legal agents. To clarify, what is expected in 
adversarial legal proceedings is that the parts under litigation, with the incentive of winning the 
case, look for all the relevant information for their legal inquiry and present such information in 
an argument justifying their point. Additionally, they might be able to undermine their 
counterparts’ position. According to DEROSE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION, one of the 
ways of attacking the counterpart’s alleged knowledge is raising the epistemic standards with the 
introduction of, so far, unconsidered counter-possibilities. This makes their counterpart’s 
allegations fall short in knowledge because the epistemic standards are raised with the new 
possibilities suggested.  
  
3.1 Stakes-Shifting Cases for Legal Contexts 
Shifty epistemologies justify their intuitions with stakes-shifting cases. Consequently, if 
my interpretation of CS is right, I might be able to provide some stakes-shifting cases for legal 
contexts. The challenge here is to transplant the intuitions about knowledge attributions from 
ordinary conversational contexts to legal ones. To recall, the intuitions under assessment started 
out in specific pair cases where knowledge ascriptions differ in their true values due to the 
variation of specific factors (i.e., either practical stakes or salience of error possibilities) that are 
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relevant for specific agents (i.e., either the knowing attributor or the knowing subject). These 
cases aim to capture the ordinary knowing-attributing practices. This is recognized by Cohen 
when analyzing AIRPORT states: “On the contextualist view, we explain our confidence in the 
truth of our everyday knowledge ascriptions … by supposing that our reasons are sufficient for 
us to know, relative to the standards of everyday contexts” (1999, p 65). DeRose does the same 
talking about the advantages of EC: “The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning 
knowledge attributions come from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) 
sentences are used in ordinary, non-philosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as 
‘knowledge’ in some non-philosophical contexts, they will deny is such in others” (2005, p. 172; 
2009, p. 47). If the stakes-shifting cases are meant to explain our intuitions of knowledge 
attributions in everyday, non-specialized, contexts, how can I extend stakes-shifting cases to 
legal contexts? 
Fantl and McGrath (2012) in “Arguing for Shifty Epistemology” suggest a method that 
could be useful here. Briefly, they propose that accounts concerned with knowledge attributions 
“should look beyond intuitions concerning the truth-value of knowledge-ascriptions in particular 
stakes-shifting cases, to see if there are general principles at work behind the scenes” (2012, p. 
57). The idea is to change the strategy of arguing from instances, to a new one centered on 
arguing from principles. From their perspective, this “argument-from-principles strategy,” as 
they called it, has shown good results in examining Gettier’s cases a là Zagzebski (1994). She, 
instead of wondering if Smith is justified in believing the relevant proposition, reveals the 
principle constituting all Gettier-type cases: 
[S]tart with a case of justified (or warranted) false belief. Make the element of 
justification (warrant) strong enough for knowledge, but make the belief false. 
The falsity of the belief will not be due to any systematically describable element 
in the situation, for if it were, such a feature could be used in the analysis of the 
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components of knowledge other than true belief, and then truth would be entailed 
by the other components of knowledge, contrary to the hypothesis. The falsity of 
the belief is therefore due to some element of luck. Now emend the case by 
adding another element of luck, only this time an element which makes the belief 
true after all. The second element must be independent of the element of warrant 
so that the degree of warrant is unchanged. The situation might be described as 
one element of luck counteracting another. We now have a case in which the 
belief is justified (warranted) in a sense strong enough for knowledge, and the 
belief is true, but it is not knowledge. (Zagzebsky, 1994, p. 69) 
This strategy not only shows that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge in a stronger way 
than theories imbued with the Gettier’s casuistry, but that it is possible to reproduce the problems 
in different scenarios associated with Gettier’s cases and the tripartite concept of knowledge. For 
example, Michael Pardo (2005), following Zagzebski’s principle, creates the following case:  
COCAINE 
Two officers plant cocaine on an automobile driver, and they then give unrebutted 
testimony at the driver’s trial that they found the cocaine after a consensual search 
of the car. The driver, concerned about his prior record coming out on cross-
examination, does not testify and offers no real defense. The fact-finder convicts 
after finding the officers credible. Now, unbeknownst to everyone save the 
defendant, he really did have cocaine in the car that never was discovered. (Pardo, 
2005, p. 322) 
As any other Gettier case, COCAINE shows that the fact-finder does not know that the defendant 
had cocaine. However, the fact-finder’s belief that the defendant had cocaine is true, and the fact- 
finder is justified in believing that it is true, provided the two officer’s “unrebutted” testimony. In 
other words, COCAINE shows that the fact-finder did not know that the defendant had cocaine; 
this finding was true, but just as mere coincidence. According to Pardo, in modern legal 
proceedings, fact-finders are expected to sentence based on the knowledge of the facts under 
litigation and not on coincidentally true findings.  
Following Fantl’s and McGrath’s method, the structuring principle I am going to apply 
is: 
Certainty-Actionability: If p isn’t absolutely epistemically certain for a subject in 
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a particular case C1, and p is actionable for the subject in 
C1, then there is a correlated case, C2, which differs in 
actionability from C1 merely because the stakes are 
higher in C2 than in C1. (Fantl and McGrath, 2012, p. 68) 
This principle is composed by two sub-principles: 
Fallibilism: “Knowledge that p does not require absolute epistemic certainty for 
p” (p. 65). 
Actionability: “You can know that p only if p is actionable for you” (p. 65).  
In the terms in which it is formulated here, Fallibilism captures the idea that it is possible to 
achieve knowledge even if there is not absolute epistemic certainty of the proposition to be 
known. This principle is a response to a variation of skepticism demanding absolute certainty for 
knowledge, and its plausibility resides in the fact we lack absolute certainty for most of the 
things we claim to know. Actionability relates knowledge with action in such a way that if K 
knows that p, K is justified in acting as if p. Practically, in the BANK CASES, if DeRose knows 
that the bank opens on Saturday, he is justified in going to the bank on Saturday. In AIRPORT, if 
Mary and John know that the plane stops in Chicago, they are justified in taking the train. 
Actionability is also a tool for evaluating actions: if K knows that p, one could have criticized K 
if K had not acted as if p. In the BANK CASES, one could have said, if DeRose knew that the 
bank opens on Saturday, he should not have waited in the long lines on Friday. In the AIRPORT 
CASES, if Mary and John knew that the plane stopped in Chicago, they should have taken the 
plane. 
As a way of illustration, I propose a stakes-shifting case for legal contexts applying the 
Certainty-Actionability principle. 
BARGAINING LOW 
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Smith apparently belongs to a criminal organization doing different types of 
electronic fraud, and he was charged for aggravated identity theft, which is the 
use of stolen identity to commit crimes. The prosecutors of this case thought that 
the evidence for the accusation was solid, and, consequently, they wanted to plea 
bargain. They offered Smith a five-year sentence, accompanied by a threat: If he 
were to refuse the plea, he would be charged with life in prison. After this bargain 
offer, and before saying anything to the prosecutors, Smith talked in private to his 
attorney. The latter assured that it was a tempting offer, but Smith replied saying 
“I believe the bargain is unfair because if I do not accept it, I will spend all my 
life in prison. I do not have a real alternative here.” Additionally, he states, “I 
know that the prosecutors do not have strong evidence against me.” He was 
confident about the technology his mob was using in their criminal activities and 
the loyalty of his accomplices. With this in mind, and with the approval of his 
attorney, Smith rejected the five-year plea offer, despite the threat.  
BARGAINING HIGH 
Smith is in the same legal predicament, and he is offered the same plea bargain as 
in BARGAINIG LOW, but now the conversation with his attorney goes along the 
following lines. The lawyer assures that it is a good offer, but Smith replied 
saying, “I believe the bargain is unfair because if I do not accept it, I will spend 
all my life in prison. I do not have a real alternative here.” His lawyer responds: “I 
understand the bargain seems unfair and maybe it is, but that is better than the risk 
of being condemned. Are you sure there are not undercover agents in your 
group?” After a moment of silence, Matthew recognizes: “No, I cannot assure you 
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of that. I better accept the bargain for I do not know whether the prosecutors have 
strong evidence against me.” 
If Fallibilism is true, then it is right to attribute knowledge to Smith in BARGAINING LOW, 
though he lacks absolute certainty for the proposition: “I know that the prosecutors do not have 
strong evidence against me.” This presumptive knowledge is actionable to Smith. That is to say, 
it justifies him in rejecting the bargain offered by the prosecutors and taking the risk of going to 
trial. In BARGAINING HIGH, Smith’s attorney raises the epistemic standard, demanding that 
Smith rule out the possibility of undercover agents being within his mob. Given that Smith is 
unable to squelch this possibility, it is wrong to say that he knows that the prosecutors do not 
have strong evidence against him. Therefore, this supposed belief is not actionable for him. 
ECsts would claim that changes in Actionability are due to the contexts of utterance of 
the respective knowledge attribution. Specifically, Cohen would claim that Smith’s self-
attribution of knowledge is correct if there are not error possibilities salient to Smith. That is the 
case in BARGAINING LOW where the proposition, “I know that the prosecutors do not have 
strong evidence against me,” is true. In BARGAINING HIGH, differently, the possibility of 
being undercover agents in Smith’s mob is a salient source of error to Smith. Consequently, his 
self-knowledge attribution is false. This would be confirmed by DeRose who comparing 
BARGAINING LOW and HIGH, would have said: “If [the possibility of being undercover 
agents in Smith’s group] has been mentioned, [he] cannot truly claim to know, unless [he] can 
rule out [that] possibility” (1992, p. 915). 
Let me return to the argument-from-instances strategy to verify that my BARGAINING 
cases are correctly designed. DeRose proposes a list of “ingredients” making a good pair of 
stake-shifting cases (2009, p. 54). First, the practical situation in LOW should be in fact low, and 
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the practical situation in HIGH is supposed to be clearly high. When these stages are not 
unmistakably differentiated, the knowledge attribution’s verification conditions (i.e., the 
conditions making a knowledge attribution true or false) become confusing and, therefore, 
inapplicable (p. 55). Second, the stakes-shifting case under consideration should not include 
skeptical possibilities because a skeptic’s hyperbolic doubts go far beyond non-philosophical 
intuitions of knowledge, and the goal of stake-shifting cases is to clarify such intuitions (p. 56). 
Finally, good stakes-shifting cases avoid any dispute among their conversational characters with 
regards to the proposition allegedly known. The reason for this is that disagreements about 
knowledge possession and knowledge attributions pose different issues that deserve a thorough 
and differentiated analysis (p. 57). I believe my BARGAINING CASES include these 
ingredients. First, the situation of Smith in LOW is lower than the one in HIGH. The difference 
of epistemic standards included in one situation and the other comes from the attorney’s 
interventions. When he/she introduces the possibility of undercover agents being in Smith’s mob, 
he/she raises the epistemic standards making it HIGH rather than LOW. Second, clearly in 
BARGAINING HIGH, there is not a skeptical possibility included, for it is possible to know in 
this context. Finally, even though there is a disagreement between Smith and his attorney about 
whether to accept the bargain offer or not, this dispute does not verse on the proposition 
allegedly known, which is the limitation imposed on good stake-shifting cases. If my analysis is 
right, then CS seems to be justified. 
 
4. Is the Contextualist Suggestion Right? 
Despite its initial plausibility, Sutton proposes a counter-example for CS:  
EVERYONE KNOWS 
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In a trial, the cops can know that the accused is guilty. The judge can know it. The 
jury can know it. Everyone within and without the courtroom can know it. And 
yet a conviction cannot be secured since knowledge, however widespread, does 
not entail that legal standards of proof [contextually invariant in the relevant 
sense] can be met. (2007, p. 83) 
Broadly speaking, in criminal proceedings a conviction is a verdict consequent on finding a 
defendant guilty of a crime. The opposite of a conviction is an acquittal. To find a defendant 
guilty, the fact-finder is expected to know the facts constituting the action legally classified as a 
crime. The achievement of this epistemic task is conditioned to epistemic thresholds, or 
standards of proof, imposed by legal proceedings on legal agents. These standards are invariant 
in the sense that they do not change with the contexts of attribution. Rather, they have to be 
satisfied by the putative knower disregarding the attributor’s epistemic standards. In 
EVERYONE KNOWS, the standard of proof to be satisfied is beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Explicitly, maybe everyone within and without the courtroom believe that the accused is guilty, 
but if the jury does not find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not satisfy the 
epistemic standard required for knowledge, and conviction does not proceed. 
If EVERYONE KNOWS is right, courtroom proceedings do not provide a context that 
shows the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascription truth-conditions, as CS states. To be sure, 
ECsts claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary according to the legal 
context of utterance the attributor is immersed in. If this were right, the contexts of attribution 
would be sufficient for securing a conviction, but that is not the case. In EVERYONE KNOWS, 
there is not salience of error possibilities to the cops, the judge, the jury or everyone within and 
out of the courtroom, and the possibilities raising the practical stakes, if there are any, are already 
ruled out—otherwise, it could not be possible to state that they know that the accused is guilty. 
Therefore, they could properly anticipate a conviction. Yet, none of these legal agents can do so 
until the invariable epistemic standard for conviction is satisfied. Consequently, knowledge 
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attributions in legal contexts do not depend on the contexts of utterance, as it is stated by EC, but 
on the satisfaction of the invariant epistemic standards of proof.  
Let me confirm these ideas with a different standard of proof: Reasonable Suspicion. This 
standard was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio (1968). Prima facie, it is recognized that being 
stopped and frisked by the police violates human dignity because it is humiliating, degrading and 
stigmatizing. However, when an officer believes that his life could be at risk because an 
individual is armed and dangerous, it seems that stopping and frisking is reasonable. The 
standard of reasonable suspicion balances these demands imposing the burden of proving reasons 
for his/her belief that the individual to be stopped and frisked is armed and dangerous on the 
officer stopping and frisking. In other words, the mere belief that there is an armed and 
dangerous individual, even if it is true, is not enough for officers to violate human dignity. Such 
belief has to be justified, and it cannot be the product of a mere guess. In the court’s words, “due 
weight must be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ 
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.” 
 If my interpretation of EVERYONE KNOWS is right, in legal contexts, one cannot 
properly state that an official knows that an individual is armed and dangerous unless the former 
satisfied the invariable epistemic standard of reasonable suspicion. This is right even if for a 
knowledge attributor, the officer knows that an individual is armed and dangerous. Let me 
illustrate this idea with the following real-life-case adapted by Craig Lerner (2006) to show how 
well prepared police officers should be in order to face a cross-examination: 
HUNCH? 
While driving home at 3:00 a.m. on a deserted gravel road, Officer Heath saw a 
Saab that he did not recognize as belonging to anyone in the neighborhood. 
Lacking a front license plate, the car piqued his curiosity, and Officer Heath 
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pulled it over. Alas, the officer's premonition that something was amiss turned out 
to be correct, and the car thieves tried to flee on foot as soon as the car stopped. 
Here, however, was the cross-examination at the suppression hearing: 
Q. It was basically your belief that no cars should be on Route 66 at that 
time in the morning that prompted the stop; is that correct? 
A. I felt it was very ... unusual ... . 
Q. But there is nothing in particular about that unusualness that would tie 
... this particular car to any particular crime? 
A. No ... 
Q. So, more or less, it was just a hunch that you had? 
A. Well, if that's the way you want to put it, yes. 
The court, of course, cast the defendant free, but not before a mocking reference 
to the police officer’s “suspicion.” 
One wonders if the prosecutor took Officer Heath aside after the hearing and gave 
him a quick lesson in Testifying 101: Never allow a defense attorney to put words 
in your mouth. You never pull someone over on just a hunch. The correct answer, 
of course, was: 
A. Hunch? No, I wouldn’t call it that, sir. I would say there were a 
number of objective factors which, viewed in their totality through my 
experienced eyes, rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. (422-423) 
In HUNCH?, the putative knower is the police officer and the knowledge attributors are, from a 
third-person perspective, the court, the prosecutor and the defendant, and, from a first-person 
perspective, the police officer himself. Remember that “legal deliberations are not private beliefs 
but public judgments” (Goldman, 1999, p. 272). Consequently, Officer Heath was supposed to 
publicly justify his belief that the defendant’s car was suspicious. Everyone in the courtroom 
could have properly attributed knowledge to the officer: the defendant “tried to flee on foot as 
soon as the car stopped,” the court mocked “the police officer’s ‘suspicion’,” and the prosecutor 
could have taken “Officer Heath aside after the hearing and given him a quick lesson in 
Testifying 101.” However, the officer did not satisfy the invariant epistemic standard for his 
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belief to be a reasonable suspicion. Instead, it was a mere hunch, and in legal proceedings mere 
hunches do not satisfy epistemic standards. Therefore, HUNCH? also confirms that CS is wrong. 
 
Does EVERYONE KNOWS also undermine SSI? To clarify, EVERYONE KNOWS is 
not designed to criticize SSI. However, given that it is designed to object to the idea that 
knowledge attributions are sensitive to contexts, and since SSI argues for such sensitivity, one 
may wonder if EVERYONE KNOWS also applies to SSI. Remember that SSI places the factors 
allowing for the consistency of stakes-shifting cases in the putative knower and not in the context 
of the attributor, as it is suggested by EC. According to Stanley (2005), a presumptive knower 
(K) knows that p if two joint conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the question of whether p is a 
serious practical question for K. Secondly, K has evidence that reduces the probability of the 
negation of p to a sufficiently low level. In EVERYONE KNOWS, p is “the accused is guilty” 
and K is the fact-finder. The question of whether the accused is guilty is a serious practical 
question for the fact-finder because, by definition, this legal agent has to render a verdict based 
on his/her knowledge of the facts under litigation. Additionally, in EVERYONE KNOWS, the 
fact-finder is described as knowing that the accused is guilty. Therefore, ex hypothesi, the finder 
has reduced the probability of negation of the accused to be guilty. But once again, this does not 
secure a conviction because the standards of proof are not mentined. This result is appreciated 
with more clarity in HUNCH?. There, p is “the defendant’s car was suspicious” and K is Officer 
Heath. The question of whether the defendant’s car was suspicious is relevant for the officer, and 
when the defendant “tried to flee on foot as soon as the car stopped,” the possibility of p to be 
false was substantially reduced. Therefore, knowledge attributions in legal contexts do not 
depend on the reduction of error possibilities for the presumptive knower, as it would be stated 
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by SSI.  
 
5. Agendivism 
So far, I have shown that neither EC nor SSI provide an accurate theory of knowledge 
attribution for legal contexts. In this section, I am going to propose such an account. My working 
hypothesis is that A correctly asserts that K knows that p when K properly closes or advances 
his/her cognitive agenda. Deploying this idea, first, I am going to introduce the most important 
concepts of my agendivism. Then, I will propose an agendival interpretation of the most 
important stakes-shifting cases, namely, AIRPORT and BANK CASES. Finally, I will propose a 
theory of knowledge attribution for legal contexts and a response for EVERYONE KNOWS. 
The conceptual background of my account comes from the notions of agent and agenda. I 
will use some information inferred from JONES to illustrate these ideas. An agent is an entity 
doing something. Agents can be individuals such as Smith, the MD candidate, or groups such as 
the committee evaluating him. Agendas are plans of action agents are disposed to close or 
advance, for instance, Smith’s plan of getting an MD degree. This agenda depends on sub-
agendas like Smith’s completion of a determined amount of course-work, having a specific 
GPA, or passing the United States Medical Licensing Examination. In this sense, “[a]n agenda is 
something like a network of tasks or programmes to be discharged” (Gabbay & Woods, 2003, p. 
182). Agendas and sub-agendas have conditions of closure determining both the actions an agent 
is expected to perform in order to achieve his/her objective, and the time range in which he/she 
should do it. For instance, students enrolled in an MD program are expected to conform to a set 
of conditions in order to earn their degrees. An agenda in course is properly closed when agents 
deploy their resources in such a way that its conditions of closure are obtained, but agendas are 
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not closed simpliciter. Instead, the agent’s matching of the conditions of resolution comes in 
degrees. An agenda in course is properly advanced when some of its closure conditions have 
been obtained, but not all of them yet (Gabbay & Woods, 2003, p. 215). 
“An agenda may involve things an agent desires to know, or would find it useful to know 
for the transaction of certain tasks, or the making of certain decisions in some contextually 
circumscribed circumstances or states of affairs he is disposed to realized” (Gabbay & Woods, 
2003, p. 183). I refer to this as cognitive agendas. A cognitive agenda is, then, a set of questions 
that a cognitive agent wants, or needs, to answer for the achievement of his/her objectives. 
Agents pursue cognitive agendas for the sake of knowledge just as Salk’s research team 
understanding polio, or as sub-agendas enable them to achieve other purposes in the same way as 
Smith knowing about polio to getting his MD degree. Theories of epistemic risk claim that it is 
possible to differentiate between two types of cognitive agents in accordance with their attitude 
toward epistemic risk taking (Levi, 1962; Fallis, 2007; Riggs, 2008; Mathiesen, 2011). Whereas 
some agents withhold the acceptance of a proposition until all the information has been obtained, 
other agents act with less caution and accept propositions with incomplete information. Theories 
of epistemic risk claim that agents accept propositions with incomplete information because of 
practical reasons. Think of Smith’s Resident Medical Officer teaching him how to deal with 
clinical emergencies on behalf of admitting consultants in juxtaposition to his professor of 
biochemistry studying the biochemistry of bacteria resistant to penicillin. Although both the 
Resident Medical Officer and the biochemistry researcher want a true answer for their inquires, 
the latter, but not the former, can withhold it until all the information has been collected. 
Cognitive agents adopting cognitive agendas for the sake of the achievement of a practical goal 
are practical doxastic agents. Theoretical agents, differently, pursue cognitive agendas when it 
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leads to “the truth and nothing but the truth.” Cognitive agents have to use their cognitive 
resources (i.e., time, information and computational capacity) trying to close or advance their 
agendas in course. While practical doxastic agents “perform their cognitive tasks on the basis of 
less information and less time than they might otherwise like to have,” theoretical agents “can 
wait long enough to make a try for total information, and they can run the calculations that close 
their agendas both powerfully and precisely” (Gabbay and Woods, 2005, pp. 11-12).  
From my perspective, knowledge attributions have the purpose of stating that a cognitive 
agenda has been properly closed. Given that the object of knowledge attributions is cognitive 
agendas, the conditions under which knowledge is properly attributed depends on the nature of 
the cognitive agenda claimed to have been properly closed or advanced. For example, in JONES, 
the cognitive agendas under account are, first, Jones’s belief that polio is caused by a virus in 
advancing the agenda of an everyday conversation and, second, Smith’s belief that polio is 
caused by a virus in advancing the agenda of passing an MD exam. While Jones’s belief that 
polio is caused by a virus due to the fact that he remembers the newspaper reporting that Salk 
said it is enough for advancing the agenda on a everyday conversation, it is not enough for the 
more demanding agenda of passing an MD exam. From my perspective, the changes in 
knowledge attribution between propositions (1) and (2), above, are not due to the changes in 
practical stakes or the salience of error possibilities. Instead, they are caused by the conditions of 
closure of the cognitive agendas involved. In JONES, the MD candidate’s agenda has conditions 
of closure which are more stringent than the ones of an everyday conversation. 
If my intuitions are right, I might be able to confirm them in the main stakes-shifting 
cases. Firstly, in BANK CASES, DeRose correctly states that he knows that the bank opens on 
Saturday in LOW, but not in HIGH because the agenda for which that information is important, 
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can be successfully closed in LOW, but not in HIGH. Remember that an agenda is a list of 
interconnected activities an agent is supposed to perform in the achievement of his/her 
objectives. While LOW’s main agenda is, ex hypothesi, to deposit some paychecks, HIGH’s is to 
honor some economical obligations via depositing some paycheck. Also, recall that cognitive 
agendas are questions whose answers provide information for the successful closure of 
advancing of other agendas. In LOW, the way in which DeRose answers the question of whether 
the bank is opened on Saturday allows for the advancing of the agenda of depositing their 
paycheck because that activity can be performed either on Friday, Saturday, or any other day of 
the week. In HIGH, differently, DeRose’s answer to the question of whether the bank is opened 
on Saturday is unsatisfactory because the agenda for which that information is relevant cannot be 
properly advanced with it: if the paychecks are not deposited by Saturday, their economical 
obligations will not be satisfied. Secondly, in AIRPORT, Mary and John properly state that 
Smith does not know that the itinerary stops in Chicago because with that information they 
cannot close the agenda for which that information is important: to arrive in time to their meeting 
in Chicago. Unfortunately, Smith’s main agenda is not specified because AIRPORT does not 
give us any information about his plans of action. Adopting a charitable interpretation, I assume 
that if there is not an extra agenda to be fulfilled, Smith’s agenda is satisfied with the itinerary 
information. If this is right, it is correct for Smith to state that he knows that the train stops in 
Chicago. This interpretation is confirmed by Fantl and McGrath’s TRAIN CASES, which 
according to them, is an improved version of AIRPORT (2002, p. 68). In TRAIN CASE LOW, 
the main character is going to see friends during a relaxing vacation. Given that the description 
of this agenda implies that there are not time constraints, the main character properly states that 
the guy sitting by him/her knows that the train stops in Foxboro, his/her destination. 
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If my ideas are right, knowledge attributions in legal contexts depend on the nature of the 
cognitive agenda under account. To be sure, legal proceedings impose cognitive agendas on its 
participants depending upon the activities they have to perform in each procedural stage. These 
agendas include closure conditions for the required actions. When such standards are not met, 
knowledge attributions are not justified. In THELMA AND LOUISE, for instance, when Louise 
is with the police, it is not correct to state that she knows that John was in the office because that 
presumptive knowledge does not meet the conditions of resolution of the criminal investigation 
in course. Practically, when the police ask Louise if she would be able to testify confirming that 
John was in his office, Louise’s negative response is due to the requirement of witnesses to 
testify what they saw. These are Louise’s words: “I never saw him. I could testify that I saw his 
hat hanging in the hall, which is a very reliable sign that he’s at work” (DeRose, 2009, p. 5). 
Given the closure conditions of the cognitive agenda in course, Louise is able to testify that 
John’s hat was hanging in his office hall. From this observation, Louise could have inferred that 
John was in the office, but the closure conditions of the epistemic agenda in course restricts the 
formation of doxastic states to perception and explicitly exclude the use of inference as a 
cognitive process. Similarly, in BARGAIN HIGH, it is not proper to state that Smith knows that 
the prosecutor does not have strong evidence against him because he cannot rule out the 
possibilities decreasing his chances of being acquitted at trial, which is his ultimate agenda. In 
EVERYONE KNOWS, the cops know that the accused is guilty because, for example, they 
caught the accused red-handed. The judge knows that the accused is guilty because, given her 
previous experience, she knows the accused has a criminal record, leading her to infer so. The 
jury knows the accused is guilty because they found the prosecutor’s opening statements strongly 
compelling. Finally, “[e]veryone within and without the courtroom” knows the accused is guilty 
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because before the law enforcement officials took the accused into custody, there was a police 
persecution that was broadcasted on prime-time national TV. Even with all of this alleged 
knowledge, conviction is not secure because the closure conditions of conviction demand the 
trier of facts to find the facts under litigation beyond a reasonable doubt. This confirms that 
knowledge attributions in legal contexts depend on the closure conditions of cognitive agendas 
they impose in legal agents and not on their context of utterance, as it is stated by CS. 
I want to conclude this chapter making explicit the position my theory adopts in the 
debate between TTK, EC and SSI. My view is invariantist in the sense that it denies EC. In other 
words, I do not believe that knowledge attributions change with the attributor’s context. Yet, I 
am not a SSIst, because I do not think knowledge ascriptions change with the knower’s context 
either. From my perspective, knowledge attributions depend on the cognitive agenda the subject 
of the attribution is disposed to close or advance. This does not make me a Strict Invariantist, 
because I do not believe there is only one standard of knowledge for all cognitive agents and it is 
high. Instead, I believe epistemic standards are part of the closure conditions of the cognitive 
agendas to be closed or advanced. Remember the ways in which standards of proof work in legal 
proceedings: they impose different epistemic standards on legal agents depending on the agenda 
they want to close or advance. If the goal is to stop and frisk an assumed armed and dangerous 
individual, the standard of reasonable suspicion should be satisfied. If the goal is to convict 
someone for a crime, the standard in beyond a reasonable doubt has to be fulfilled. 
Maybe this is a type of contextualism but, borrowing MacFarlane’s expression (2005a), 
“not at all the usual kind” (p. 26). Before labeling my view, I want to clarify my concept of 
context. From an agendivistic perspective, context is a general structure where converge specific 
roles and idealized behaviors that are bound by specific purposes. In it, socio-historic 
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expectations are set for their participants. Consequently, a context is goal-oriented and imposes 
specific agendas, or plans of action, to the agents intervening in it.4 For example, legal 
proceedings are understood as context because in them, specific roles converge such as criminal 
investigator, prosecutor, defendant, juror, jury, judge, and the like. Agents performing each of 
these roles have specific goals and they are supposed to behave according to specific social 
expectations. A prosecutor at trial is expected to justify that a defendant is guilty, and a jury is 
expected to hear the evidence presented by the parties and render a verdict. Now, an agent is said 
to be in a context when, in a specific situation, and according to his/her interests and capabilities, 
he/she adopts a stipulated role and commands his/her resources in order to achieve the assigned 
objective. Officer Heath in HUNCH? is a good example of an agent adopting the role of a police 
officer. The actions to be performed in a context are properly executed if they fulfill the 
standards stipulated in the respective agenda. Since my view is that A correctly asserts that K 
knows that p when K properly closes or advances his/her cognitive agenda, then, from my 
perspective, context changes truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions by imposing different 
agendas. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Notice that this does not make me an ECst because for this view a “context” is a circumstance 
of utterance of a knowledge attribution.  
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Chapter 2: Knowledge Attributions and the Advancing of Cognitive Agendas 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to explore the role that knowledge attributions play in our 
cognitive economies. The most important antecedent of this issue is found in Edward Craig’s 
Knowledge in the State of Nature. In this book, he claims that the purpose of knowledge 
attributions is to flag approved informants (Craig, 1990, p. 11). This has been the inspiration of 
prominent contemporary philosophical projects. For instance, John Greco, arguing for his virtue 
epistemology, claims that the concept of knowledge is valuable because of the role it plays “in 
the lives of information-using and information-sharing being as ourselves” (2011, p. 91). Duncan 
Pritchard (2010), using Craig’s ideas to justify his anti-luck epistemology, claims that “the 
central importance of the concept of knowledge resides in the practical need to pick-out reliable 
informants—informants that one can rely on” (p. 62). Similarly, Ram Neta expands Craig’s view 
suggesting “to generalize [it] by claiming that the various terms of epistemological appraisal are 
designed to flag informants that are creditable to various levels, or in various ways. (2006, p. 
267). Craig’s account and his legacy, however, have been recently criticized with several 
counter-examples and alternative theories. Practically, it is argued that it is possible to find 
knowledge attributions without approved informants, and approved informants without 
knowledge attributions. Two main alternative views account for these counter-examples. On one 
hand, Jennifer Lackey proposes that the function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag 
reliable sources of information (2012, p. 246). On the other, Christoph Kelp states that the 
function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag adequately terminated inquiry (2011, p. 
63). 
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 In this chapter, I am going to reconstruct this debate more thoroughly and propose an 
agendivistic account for the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies. As I 
am going to explain below, one of the components of Craig’s method is to adopt an ordinary 
situation and formulate a hypothesis of what the concept of knowledge would do for us in that 
situation (1990, p. 2). Borrowing this idea, I will adopt inquiry in criminal investigations as my 
field of exploration. To be sure, inquiry is the main activity of the procedural stage of 
investigation. The goal of an agent (A) while inquiring is to come to know whether or not p. 
Achieving this objective, A looks for the information useful to advance from his/her preliminary 
clues to the knowledge of p. One of the most important sources of information here is the claims 
of eyewitnesses and other informants. A attributes knowledge to those putative knowers when 
they provide information allowing A to advance or close his/her inquiry. If these general remarks 
are correct, I would be able to account for the function of knowledge attributions in an 
agendivistic way: the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag relevant 
information to close or advance an epistemic agenda. Since this agendivistic account is the main 
goal of this chapter, I will proceed as follows. First, I will present Craig’s methodology and 
theory. Then, Lackey and Kelp’s counter-examples and alternative accounts will be formulated. 
This debate will provide the contextual background for the agendivistic view that I will propose 
in the final part of this chapter. 
 
2. The Approved Informant Account of Knowledge Attributions 
As I interpret it, the main objective of Knowledge and the State of Nature is to provide an 
explanation for the concept of knowledge and the practice of knowledge attributions without 
using the “standard approach” of specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for each of 
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them. In his words, “We are asking not so much: when is the ascription of a certain concept 
correct, but rather, why is it applied?” (Craig, 1990, p. 14). Two reasons justify this alternative 
approach. For one thing, the standard approach has theoretical issues exposed, for instance, by 
skepticism and Gettier-type problems, and “if the standard approach runs into difficulties—and 
the work of the last twenty-five years makes it apparent that it does—it is surely worthwhile to 
try to think of another [approach]” (p. 1). For the other, even if the standard approach were a 
successful project “so that agreed necessary and sufficient conditions for the ascription of 
knowledge were now on the table,” there is another issue worth exploring: “why has a concept 
demarcated by those conditions enjoyed such widespread use?” (p. 2). According to Craig, the 
ubiquitous use of “to know”, and all its word forms, shows that this expression serves some 
purpose in our lives. The problem is to know which one and how. 
I interpret Craig’s alternative methodology as a state of nature etiology of the concept of 
knowledge. For the etiological component of his project, he differentiates the concept of 
“knowledge” from concepts such as “water” which is bound by the nature of water itself and our 
perceptions of it. “Knowledge,” differently, was created in response to certain needs, and is used 
to pursue certain objectives (p. 3). This is why Aristotle’s method of understanding of the origins 
of an object to clarify its developed form is a fundamental part of Craig’s methodology (Craig, 
1990, p. 8). Practically, the concept of knowledge as we use it today is clarified by the study of 
its origins. Furthermore, Craig understands himself as belonging to the same group of 
“naturalist” philosophers such as Hobbes and Hume: “We are attempting a ‘state of nature’ 
explanation of a number of facts of conceptual or linguistic practice. Such explanations work by 
identifying certain human needs and arguing that the practices are a necessary (or at the least a 
highly appropriate) response to them” (p. 89). This “‘state of nature explanation” has as its 
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explanandum human practices and institutions, and as its explanans human needs. The idea is 
that human practices and institutions are an appropriate response to specific needs. In Craig’s 
project, the concept of knowledge and the practice of knowledge attribution are explained by the 
need of getting accurate information allowing humans to achieve their goals. 
For his state of nature explanation, Craig specifies three steps: 
Instead of beginning with ordinary usage, we begin with an ordinary situation. We 
take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge 
does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having 
that role would be like, what conditions would govern its application. (p. 2) 
First, he selects an ordinary situation as a field of epistemological exploration. In the second step, 
he hypothesizes about the function of knowledge and knowledge attributions within the selected 
situation. Finally, he specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of 
knowledge and the practice of knowledge attributions.  
Selecting an ordinary situation, Craig, adopting a state of nature strategy, invites us to 
imagine a group of beings, our imaginary ancestors, who are identical to us in all cognitive 
aspects, but they do not have a concept of knowledge yet. These imaginary cognitive agents, like 
us, have different needs and desires to be satisfied in order to survive. Consequently, they have 
to act in favor of their contentment. To illustrate, the need for food demands from our ancestors 
to develop reliable mechanisms of identification and acquisition of this precious item. Using a 
more detailed description of Craig’s: 
The creature must distinguish between food, here, now, provided it makes the 
right movement, and food here, soon, provided it waits very quietly for a bit and 
then makes the right movement. It must distinguish these from food, there, soon, 
provided it can get there; and cases in which it can get there from ones in which it 
cannot. Helpful again, as life grows more varied, will be the capacity to 
distinguish cases in which it simply cannot get there from those in which it cannot 
get there because of some temporary hindrance, either in the environment or in 
itself. (p. 81) 
In this thought experiment, our imaginary ancestors do not know that this thing is food yet. 
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Rather, they are inquirers wondering whether this thing is food or not. For this inquiry, the 
information received is fundamental because it would lead our ancestors to the satisfaction of 
their needs. Two sources of information are important for Craig. Our ancestors, like us, are 
equipped with cognitive capacities such as perception, memory and reasoning. Even though this 
natural equipment is a fundamental source of information, it would also be useful if they can be 
informants for each other. Consequently, a second source of information is the claims that our 
ancestors communicate to each other. To illustrate, one of our ancestors could identify food 
given his perception of an apparent item of food, the memory of eating something similar to the 
thing he/she is perceiving, and the inductive reasoning relating the food remembered with the 
apparent piece of food perceived. Granted this is true, but another useful source of information 
could be a second ancestor who reveals to the first that this thing is edible. 
What is the function of the concept of knowledge in this scenario? Moving to the second 
stage of his methodology, Craig answers in the following terms: 
So any community may be presumed to have an interest in evaluating sources of 
information; and in connection with that interest, certain concepts will be in use. 
The hypothesis I wish to try out is that the concept of knowledge is one of them. 
To put it briefly and roughly, the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved 
sources of information. (p. 11) 
The concept of knowledge, as it is hypothesized in this quote, only applies to one source of 
information, namely, to informants. To be sure, Craig differentiates between two sources of 
information, namely, informants and states of affairs. While with the former the inquirer obtains 
the information that p because someone tells him/her so, in the latter the inquirer extracts the 
information that p from the world. However, Craig points out, “[w]e don't speak, even 
metaphorically, of a tree as knowing how old it is; and if Fred enters dripping wet, although he 
may well know that it is raining, we don’t say that he knows it just because we can tell it by 
looking at him” (p. 35). Taking this qualification into account, I propose to reformulate Craig’s 
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hypothesis making it explicit that in it he refers to informants and not to any other source of 
information: 
The concept of knowledge is used to flag approved informants. 
How do we use the concept of knowledge to flag approved informants? Let me spell out this re-
formulated hypothesis with a case by Craig. 
ONE DAY LATE 
Fred is, as I am aware, systematically wrong about what day of the week it is: he 
is always a day behind. Now I can certainly find out which day it is by asking 
him: if he says Thursday, I can rely on its being Friday, and so on. But Fred 
neither knows what day it is, nor is he a good informant; for he does not tell us, or 
even believe, that it is Friday. (p. 37) 
This case shows that even though one can obtain information from Fred, one would not flag him 
as an approved informant. The reason for this reluctance in flagging is that Fred does not know 
which day of the week is today. This matters because, as I explained above, for Craig there is a 
non-trivial distinction between informants and sources of information. Even though Fred is a 
good source of information, he is not an informant. If this is right, then we attribute knowledge to 
informants when we want to approve them. From this interpretation, I infer the Approved 
Informant Account for the function of knowledge attributions (AI). 
AI: The function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag approved 
informants. 
The final step of Craig’s project is to specify the conditions for flagging approved 
informants (i.e., for knowledge attributions). Without more preamble, such conditions are:  
(1) Either p and the informant believes that p, or not-p and the informant believes 
that not-p. (p. 11) 
(2) The informant should be accessible to the inquirer here and now. 
(3) The informant should be recognizable by the inquirer as someone likely to be 
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right about p. 
(4) The informant should be as likely to be right about p as the inquirer’s concerns 
require. 
(5) Channels of communication between the informant and the inquirer should be 
open. (p. 85) 
(1) is explained by the plausible idea that someone inquiring about whether or not p wants 
his/her informant to have the right answer for this question. That is, if p, the informant should 
believe that p. Additionally, according to Craig, an informant cannot say the truth about p if he 
does not believe that p (p. 12). Lastly, ONE DAY LATE also provides support for (1) because 
part of our reluctance to approve Fred as an informant is that he does not have the right belief 
about the question of what day is today. A second thing that an inquirer might want from his/her 
informant is to be available for consultation when the inquiry requires. This is why (2) imposes 
spatiotemporal constraints on the informant. (3) points out that it does not do any good for the 
inquirer if he/she is not able to recognize that the potential informant would provide the right 
information about p. (4) demands a tailor-made informant for the specific concerns of the 
inquirer. To clarify, according to Craig, inquirer’s concerns vary due to three main factors (pp. 
86-87). First, “the urgency of forming a belief as to whether p, in the inquirer's particular 
situation.” While for some inquiries the negative outcomes of not forming a belief force the 
inquirer to beg for an informant with urgency, other searches, such as the one advanced in 
Descartes’s Meditations, do not impose any time constraint. The second factor is “the relative 
pay-offs of being right and being wrong.” In some inquiries, to be wrong does not matter too 
much. Consequently, an informant with low reliability would supply the required information. 
The final factor is “[the inquirer’s] attitude to risk.” Some inquirers can make decisions with less 
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information than others, so, the type and amounts of informants vary according to the epistemic 
risk the inquirer is disposed to take. Finally, (5) demands proper ways of conveying information 
from the informant. 
Continuing with Craig’s etiology of the concept of knowledge, what we have so far is a 
bunch of individual inquirers wondering whether or not p, and a set of criteria for the 
identification of approved informants. Now, Craig invites us to imagine our ancestors forming a 
community of members that collaborate with each other. In this new scenario, the way in which 
our ancestors individually deal with the satisfaction of their needs should be “objectivized” in 
such a way that the successful fulfillment of a particular need should overcome the parochial 
circumstances of the agent whose need was satisfied and become a successful response for all the 
community members. Craig fleshes out the concept of “objectivization,” and explains why we 
have objectivized concepts with the following example: 
I may well be interested in “something which I can now sit on” (only close and 
accessible objects need apply). But in due course I shall be interested, since I 
anticipate wanting to sit down at future times, in objects which I could sit on if I 
wanted to, or in whether there will be something which I can sit on when I want to 
(at the end of the walk). This interest will naturally lead to an interest in hearing 
the opinions of others as to where there are objects which I can sit on if I want to, 
irrespective of whether they want to sit on them or not; so I shall want them to 
operate an objectivized concept too. And if I grow a little more altruistic in my 
outlook I may even be interested in whether there is something which Fred can sit 
on if he wants to, irrespective of whether I shall want to sit on anything or not. 
Hence the concept of something which is, in abstraction from what any particular 
person wants at any particular time or place, or even from whether anyone ever 
wants to sit down, simply suitable for sitting on. It may right now be out of reach, 
it may be upside down, it may be folded up in a cardboard box, perhaps no-one 
will ever want to sit on it anyway; but it is a chair I oversimplify, of course; there 
is more to the concept of a chair than that. (p. 84)  
The next step of Craig’s etiology, then, is to objectivize the concept of an approved 
informant in such a way that it does not depend on the particularities of specific inquirers, but 
becomes a useful concept for all the community. This is essential because, for Craig, “[t]he 
	   51 
concept of knowing … lies at the objectivized end of [this] process” (pp. 90-91). The issue is that 
given the subjective character of (2) – (5), reliable informants will not be recognized. To be sure, 
an informant could fail to satisfy (2) because he/she might not be “here” when the inquirer needs 
him/her. (3) is hard to satisfy given that different inquirers have different criteria for the 
recognition of an informant to be right. (4) makes the concept of a good informant arbitrary 
because it depends excessively on the variety of inquirers’ needs and particular situations. 
Finally, the channels of communication mentioned in (5) could be broken by particular 
circumstances such as when the informant and the inquirer speak different languages. 
How does the principle of objectivization transform conditions (1) to (5), then? Shortly, 
condition (1) remains the same, (4) is tightened, and (2), (3) and (5) are “diluted” (p. 90). To be 
sure, condition (1) remains the same because informants having true beliefs matters for a 
community disregarding the individual inquiries advanced by its members. (2), differently, is 
weakened because what matters in it is the accessibility of the informant and not if the informant 
and the inquirer share the same place and time. (3) is mitigated because its original formulation 
depends on an individual inquirer looking for something than he/she could recognize, ideally, 
without much effort. But, “what is effortlessly available to him then and there will not be a 
matter of public interest” (p. 90). Additionally, if an individual inquirer wants to receive some 
benefits from his/her community, he/she has to recognize that other inquirers have different 
methods of detection that could be better than his/her own. The more he/she uses the 
detectability powers of others, the weaker (3) will be. (4) is tightened because the inquirers’ 
individual concerns to which good informants have to accommodate should be adjusted to the 
general interest of having good informants available for a vast diversity of cognitive enterprises. 
It is worth mentioning here that (4)’s objectivization justifies strict invariantism because it 
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demands a concept of a good informant disregarding the inquirer’s context. To be sure, in 
Chapter 1, I defined strict invariantism as the view holding that epistemic standards are fixed 
(i.e., invariant) and high. Since (4)’s objectivization demands good informants for all sorts of 
inquiries, if standards for knowledge are low, the high profile cognitive enterprises, such as 
scientific research, are excluded. This is confirmed by the following quotes: 
All this is going to edge us towards the idea of someone who is a good informant 
as to whether p whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer, whatever 
rewards and penalties hang over him and whatever his attitude to them. That 
means someone with a very high degree of reliability, someone who is very likely 
to be right—for he must be acceptable even to a very demanding inquirer. (Craig, 
1990, p. 91) 
And, 
In saying that someone knows whether p, we are certifying him as an informant 
on that question, and we have no idea of the practical needs of the many people 
who may want to take him up on it; hence a practice develops of setting the 
standard very high, so that whatever turns, for them, on getting the truth about p, 
we need not fear reproach if they follow our recommendation. (p. 94) 
Finally, (5) should be objectivized because channels of communication cannot depend on 
particular circumstances of inquirers. If our ancestors form a community, as Craig imagines, they 
might engage in group action. In this case, “it is important to me that someone in the group holds 
a true belief as to whether p, and quite unimportant whether the route by which they acquired it 
would have been open to me or not” (p. 92).  
 
3. Knowledge Attributions Without Approved Informants, and Approved Informants 
Without Knowledge Attributions 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, although AI has been the inspiration of 
important contemporary epistemologies, it has also been the target of criticism. Specifically, 
some counter-examples against AI’s necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of 
	   53 
approved informants have been proposed. These counter-examples show, against AI, that it is 
possible to find cases of knowledge attributions without approved informants, and approved 
informants without knowledge attributions. These results are the main motivation for proposing 
alternative theories accounting for the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive 
economies. In this section, I will study the counter-examples and the accounts designed by Kelp 
(2011) and Lackey (2012). 
 
3.1 The Adequately Terminated Inquiry Account of Knowledge Attributions  
Kelp, in “What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?,” after thoroughly reconstructing 
Craig’s account for the function of knowledge attributions, remarks that there is some 
“recalcitrant data” that AI cannot explain (Kelp, 2011, p. 58). Such problematic data become 
explicit in two cases meant to defeat AI’s conditions (1) to (5). I will start presenting the case 
against (5). To recall, this condition stipulates that the channels of communication between the 
inquirer and the informant should be open. However, for Kelp, cases of professional secrecy as 
the ones required from some doctors, lawyers, accountants, and social workers pose a problem 
for this condition. Kelp instantiates this with the following case: 
SEAL OF CONFESSION 
Don Camillo is the priest at the local parish. The members of his parish, who are 
all devout believers, regularly come to Don Camillo to confess their sins. As an 
ordained priest, Don Camillo is bound by the seal of confession. That is to say, he 
must not divulge information about his confessors’ sins in any way or for any 
reason and cannot be forced to break this obligation even by the authorities. (p. 
59) 
According to Kelp, we will properly attribute knowledge to Don Camillo because he comes to 
know different facts about his confessors’ sins. However, he is not an approved informant, in 
Craig’s terms, because he “is committed to taking his knowledge of his confessors’ sins into his 
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grave.” In other words, his channels of communication are not open to any inquirer. To 
conclude, what SEAL OF CONFESSION is supposed to show is that there are cases of 
knowledge attributions without approved informants, and, therefore, AI is wrong. 
With a second case Kelp shows that there also could be cases in which there is an 
approved informant to whom it would be inappropriate to attribute knowledge. 
SECRET SECT 
Dick is a member of a secret sect and for that reason shares the sect’s belief that 
our planet is gradually warming. However, this belief is held not on the basis of 
scientific findings but is instead grounded in the sect’s belief (also shared by 
Dick) that global warming is the result of God’s decision to punish humanity for 
the fornicatory practices that in recent times have become so outrageously 
widespread among his once beloved sheep. Since the sect is secret, Dick is not 
allowed to assert its beliefs. For that reason, he has adopted a policy of asserting 
the relevant issues in accordance with what the experts in the field have to say. 
Fortunately, Dick is a government spokesman on environmental issues and thus 
particularly well acquainted with expert views on global warming. (p. 60) 
Dick satisfies (1) because he tells the truth about global warming and he believes that global 
warming is actually happening. Additionally, given Dick’s familiarity with questions such as 
climate and habitat, condition (4) is also satisfied Finally, provided his governmental position he 
is supposed to be available to attend inquiries about environmental issues, he is publically 
recognized as someone knowledgeable in these areas, and his channels of communication are 
always open. Therefore, he also meets conditions (2), (3) and (5). Even when Dick would be 
approved as an informant by AI, “Dick’s belief that global warming is happening is highly 
irrational, as it is held for reasons that only the raving mad would conceivably take to support it. 
In consequence, it does not qualify as knowledge” (p. 61). 
Claiming to account for the problems posed by SEAL OF CONFESSION and SECRET 
SECT, Kelp proposes an alternative view of the functions of knowledge attributions in our 
cognitive economies: the Adequately Terminated Inquiry Account (ATI). 
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ATI: The function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag “when agents 
may adequately terminate inquiry into a given question” (p. 62). 
Showing the virtues of ATI over AI, Kelp makes a parallel with Craig following his method of 
objectivization. Here, I am going to present some of the most important aspects of such 
juxtaposition. 
Kelp, unlike Craig, believes that our imaginary ancestors not only need to flag approved 
informants, but also “to evaluate various inquiries agents undertake” (p. 62). This second need, 
for Kelp, deals better with the problems posed by SEAL OF CONFESSION and SECRET SECT 
than the first one. To support this, he wonders “[w]hat properties would our ancestor want 
himself to have upon terminating inquiry?” To respond, Kelp specifies the conditions governing 
an adequately terminated inquiry. 
(6) He has formed a belief on whether p. 
(7) His belief on whether p is true 
(8) His belief on whether p stems from a source that is as trustworthy on the 
question whether p as his concerns require. (p. 62) 
Notice that (6) and (7) correspond to (1) in AI, which is the condition demanding a true belief. 
(8), respectively, has parallels with (4). To recall, 
(4) The informant should be as likely to be right about p as the informant’s 
concern requires. 
However, there is an important difference between (8) and (4): to demand from the source of 
information to be “trustworthy” instead of “being right about p” does not imply that such source 
knows that p. Finally, there is no trace of AI’s conditions (2), (3), (5) in ATI. These three 
conditions demand from the informant to be accessible, recognizable, and to have open channels 
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of communication. 
Kelp also imitates Craig reflecting on the principle of objectivization: 
Suppose … that agents in this community traffic in information in the way we do: 
agents can inquire on behalf of other agents or as members of groups and can 
enter the results of their inquiries into various databases, from which they may 
subsequently be retrieved by agents who have access to the databases. In such a 
community, the pressure towards objectivization of the concept of adequately 
terminated inquiry only increases. After all, what matters now are not only the 
concerns of the individual agent at the specific time of inquiry, but also the 
concerns of other agents and groups of agents, present and future, which may be 
very different than the ones of the inquiring agent at the time of inquiry. (p. 63) 
How does objectivization change conditions (6) – (8)? Conditions (6) and (7) remain the same 
because to form a true belief is relevant for future and present inquiries conducted by individuals 
or groups. Differently, (8) has to be tightened. For one thing, the element of trustworthiness 
could vary depending on the source of information and the inquirer. For the other, to join 
trustworthiness with the inquirer’s concerns includes as many possible variations as the ones that 
Craig pointed out when talking about the “urgency of forming a belief”, “the relative pay-offs of 
being right and being wrong,” and “[the] attitude to risk” different inquirers have (Craig, 1990, 
pp. 86-87). These reasons motivate Kelp to replace trustworthiness with reliability, obtaining “a 
very strong reliability condition on adequately terminated inquiry objectively construed,” in the 
following terms: 
(8)* “His belief stems from a highly reliable source” (Kelp, 2011, p. 62).    
SEAL OF CONFESSION does not represent a threat for ATI because, for this account, 
the fact that an agent does not convey pieces of information does not have anything to do with 
the issue of whether such agent have adequately terminated his/her inquiry. ATI also do well with 
SECRET SECT. Given that ATI does not demand from the sources if information to believe that 
what they are informing is true, but only to be reliable sources, one does not need to attribute 
knowledge to them, even though they are good informants. 
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3.2 The Reliable Information Account of Knowledge Attributions 
Lackey in “Group Knowledge Attributions” also proposes several counter-examples 
against AI. She characterized AI as a theory holding that “the purpose of knowledge attributions 
is to identify or flag informants who at least either believe that p when p is the case, or believe 
that not-p when not-p is the case” (2012, p. 247). However, she challenges this belief-
dependence account with the following case taken from her epistemology of testimony: 
CREATIONIST TEACHER 
Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, and her religious beliefs are 
grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she was a very young child. Part of 
this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief in 
the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, she fully recognizes that there is 
an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. 
Indeed, she readily admits that she is not basing her own commitment to 
creationism on evidence at all but, rather, on the personal faith that she has in an 
all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella does not think that religion is 
something that she should impose on those around her, and this is especially true 
with respect to her fourth-grade students. Instead, she regards her duty as a 
teacher to involve presenting material that is best supported by the available 
evidence, which clearly includes the truth of the evolutionary theory. As a result, 
after consulting reliable sources in the library and developing reliable lecture 
notes, Stella asserts to her students, “Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from 
Homo erectus,” while presenting her biology lesson today. Though Stella herself 
neither believes nor knows this proposition, she never shares her own personal 
faith-based views with her students, and so they form the corresponding true 
belief solely on the basis of her reliable testimony. (Lackey, 2008, p. 48) 
This case shows that AI’s condition (1) is wrong because it is the case that the “Modern-day 
Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,” but Stella does not believe it. However, Stella is an 
approved informant for her students, and she properly conveys that p. Then belief is not a 
necessary condition for being an approved informant, as Craig states (Lackey, 2013, p. 254). But, 
for Lackey, this is just a symptom showing that AI is wrong as a whole. Justifying this, she 
suggests another case: 
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DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION 
The UN Population Commission, which is comprised of forty-seven individual 
members, has a central office located in New York City in which all of the data 
gathered by the Commission members are stored. Each member of the group was 
responsible for collecting information about a different segment of the population, 
and their respective work was done entirely independently from one another. 
Sam, who is not a member of the UN Population Commission, was hired to 
interpret and compile all of the data contributed by the members of this group into 
a single document, which she completed but did not yet publish. Maria, who is an 
investigative journalist working for an independently owned newspaper, suspects 
that the Commission is radically underreporting the number of Latinos currently 
living in the US for political purposes, and so she breaks into the New York office 
to research the matter. Once inside, Maria interprets and compiles all of the data 
contributed by the members of this group into a single document just as Sam did 
and publishes it in the newspaper. One of the statements in this report is, “the 
birth rate of Latinos in the US is on the rise,” of which not a single member of the 
UN Population Commission is aware. (p. 261)  
In accordance with Lackey, in DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION, “we have a knowledge 
attribution without [an approved] informant, and [an approved] informant without a knowledge 
attribution” (p. 262). To be sure, in this case, the knowledge that “the birth rate of Latinos in the 
US is on the rise,” is attributed to the UN commission, but this institution is not an approved 
informant, “since not a single member of the group is privy to the relevant information” (p. 162). 
Maria, on the contrary, conveys the information that “the birth rate of Latinos in the US is on the 
rise,” but it would be wrong to attribute knowledge to her since “[s]he arrived at her conclusion 
in a way that is causally independent from Sam’s process, she is not a member of the UN 
Population Commission, she is not their official spokesperson, and she is not testifying on their 
behalf” (p. 261). Therefore, AI is wrong. 
With the results of this thought experiment in mind, Lackey creates the Reliable 
Information Account (RI) for the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies: 
RI: “The function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag reliable sources 
of information” (p. 263). 
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As it is easily inferred from this formulation, Lackey disagrees with Craig’s distinction between 
informants and sources of information. DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION justifies her view 
because even though Maria is considered an informant that “the birth rate of Latinos in the US is 
on the rise” for the public in general, the UN commission is a source of information for her and 
Sam. Yet, the UN commission is not an informant because none of its members have the belief 
that “the birth rate of Latinos in the US is on the rise.” By the same token, Stella, in 
CREATIONIST TEACHER, is a source of information, but not an informant, for her students 
because she does not believe that the “Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus.” 
 
4. The Advancing or Closing Agendas Account of Knowledge Attributions 
My disagreement with Craig is in the way he executes his methodological program. 
Remember that in Craig’s state-of-nature-explanation, the practice of knowledge attributions is 
the explanandum, and the human need of getting true beliefs about the surrounding environment 
is its explanans. The idea is that knowledge attributions are “highly appropriate responses” to the 
need of obtaining true beliefs. In his words, “[h]uman beings need true beliefs about their 
environment, beliefs that can serve to guide their actions to a successful outcome. That being so, 
they need sources of information that will lead them to believe truths” (Craig, 1990, p. 11). My 
contention is that Craig does not take into account the reason for which humans need “to believe 
truths,” and such explanation seems to be crucial for his project. To be sure, in the fragment just 
quoted, Craig correctly states that knowledge attributions respond to the need of having true 
beliefs, and that true beliefs matter because they “serve to guide their actions to a successful 
outcome.” However, Craig does not explain how knowledge attributions serve to guide human 
actions to a successful outcome. I submit that a theory of the function of knowledge attributions 
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in our cognitive economies should account for the ways in which knowledge attributions serve to 
guide our cognitive endeavors to a successful outcome. In the remaining part of this chapter, I 
am going to develop this intuition. 
I find some of the steps of Craig’s methodology useful for the task at hand, but I want to 
make some adjustments to them. To recall, Craig’s methodological route starts with the selection 
of an “ordinary situation” as a field to test different hypotheses about the function of the concept 
of knowledge and knowledge attributions. If a robust hypothesis is found, the study concludes 
with the determination of the conditions under which the concept of knowledge and knowledge 
attributions operate. So far so good, but I do not believe that a community of our imaginary 
ancestors in the terms described by Craig is an “ordinary” situation. Craig’s selection of such 
community is justifiable from his state of nature methodology. Given that I do not follow the 
state on nature tradition in this paper, I have freedom to select a case post-state of nature. There 
is one element that I want to maintain as close as possible to Craig’s methodology: I want the 
agents taking part in my field of experimentation to lack knowledge as well. Being loyal to the 
spirit of this work, I propose to use criminal investigation as a field of philosophical exploration. 
A possible objection to this methodological decision is that criminal investigation is not 
an “ordinary situation” either. Instead, this is an activity belonging to a specialized domain. This 
could lead me to a specialized concept of knowledge going against the main objective of this 
chapter: to account for the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies in 
general. This is my response. I understand criminal investigation as the activity of determining 
whether a crime was committed. In this sense, criminal investigations are a type of inquiry, and 
inquiry is general enough to serve my purposes. I do recognize that criminal investigations are 
executed through particular evidence-handling actions such as looking for evidence at the scene 
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of the crime, interviewing eyewitnesses or looking in police databases for criminal records. 
These activities are regulated by specific rules such as the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution. However, these are particular applications of the concept of 
criminal investigation in a particular legal system. Following Rawls’s (1955) differentiation 
between “justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it” (p. 3), I do not 
need to include these particular applications in my concept of criminal investigation, as I 
mentioned in the introduction of my dissertation. If this is right, the concept of criminal 
investigation I am going to develop here is general enough to lead me to the broad concept of 
knowledge required for the achievement of the main objective of this chapter. 
Moving to the second step, I want to maintain the elasticity that Craig attributes to the 
formulation of hypotheses. Using his words, the idea is “to illuminate [the actual practice of 
knowledge attributions] by showing that a concept with the hypothesized role would have 
characteristics closely resembling those that [they exhibit]” (Craig, 1990, p. 2). Then, the 
corroboration of my hypothesis requires not a detailed description, but an accurate resemblance 
to the object under account.1 Finally, I am not concluding with a list of conditions individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient, as Craig does it, because this is a method belonging to 
conceptual analysis, and here I am studying function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive 
economies. 
The central question of my view is: How do knowledge attributions serve to guide human 
actions to a successful outcome? To answer this question, I need an activity linking human 
actions with cognitive endeavors. I believe criminal investigation, as instantiations of the general 
epistemic project of inquiry, satisfy this requirement. Criminal investigations, as all types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This elasticity provides another reason for thinking that a general concept of criminal 
investigation, as a sort of inquiry, will do the job required in this chapter. 
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inquiries, are cognitive enterprises wondering whether p. Broadly speaking, in criminal 
investigations, p stands for an action catalogued as a crime for criminal law. Some of those 
actions are assault, drug possession, burglary, domestic violence, homicide, and so on. Criminal 
investigations are one of the sub-agendas of the prosecution in criminal cases. The ultimate 
agenda of a prosecution is to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant committed a 
crime. When the prosecution does not satisfy this burden, the innocence of the defendant is 
assumed. The goal of criminal investigations is to present a case to the prosecutor. This includes 
a cognitive agenda of determining whether a crime has been committed, and who did it. Such 
cognitive agenda is closed or advanced in two ways: either determining that there is good 
evidence of the occurrence of a crime, or determining that there is not good evidence for the 
occurrence of a crime. Criminal investigations involve different types of activities; to inquire is 
the main one, but criminal investigators also search for evidence, interview witnesses, conduct 
interrogations, collect and preserve legal evidence, and the like. The connection between 
knowledge and action in criminal investigations becomes clear by the fact that when an 
investigator comes to know that p, he/she stops performing all the actions related with the 
inquiry of whether p. 
Imagine a criminal investigator wondering whether p; how can this investigation finish in 
a successful outcome? Relevant information that is processed in the right way allows the 
criminal investigator to come to know p. There are two main sources of information in criminal 
investigations: state of affairs, or physical evidence, such as fingerprints, sound recordings, 
photographs, and so on, and the testimony of eyewitnesses and other collaborators. Let me focus 
on testimonial evidence. Testimonies are relevant when they provide information useful to 
advance the agenda of the criminal investigation. That is, they provide information useful to 
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determine that either there is good evidence for the hypothesis that a crime occurred, or there is 
not good evidence for such hypothesis. When this is the case, criminal investigators attribute 
knowledge to the eyewitness, victims and other collaborators. Consequently, the function of 
knowledge attributions in criminal investigation is to flag information useful to finish the 
investigation with a successful outcome. 
Now, I can formulate a more general view of the function of knowledge attributions: the 
Advancing or Closing Agendas Account (ACAA). 
ACAA: The function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag relevant 
information to close or advance an epistemic agenda. 
Given that epistemic agendas are aimed at knowledge, they are advanced or closed in response to 
relevant information. For instance, a criminal investigator receiving testimonies of victims and 
eyewitnesses providing details of the crime and descriptions of the perpetrator advances in 
his/her agenda because they confirm the hypothesis of that a criminal action occurred. If this is 
right, attributing knowledge is a way of saying that the information someone conveys leads to the 
advancing or closing of a cognitive agenda. Neither ATI nor RI explains the connection between 
knowledge attributions and successful, or frustrated, cognitive endeavors. However, from my 
perspective, a theory of the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies should 
be able to do so. Flagging an adequately terminated inquiry is important because that leads to 
knowledge, but ATI does not account for this fundamental relationship. By the same token, even 
though reliable information has epistemic value itself, a theory accounting for the function of 
knowledge attributions should be able to show that the information coming from a proper 
knowledge attribution is relevant within a cognitive enterprise. My account, unlike ATI nor RI, 
shows the specific connections between knowledge attributions and epistemic projects, or 
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Chapter 3: Testimony and Knowledge Attributions 
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of epistemologies of testimony is to evaluate the conditions under which a 
hearer acquires knowledge based on testimony. According to Greco (forthcoming), theories of 
testimony face two interrelated dilemmas: The Dilemma Reductionism vs. Antireductionism, and 
the Dilemma Transmission Vs. Generation. Firstly, the Dilemma Reductionism vs. 
Antireductionism comes from two responses to the problem of the epistemic status of testimony. 
(1) Reductionism: the epistemic status of testimony comes from other sources of 
knowledge such as memory, perception [or] inductive reasoning. 
(2) Antireductionism: the epistemic status of testimony comes from testimony as a 
source of knowledge in its own right. 
Let me show how (1) and (2) work with a list of cases by Greco: 
Case 1. A seasoned investigator questions a potentially uncooperative witness.  
Case 2. A job applicant tells you that he has no criminal record.  
Case 3. You ask directions from a stranger in an unfamiliar city. For example, 
where is the train station? 
Case 4. You ask your friend whether he intends to come to your party, and he says 
that yes, he does.  
Case 5. A third-grade teacher tells his student that France is in Europe.  
Case 6. A mother tells her small child that there is milk in the refrigerator. 
(forthcoming, pp. 8-9) 
(1) accounts for Cases 1 and 2, and (2) accounts for Cases 5 and 6. Cases 3 and 4 are 
“somewhere in between” (Greco, forthcoming, p. 9). Under which conditions does a seasoned 
investigator acquire knowledge from the testimony of an uncooperative witness? A witness could 
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be “uncooperative” in different ways. For instance, he/she could be reluctant to convey relevant 
information for the investigation, or the information he/she provides is inaccurate, incomplete, or 
false. Either way, a seasoned investigator has to use his/her previous experience interrogating 
witnesses, his/her knowledge of the case, his/her experience in cases similar to the one case 
he/she is investigating, and the like. If this is right, Case 1 shows that the epistemic status of 
testimonial knowledge comes from other sources of knowledge. Therefore, (1) is right. 
Something similar would happen with a job recruiter wanting to know if a job applicant has 
criminal records in Case 2. The job applicant is not necessarily uncooperative, as the witness in 
Case 1. However, an experienced job recruiter knows that he/she should not rely only on the 
applicant’s testimony. The recruiter should check, by him/herself, other sources of information 
such as the police databases to verify the applicant’s information. This is confirmed by the way 
in which experienced job recruiters behave when trying to know, by the testimony of job 
applicants, other information such as a previous particular job experience. The recruiters in these 
cases not only rely on the applicant’s testimony, they also study the applicant’s CV, read 
recommendation letters, call and talk to references and former employees, and the like. Compare 
Cases 1 and 2 with Cases 5 and 6. A third-grade student comes to know that “France is in 
Europe” because his/her teacher says so. The student does not, and normally, cannot use other 
sources of information to verify his/her teacher’s testimony. Therefore, the epistemic status of 
testimony comes from testimony itself, as it is stated in (2). By the same token, in Case 6, the 
child knows that the milk is in the refrigerator because of his/her mother’s testimony. The child 
does not need to make inductive generalizations or to use previous knowledge to confirm his/her 
mother’s information. 
For Greco, what characterizes Cases 1 – 6 is that in them testimonial knowledge is 
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increasingly easy to acquire. To clarify, hard testimonial knowledge demands from the hearer 
background information and non-testimonial reasons to acquire knowledge by testimony, as in 
Cases 1 and 2. Alternatively, in easy testimonial knowledge, the hearer knows from testimony 
straight away, as in Cases 5 and 6. Putting this together with the results of the previous 
paragraph, (1) seems to account better for cases of hard testimonial knowledge, and (2) seems to 
work better for cases of easy testimonial knowledge. What if one tries to explain cases of easy 
testimonial knowledge, such as Cases 5 and 6, with (1), and cases of hard testimonial knowledge, 
such as Cases 1 and 2, with (2)? I believe one will make testimonial knowledge in Cases 5 and 6 
too hard to acquire, and too easy to obtain in Cases 1 and 2. To be sure, to demand from the 
third-grade student and from the child to use memory, perception and inductive reasoning to 
verify the correctness of their caretakers’ testimony seems to be wrong. Alternatively, it would 
be naïve to think that the investigator in Case 1 acquires knowledge with the testimony of an 
uncooperative witness. Similarly, a job applicant’s testimony is not enough for the job recruiter 
to achieve knowledge about the former. Greco shapes this problem with the following dilemma:  
Dilemma Reductionism vs. Antireductionism 
(3) Either testimonial knowledge requires good inductive evidence on the part of 
the hearer or it does not. 
(4) If it does not, then testimonial knowledge is too easy [to acquire in some 
cases]. There will be cases counted as knowledge that should not be. 
(5) If it does, then testimonial knowledge is too hard [to acquire in some cases]. 
There will be cases not counted as knowledge that should be. 
Therefore, 
(6) An adequate account of testimonial knowledge is impossible: a given account 
must make testimonial knowledge either too easy for some cases or too hard 
for others. (Greco, forthcoming, p, 10) 
Secondly, the Dilemma Generation vs. Transmission comes from two approaches 
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explaining the ways in which the hearer acquires the knowledge that p by testimony. 
(7) Generation: The knowledge that p is acquired by the hearer him/herself. 
(8) Transmission: The knowledge that p is transmitted, via testimony, from the 
speaker to the hearer.  
Cases 1 – 6 illustrate these ideas as well. (7) accounts for Cases 1 and 2, and (8) accounts for 
Cases 5 and 6. An uncooperative witness, ex hypothesi, either does not want to transmit 
knowledge, or the information he/she coveys is inaccurate, incomplete or false. As a 
consequence, the investigator comes to know on his/her own using the questionable witness’s 
testimony and other sources of knowledge, such as his/her memories of other cases he/she has 
previously investigated, criminal profiles, the information of other witnesses and collaborators, 
and so on. Consequently, (7) seems to be right. The knowledge that a job recruiter acquires of a 
job applicant also seems to be generated. Even though it is right that the former uses some of the 
information testified by the latter, usually the knowledge of job applicants that job recruiters 
achieve goes beyond the description a job applicant would provide for him/herself. For example, 
at the end of an application process, job recruiters know by themselves whether the applicant is 
well-prepared for the job, if he/she has the experience required for the functions he/she will be in 
charge of, if he/she has past records than could affect the position he/she is going to fulfill, and 
so on. Compare Cases 1 and 2 with Cases 5 and 6. The information that “France is in Europe” 
seems to be transmitted from the teacher to the student in Case 5, and the child knows that the 
milk is in the refrigerator because his/her mom told him/her so. There is no generation of 
knowledge, but instead a transmission of knowledge in these two cases. 
If these remarks are right, (7) accounts for cases of hard testimonial knowledge, and (8) 
for cases of easy testimonial knowledge. Does (7) make testimonial knowledge too hard to 
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acquire in Cases 5 and 6?, and does (8) make testimonial knowledge too easy to acquire in Cases 
1 and 2? I believe the answer for these questions is yes. (7) makes testimonial knowledge too 
hard to acquire in Cases 5 and 6 because it demands from the third-grade student and the child to 
come to know by themselves that “France is in Europe” and “there is milk in the refrigerator.” 
But they do not know this by themselves, but because of the testimony of their caretakers. (8) 
makes testimonial knowledge too easy to acquire in Cases 1 and 2 because under (8) the 
knowledge that the uncooperative witness and the job applicant have is supposedly transmitted to 
their hearers. But, such a testimony could be false; and, therefore, there is not knowledge 
transmitted in those cases. This is Greco’s second dilemma.  
Dilemma Generation vs. Transmission 
(9) Either testimonial knowledge [is transmitted from the speaker to the hearer] or 
[the hearer comes to know by him/herself]. 
(10) If testimonial knowledge [is transmitted from the speaker to the hearer], then 
it is too easy [to acquire in some cases]. A hearer can come to know merely by 
believing what a speaker says. 
(11) If [the hearer comes to know by him/herself], then testimonial knowledge is 
too hard [to acquire in some cases]. A hearer can never depend on a speaker 
to transmit knowledge, but must in every case come to know “for herself”. 
Therefore, 
(12) An adequate account of testimonial knowledge is impossible: a given 
account must make testimonial knowledge either too easy in some cases or 
too hard in others. (Greco, forthcoming, p. 14) 
These dilemmas additionally show an antagonism between (1), reductionism, and (7), 
generation, and (2), antireductionism, and (8) transmission. On one hand, with the pairing of (1) 
and (7), a hearer comes to know that p by him/herself because the epistemic status of testimony 
is derived from other sources of knowledge such as memory, perception or inductive reasoning. 
On the other hand, with the combination of (2) and (8), the hearer knows that p because 
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testimony has epistemic status by itself, and the knowledge that p is transmitted from the speaker 
to the hearer. In Greco’s words: 
If you opt for reductionism, you make it impossible to accommodate transmission 
… Accordingly, you make testimonial knowledge too hard. If you opt for anti-
reductionism, … you create a disconnect between the requirements for testimonial 
knowledge and the requirements for knowledge of any other kind. Accordingly, 
you make testimonial knowledge too easy. (Greco, forthcoming, p. 16) 
The objective of this chapter is to compare the ways in which EC, SSI and Agendivism 
try to solve the aforementioned dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony. Let me use the model 
of knowledge attributions to explain the epistemological problem of testimony. An agent, the 
putative knower1 (K1), testifies that p. Another agent, the knowledge attributor1 (A1), receives 
such testimony and, attributing knowledge to K1, allegedly comes to know that p. Now, A1 
becomes K2, and he/she is the object of evaluation of a new attributor (A2) wondering whether K2 
knows that p by testimony. My intuition is that EC and SSI make testimonial knowledge too easy 
because they endorse (2) and (8). Agendivism, differently, dissolves those dilemmas. This 
chapter is structured with the steps of my argumentation. I will start showing that EC and SSI 
endorse the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). That is, the claim that 
KAA: One should assert that p only if one knows that p. 
A second step shows that KAA leads to (2) and (8). Third, I am going to justify that (2) and (8) 
make testimonial knowledge too easy. Finally, I will show that Agendivism has a better response 
to the dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony than EC and SSI. 
 
2. Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Account of 
Assertion 
The starting point of my argumentation shows the connections between KAA, EC and 
SSI. With this in mind, first, I am going to reconstruct Peter Unger’s and Timothy Williamson’s 
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KAA. Second, I will make explicit the ways in which these accounts have been endorsed by 
DeRose’s and Cohen’s EC and Stanley’s and Hawthorne’s SSI. 
Unger (1975) proposes KAA as a way of uncovering the nontrivial relations between 
knowledge and assertion. His idea is that when one asserts something, one represents oneself as 
knowing whatever was asserted. In his words, 
KAA-Unger: “if S asserts, states, or declares that p, then he not only represents it 
as being the case that p, but he represents it as being the case that 
he knows that p” (p. 253). 
For Unger, the main support for KAA-Unger is the antipathy generated by the skeptic claims 
such as “Nobody knows anything.” If in KAA-Unger, S stands for a skeptic and p for “Nobody 
knows anything,” we obtain: “if a skeptic asserts, states, or declares that nobody knows anything, 
then he not only represents it as being the case that nobody knows anything, but he represents it 
as being the case that he knows that nobody knows anything.” But this proposition is self-
contradictory because if a skeptic represents him/herself knowing that nobody knows anything, 
then something is known by someone: the skeptic him/herself. Therefore, the skeptic has a 
wrong representation of him/herself. 
Williamson (2000) provides a second version of KAA in the following terms: 
KAA-Williamson: “One must: assert p only if one knows p” (Williamson, 2000, p. 
241). 
Two main arguments support KAA-Williamson. The first argument comes from conversational 
patterns. Imagine a speaker asserting “p.” Now compare the following reactions: 
(13) How do you know that p? 
(14) Where did you read that p? 
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Both questions presuppose a response: while (13) presupposes that somehow the speaker knows 
that p, (14) presupposes that the speaker read “p” somewhere. However, while (13) is a proper 
reaction to the assertion that “p,” (14) is not. The reason for this is that asserting “p” implies that 
the speaker knows p, but it does not necessarily imply that the speaker read “p” somewhere (p. 
252). The correctness of (13) also receives support from the fact that (13) is not a proper reaction 
when the respondent knows that the speaker knows p, as when p stands for “I want to go home.”  
The second argument for KAA-Williamson comes from the way it deals with Moore’s 
Paradox instantiated by the following proposition: 
(15) p and I do not know that p. 
KAA-Williamson and the concept of conjunction show why it is wrong to assert (15). Shortly, 
with KAA to assert that “p” is to imply that “I know that p.” Then, (15) is “I know that p and I do 
not know that p.” However, this does not make sense because one knows a conjunction only if it 
is true, and for a conjunction to be true, its two conjuncts have to be true. But if the second 
disjunct, “I do not know that p,” is true, then the first one, “I know that p,” is false, and vice 
versa. Therefore, (15) is self-contradictory (p. 253). 
KAA-Williamson allows for an ECst response to one Cartesian-type defense for the 
correctness of (15). Such defense claims that to assert (15) could be acceptable if its first 
conjunct is cancelled out by a criterion other than knowledge. This is a job that (15)’s second 
disjunct can do, as in the following variation of (15): 
(15)* p and I cannot be absolutely certain that p. 
In this case, one can assert “p” without being absolutely certain that p. So, to assert (15) is 
correct. Williamson disagrees. His diagnosis is that in (15)* there “is a reluctance to allow the 
contextually set standards for knowledge and certainty to diverge” (p. 254). EC makes possible 
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that divergence, as it is shown by the next slight modification of (15)*: 
(15)** p and by Descartes’s standards I cannot be absolutely certain that p. 
In (15)** there is a change of contexts making the second conjunct epistemically more 
demanding than the first one: “the reference to Descartes holds those standards apart from the 
present context” (Williamson, 2000, p. 234). Conversational patterns confirm the Cartesian 
objector’s illegitimate movement. It would be inappropriate to respond to the assertion that p 
asking “How can you be so certain that p?” For Williamson, the expression “so” in this response 
is an indication of the rise of epistemic standards with the demanding threshold of certainty. Yet, 
this does not cancel out (15)’s first conjunct because under ordinary standards, it is appropriate to 
state that “p” even if one is not certain that p. To sum up, below is Williamson’s explicit 
approval of EC: 
The putative connections between knowledge, assertion and certainty contain an 
obvious sceptical threat … One response is to permit contextual variation in 
epistemic standards: in effect, ‘know’ would express different contents in 
different contexts, as a result of either variation in meaning … If so, ‘assert’ will 
express correspondingly different contents. (Williamson, 2000, p. 254) 
ECsts also endorse KAA. For DeRose, KAA provides an adequate response to the 
Generality Objection against EC. The Generality Objector claims that variations of knowledge-
attribution statements do not have anything special. Rather, such variations are a ubiquitous 
phenomenon affecting assertability in general (DeRose, 2002, p. 178; 2009, pp. 89-92). This is 
confirmed by the fact that in high-standard contexts, it becomes as difficult to assert “p” as to 
assert “K knows that p.” For instance, in DeRose’s BANK CASE HIGH, it is wrong for DeRose 
to assert: 
(16) “I know that the bank will open on Saturday.” 
But also, it is wrong for him to assert: 
(17) “The bank will open on Saturday.” 
	   74 
If this is right, there is nothing special with knowledge-attribution sentences. Indeed, a better 
explanation for the unassertabilty of propositions such as (16) and (17) in high-standard contexts 
comes from the Warranted Assertability Principle (WA): 
WA: One should assert that p only if one is positioned well enough with respect to 
p to properly assert it. (DeRose, 2002, p. 178; 2009, p. 91) 
Under WA, p becomes unassertable because the epistemic standards for the assertability of p are 
increased in such a way that one is not well enough positioned with respect to p. Consequently, 
the incorrectness of asserting that p in a high-standard context is not due to the contextual 
variation of the truth conditions of p, as it is claimed by EC. To illustrate, (17) becomes 
unassertable when DeRose is not in a good enough epistemic position to assert it, and not 
because of the variations of the truth conditions of the statement: “The bank will be open on 
Saturday.” By the same token, for the Generality objector, knowledge-ascription sentences such 
as (16) do not vary because of the contextual change of the truth conditions of “to know,” but 
because DeRose, in BANK CASE HIGH, is not positioned well enough to correctly state (16).  
The challenge posed by WA is that in some contexts it demands the asserter to be 
extremely well epistemically positioned with respect to p in order for him/her to assert p, but in 
other contexts the asserter can be moderately epistemically positioned to correctly assert p. So, 
how do we determine WA’s specific content? For DeRose, KAA provides an “impressive” and 
“correct” response to this question: “One must know that p in order to be positioned well enough 
with respect to p to assert it” (2002, p. 179; 2009, p. 93). However, a qualification is required, 
given that knowledge is a context-sensitive matter, KAA should adopt a relative form. This is 
DeRose’s version: 
KAA-DeRose: A speaker, S, is well-enough positioned with respect to p to be able 
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to properly assert that p if and only if S knows that p according to 
the standards for knowledge that are in place as S makes her 
assertion. (2002, p. 182; 2009, p. 99) 
Notice that KAA-DeRose brings together the standards for the correction of assertion and the 
standards for knowledge ruling the asserter’s context. However, for DeRose, “our ascriptions of 
warranted assertability do not generally sway together with our knowledge attributions” (2009, p. 
99). To be sure, under KAA-DeRose it is possible that the proposition “S is warranted in asserting 
that p,” is true in the knowledge attributor’s contexts, but “S knows that p,” is wrong in the same 
context. The explanation for this is that the standards of knowledge governing the knowledge 
attributor’s context are higher than the ones ruling S’s contexts in such a way that S’s belief that 
p meets the lower epistemic standards of his/her context, but not the higher epistemic standards 
of the knowledge attributor’s contexts. 
Despite this detachment between ascriptions of warranted assertability and knowledge 
attributions, KAA-DeRose brings together these two elements when the putative knower and the 
knowledge attributor are the same agent, as in “I know that p.” This fusion between standards for 
assertability and knowledge is confirmed by KAA-DeRose’s explanation of the Moore’s Paradox 
instantiated by (15). When a speaker asserts “p,” he/she represents him/herself knowing (15)’s 
first conjunct, under the standards regulating both assertability and knowledge in his/her context. 
Yet, when the same speaker asserts (15)’s second conjunct, he/she is contradicting the standards 
he/she thought were right in asserting “p.” 
Going back to the Generality Objection, KAA-DeRose is useful in denying that the 
unassertability of knowledge attributions in high-standard contexts is part of a more general 
phenomenon covering all types of assertions. DeRose claims that “when the epistemic standards 
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go up past the speaker’s ability to meet them, ‘I know that p’ not only becomes unassertable, as 
the simple ‘p’ does: It becomes false” (DeRose, 2009, p. 110). On one hand, “p” becomes 
unassertable when the asserter finds him/herself in a context at which he/she is not in a good 
epistemic position to assert “p.” In this case, he/she prefers to assert something weaker that “p” 
such as “Probably p,” “I’m pretty sure that p,” “I think that p,” and the like. However, the 
assertion “~p” is not a possibility for the asserter. To illustrate, when in BANK CASE HIGH, 
DeRose is not well epistemically positioned to state (17), he could have properly stated 
“Probably the bank will open on Saturday,” “I’m pretty sure that the bank will open on 
Saturday,” “I think that the bank will open on Saturday,” and so on. Yet, for him it would be 
wrong to state “the bank will not open on Saturday.” On the other hand, “I know that p” not only 
becomes unassertable, but false. Therefore, its negation is a possibility for the asserter. This 
explains why in BANK CASE HIGH when DeRose is not in a good epistemic position to state 
(16), it is right for him to state “I do not know whether the bank will open on Saturday.” This 
difference of linguistic behavior between the assertion of “p” and the assertion of “S does not 
know that p” shows that the second has a distinctive character overcome by the Generality 
Objector. 
SSIsts also embrace KAA. First, Stanley (2005) recognizes that KAA does a good job 
explaining the oddity of the Moore’s Paradox, as Williamson shows it (Stanley, 2005, p. 11). 
Second, Hawthorne (2004) uses KAA to explain the unassertability of lottery propositions. He 
understands these sorts of propositions in juxtaposition with ordinary propositions: while “we 
ordinarily take ourselves to know” the latter, “we would be intuitively disinclined to take 
ourselves to know” the former (p. 5). A typical ordinary proposition is: 
(18) “I know where my car is parked right now” (p. 4). 
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And a lottery proposition is: 
(19) “I know whether or not I am one of the unlucky people whose car has been 
stolen during the last few hours” (p. 4). 
Propositions such as (19) are true, and if one were going to assert such propositions, one would 
have enough evidence for thinking that they are true. However, one is inclined to think that one 
does not know those propositions. That is why lottery propositions make a strong case for 
skepticism. Other examples of lottery propositions are: “I will not win a major prize in a lottery 
this year,” and “I will not be one of the unlucky people to have a sudden and unexpected fatal 
heart attack.” (pp. 7-8) 
Why are propositions such as (19) unassertable? Hawthorne answers this remarking that 
there is a non-trivial connection between assertion and knowledge attribution as it is shown by 
Unger’s and Williamson’s idea that “[t]he practice of assertion is constituted by the 
rule/requirement that one asserts something only if one knows it” (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 23). 
Hawthorne’s version of KKA follows Unger’s closely: 
KAA-Hawthorne: “Asserting that p, one represents oneself as knowing that p” (p. 
23). 
In his understanding, KAA-Hawthorne does not imply that asserting “p” is the same as asserting 
“I know that p.” Rather, when an agent asserts “p,” he/she is also implicitly conveying that 
he/she knows that p, but he/she does not assert so. This is justified by the fact that the asserter 
could be criticized if he/she does not know that p. If this is right, to assert propositions such as 
(19) is wrong because, with this linguistic action, the asserter is representing himself as knowing 
that his car will not be stolen, but even if the chance of his/her car not being stolen during the last 
few hours is extremely low, he/she does not know it. Therefore, he/she is representing 
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him/herself wrongly (p. 85).  
Along with these ideas, Hawthorne suggests that EC gets the connection between 
knowledge attributions and assertion wrong. Showing his point, he proposes the following case: 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR? 
You are in the house being asked where your car is. I am outside looking at your 
car. I have what the contextualist describes as ‘pretty high standards’ for ‘know’; 
you have what he describes as ‘lower standards’. I am thus happy to claim that 
you do not know where your car is. I am of course happy to claim that I know 
where your car is, since I am looking right at it, which is good enough, by my 
standards, to know. I hear you flat-out assert ‘My car is parked outside’. Insofar 
as I am genuinely convinced that you do not know, am I not convinced that you 
shouldn’t flat-out assert that your car is outside? Of course, I may not think you 
have committed a really egregious act. But if I really am convinced that you do 
not know where your car is, I will reckon you a little out of line to flat-out assert 
that it is outside when asked. (p. 91) 
In this case, Hawthorne points out that EC allows for the shifting epistemic standards according 
to the knowledge attributor’s contexts. While “you,” under your low epistemic standards, 
attribute knowledge to yourself asserting that you know where your car is, “I,” under my high 
epistemic standards, attribute knowledge to myself asserting that I know where your car is, but I 
deny knowledge to you because according to my comparatively higher epistemic standards, you 
do not know where your car is. Since for EC, the same attributor-dependence that governs 
knowledge attributions rules assertability, the following sentence becomes true: 
(20) S may assert that p, but S does not know that p.  
For Hawthorne, (20) “sounds odd” because it contradicts KAA. Therefore, EC gets the 
connection between knowledge attributions and assertion wrong. 
Responding to this objection, Cohen (2004) also embraces a contextualized version of 
KAA. His starting point is KAA-Unger. To recall: 
KAA-Unger: “Asserting that p, … one represents oneself as knowing that p” 
(Unger, 1975, p. 253). 
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For Cohen, a contextualist version of this principle assumes that S represents him/herself as 
knowing that p by the standards governing his/her particular context. If this is right, a 
contextualist version of KKA-Unger would state that “When S asserts p in C, S represents 
himself as being such that ‘S knows p’ is true at C” (Cohen, 2004, p. 486). Additionally, under 
Cohen’s interpretation, KKA-Unger is a special version of the “principle that one should not 
represent oneself falsely”. Consequently, Cohen’s version KAA is: 
KAA-Cohen: “S may assert p in C only if ‘S knows p’ is true at C” (Cohen, 2004, 
p. 486). 
With this in mind, Cohen claims that the oddity of (20) is a consequence of a “false inference 
about what is entailed by ‘S may assert p’ when uttered at the high-standards context” (p. 486). 
Given that the person asserting (20) is in higher epistemic standards than S, he/she is prone to 
think that S knows that p relative to high standards. This is illustrated by Cohen’s version of 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR? 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR?* 
Suppose John has recently parked his car in lot 2. Suppose further that John is in a 
low-standards context (car theft is not being discussed) and someone asks him 
where his car is. He asserts that it is in lot 2. If I am in a high-standards context 
where car theft is being discussed, then according to Contextualism, I can truly 
say, “John does not know that his car is parked in lot 2.” This remains true despite 
the fact that given John’s own low-standards context (car theft is not salient), he 
can truly say, “I know my car is parked in lot 2”. Hawthorne suggests that “given 
a contextualist profile”, John has the right to assert that his car is parked in lot 
2.Thus we get the odd result that at my high-standards context I can truly say 
“John may assert that his car is in lot 2 but doesn’t know that his car is parked in 
lot 2.” (Cohen, 2004, pp. 483-484) 
The problem with this last assertion is that it contravenes the principle that one should not 
represent oneself falsely. Following the non-false self-representation principle, S should only 
represent him/herself knowing that p in the low standards governing his/her epistemic practices. 
So, a proper way of expressing the idea contained in (20) would be: 
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(20)* “S may represent himself as knowing by low standards but S does not know 
by high standards” (Cohen, 2004, p. 486). 
So far, the relevant literature shows that both EC and SSI endorse KAA. The next step in 
my argumentation is to show that these accounts also embrace antireductionism and 
transmissibility because KAA leads them to those accounts of testimony. 
 
3. The Knowledge Account of Assertion, Transmisibility and Antireductionism 
Making it easy to remember, in this section I will take into account the following 
propositions: 
KAA: One should assert that p only if one knows that p. 
(2) Antireductionism: the epistemic status of testimony comes from testimony as a 
source of knowledge in its own right. 
(8) Transmission: The knowledge that p is transmitted, via testimony, from the 
speaker to the hearer. 
Let me present my preliminary intuitions using the model of knowledge attributions and 
testimonial knowledge proposed above. When does a knowledge attributor (A2) correctly assert 
that a putative knower (K2) knows that p based on testimony? According to KAA, K2 knows that 
p based on testimony if the speaker knows that p. Therefore, the speaker becomes the first 
putative knower (K1) in the chain of testimonial knowledge transmission. (2) follows from KAA 
since the proper assertion that p by K1 transforms K1’s testimony into a source of knowledge of 
its own. Furthermore, (8) follows from KAA because K1’s proper assertion that p transfers the 
knowledge that p from K1 to K2. 
KAA supports my intuitions. Williamson (2000), for instance, claims that one has the 
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warrant to assert a mathematical proposition p in at least two possible ways. On one hand, an 
agent knows that p because he/she “has followed [a proof of p] and retains some memory of it” 
(p. 263). On the other hand, an agent “knows by testimony that there is a proof of p” (p. 264). 
This suggests that testimony is a source of knowledge of its own like reasoning and memory. 
However, if the supposed expert mathematician testifying that p does not know that p, then the 
hearer will not know either. This is because, for Williamson, testimony transmits knowledge, but 
if the speaker does not have knowledge, there is nothing to transmit. In Williamson’s words, 
“Testimony is a special source of warrant because one speaker can pass on a warrant to another. 
Since the expert mathematicians have no warrant to assert p themselves, they have none to pass 
on to you” (p. 264). Or in a more general way:  
In normal circumstances, when the hearer knows that the speaker asserted p, the 
speaker has no reputation for unreliability, and so on, a speaker who asserts p 
thereby puts a hearer in a position to know p if (and only if) the speaker knows p. 
(2000 p. 267) 
Epistemologies of testimony also show the connection between KAA and (2). According 
to Jennifer Lackey (2008), it is possible to identify at least two versions of antireductionism: one 
weak and one strong:  
Antireductionism (Weak) 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony 
iff: 
(i) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony, 
(ii) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s 
testimony, and 
(iii) It is true that p. (p. 158) 
Antireductionism (Strong) 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony 
iff: 
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(i) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony, 
(ii) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s 
testimony, and 
(iii) A knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. (p. 159) 
It is clear that the difference between strong and weak antireductionism is condition (iii). While 
in the weak version the proposition asserted has to be true, in the strong version, p has to be 
known by the speaker. The problem for the weak version is that a true assertion based on a lucky 
guess with the absence of undefeated defeaters against the speaker would be enough for B to 
know, but this is wrong. This is why Williamson prefers the strong version of antireductionism 
(Williamson, 2000, p. 242). 
With regards to the relation of KAA with (8), Lackey (2008) makes KAA part of the 
necessary and sufficient thesis of her definition of transmission in the following terms: 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony 
… 
Necessary Thesis: 
… only if A knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p. 
Sufficient Thesis: 
… if (1) A knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p, (2) B comes 
to believe that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony that p, and (3) 
B has no undefeated defeaters for believing that p, then B knows (believes 
with justification/warrant) that p. (p. 39) 
To make it explicit, the connection between KAA and (8) is in the claim that the speaker has to 
know that p to testify that p, transferring testimony to the hearer. 
If my intuition is right, EC and SSI not only embrace KAA but also (2) and (8). 
Hawthorne, however, does not agree. He states that WHERE IS YOUR CAR? shows that EC 
entitles people to assert propositions they do not know, and, consequently, it can be testimony 
without the speaker knowing what he/she testifies. So, WHERE IS YOUR CAR? poses a 
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counter-example against (8). These are Hawthorne’s words: 
[I]f I think that you are in general entitled to flat-out assert propositions that you 
do not know, then I will have some considerable inclination to trust you about 
things that I think you do not know. This threatens to disrupt the plausible idea 
that, in general, A should only trust B’s testimony that p insofar as A thinks that B 
knows p. (2004, pp. 91-92) 
Let me spell out this argument with the case inspiring it. In WHERE IS YOUR CAR?, you are 
entitled to assert that you know that your car is parked outside, even though you are not well 
enough epistemically positioned to know that your car is parked outside. Given that I allow you 
to assert that your car is parked outside, I would allegedly have “some considerable inclination to 
trust you” about something you do not know. Therefore, if you testify about the place your car is, 
you would testify about something you do not know. Yet, this contradicts (8). 
I have two arguments against Hawthorne’s position. Remember that Cohen reacts to 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR? claiming that you are entitled to assert that your car is parked outside 
only within your low epistemic standards, but not under my high epistemic standards. For 
Cohen, Hawthorne’s mistake is to think that you represent yourself as knowing that your car is 
parked outside in my high epistemic standards because this contravenes the principle that you 
should not represent yourself falsely. Assuming that this is right, if according to my high 
epistemic standards, you do not know that your car is parked outside, then you are not warranted 
in asserting so in my context. Should I trust you, then? Surely I should not because from my 
perspective you neither know nor are warranted in asserting that your car is parked outside. So, 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR? does not pose a counter-example for the principle that “A should only 
trust B’s testimony that p insofar as A thinks that B knows p” because I neither think you know 
where your car is nor do I trust you in telling me where it is.  
This argument is confirmed by a second one pointing out that WHERE IS YOUR CAR? 
is not a threat for (8) because transmission is a theory of testimony and WHERE IS YOUR 
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CAR? is not testimonial in nature. To be sure, for a case to be testimonial in nature the resulting 
knowledge should be testimonial, and for this the hearer has to acquire knowledge on the basis of 
the content of the speaker’s testimony (Lackey, 2008, pp. 30-31; 145; 178). However, in 
WHERE IS YOUR CAR? my resulting knowledge that your car is parked outside does not come 
from your assertion that your car is parked outside, but from my perception of your car being 
parked outside. This is corroborated by the fact that neither (20) nor (20)* are meant to describe 
a hearer in a testimonial relationship. Those propositions state: 
(20) S may assert that p, but S does not know that p. (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 87)  
(20)* “S may represent himself as knowing by low standards but S does not know 
by high standards” (Cohen, 2004, p. 246). 
The asserter of those propositions denies that S knows that p in the asserter’s high epistemic 
standards. However, a hearer in a testimonial relation does not assert, before hand, that the 
speaker does not know. On the contrary, if the speaker expects to achieve knowledge through 
testimony, he/she, prima facie, attributes knowledge to the speaker. Maybe, ultima facie, the 
hearer would find undefeated defeaters for believing that p based on testimony, but this is not the 
starting point of a testimonial relationship and the knowledge acquired, if there is any, would not 
be testimonial in nature.  
 
4. Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Easy Testimonial 
Knowledge 
According to Greco (forthcoming), (2) and (8) “seem to make testimonial knowledge too 
easy, allowing that one can come to know by simply believing what one is told, and thus 
licensing gullibility” (p. 8). He borrows this idea from Elizabeth Fricker (1994), for whom (2) 
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confers to the hearer the “epistemic right to assume that the speaker always says the truth” (p. 
125), unless the former has some undefeated defeater against the latter. The problem with this 
presumptive right is “the dispensation from the requirement to monitor or assess the speaker for 
trustworthiness, before believing in it. Thus it may be called a [presumptive right] to believe 
blindly, or uncritically, since the hearer’s critical faculties are not required to be engaged” (p. 
144). Cases 1 and 2, above, illustrate this point. To recall, these are the cases: 
Case 1. A seasoned investigator questions a potentially uncooperative witness.  
Case 2. A job applicant tells you that he has no criminal record.  
Let me modify slightly Case 1 in order to make the illustration stronger. Given that in Case 1 the 
witness is described as “potentially uncooperative,” it would be unlikely that a “seasoned 
investigator” would adjudicate to him/herself the epistemic right to assume that he/she does not 
need to have reasons to believe the witness is not lying. Consequently, I shall omit the 
aforementioned adjective for the witness obtaining a most neutral case: 
Case 1*. A seasoned investigator questions a witness.  
Picking up the topic of easy knowledge again, if in Cases 1* and 2 the seasoned investigator and 
the job recruiter had the presumptive right to think that the witness and the job applicant always 
say the truth, then some cases in which the witness and the job applicant are prone to lie would 
be wrongly considered as testimonial knowledge. 
I believe EC and SSI confer such a presumptive right to the hearer when they allow 
different epistemic standards for the members of the testimonial relationship. According to (2) 
and (8), testimony is a source of knowledge on its own, and transfers knowledge from the 
speaker to the hearer disregarding the epistemic standards of the agents involved. As a 
consequence, in cases where the speaker is in a lower epistemic standard than the hearer, the 
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latter can acquire knowledge from the former, even though the speaker had no knowledge 
according to hearer’s epistemic standards. WHERE IS YOUR CAR? and WHERE IS YOUR 
CAR?* show how EC allows for this difference of epistemic standards. SSI also permits such 
divergence. Recall that SSI denies that the meaning of the expression “to know” varies according 
to the context of ascription. From this perspective, the factors determining the correctness of a 
knowledge attribution are in the subject, or putative knower, and not in the attributor. Practically, 
knowledge attributions vary according to the salience of error possibilities for the putative 
knower. If for the speaker fewer error possibilities are salient than for the hearer, then they have 
two different epistemic standards. The following case by John MacFarlane (2005) illustrates this 
point. 
  IS YOUR CAR STILL PARKED IN THE DRIVEWAY? (PART I) 
Arnold and Beth share a car, which is parked in their driveway. Beth has 
very good reasons for thinking that their car is in their driveway. She saw it there 
several hours ago when she left for work. She knows that she and Arnold have the 
only keys, and that Arnold has been out of town all week. But because Beth is 
deciding whether to get auto insurance today or tomorrow, she is subject to high 
epistemic standards. These standards require that she be able to rule out the 
possibility that the car was stolen after she left for work. Since she cannot do this, 
she does not know that the car is in the driveway. 
Arnold, on the other hand, is subject to low epistemic standards. He has 
just arrived at the airport and he is wondering how he will get groceries later in 
the day. But unlike Beth, he does not have any reason at all to think that their car 
is in the driveway. He has been gone all week, and Beth sometimes takes the car 
to work. So he calls Beth on the phone  and asks, ‘Is our car in the driveway?’ 
Beth replies: ‘Well, that’s where I left it this morning.’ Arnold has no reason to 
doubt this report, so (according to the Transmission Principle) he comes to know 
that Beth left the car in the driveway that morning. He infers that it is still there, 
and since his grounds are sufficient to meet the low epistemic standards 
appropriate to his circumstances, he thereby comes to know that the car is in the 
driveway … (p. 134-135) 
Given the practical stakes of Arnold and Beth, fewer error possibilities are salient for the former 
than for the latter. Consequently, the second has higher epistemic standards than the first.  
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Why does this difference between the speaker’s and the hearer’s epistemic standards 
allowed by EC and SSI make testimonial knowledge too easy? Using the language of the 
dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony, the response is that, under EC and SSI, there are cases 
that count as knowledge that should not count. In other words, the inferiority of the speaker’s 
epistemic standards together with (2) and (8) make testimonial knowledge too easy because the 
hearer can acquire knowledge under epistemic standards that are lower than his/her own. 
MacFarlane illustrates this point nicely with the idea of knowledge laundering. That is, cases 
where “[s]omeone who does not know that p can come to know that p simply by cycling her 
evidence through someone in less demanding circumstances.” (2005, p. 135). The second part of 
Arnold and Beth’s case makes explicit the idea: 
IS YOUR CAR STILL PARKED IN THE DRIVEWAY? (PART II) 
… now two hours pass. Arnold is in a taxi—he is late after spending some 
time buying a surprise gift for Beth at the airport—and Beth is still pondering 
whether to get auto insurance. Assuming that Arnold is home by now, she calls 
him on his cell phone. “Is our car in the driveway,” she asks? He is not surprised 
that she has asked; he assumes that she is checking to see whether he has taken 
the car out himself. “Yes, it’s still in the driveway,” he says confidently. And why 
shouldn’t he? He knows that it is. Beth accepts his testimony. She is not being 
doxastically irresponsible in doing so. After all, she has no reason to think Arnold 
untrustworthy, and no reason to think he is not home. So according to the 
Transmission Principle, Beth now knows that their car is in their driveway. She 
has “inherited” this knowledge from Arnold. 
This is a case of easy testimonial knowledge because Arnold came to know that their car was 
parked in the driveway because of the evidence Beth gave him earlier. Beth, given Arnold’s and 
Beth’s difference of epistemic standards plus (2) and (8), came to know because of the 
information she gave previously to Arnold. Consequently, Beth escapes from her high epistemic 
standards recycling evidence through Arnold. However, this case should not be considered as 
knowledge. 
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5. Agendivism and the Dissolution of the Dilemmas of Epistemologies of Testimony 
Agendivism, unlike EC and SSI, dissolves the dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony. I 
am going to justify this point, first, outlining an agendivistic theory of testimonial knowledge, 
and, second, tackling the aforementioned dilemmas. When does a knowledge attributor (A) 
correctly assert that a putative knower (K) knows that p based on testimony? Remember that my 
working hypothesis is that A correctly asserts that K knows that p when K properly closes or 
advances his/her cognitive agenda. In Chapter 1, I mentioned that some agendas include things 
that agents want or need to know. That is what I called cognitive agendas, which I defined as a 
set of questions that cognitive agents want, or need, to answer for the achievement of their 
objectives. When does a hearer properly answer the questions he/she needs for the advancing of 
his/her cognitive agenda? My intuition is that a hearer properly closes his/her cognitive agenda 
when receiving relevant information from the speaker, answers the questions required for the 
advancing or closure of his/her agendas. Consequently, there are two sub-cognitive agendas in 
testimonial knowledge: the speaker’s agenda of providing relevant information, and the hearer’s 
agenda of properly answering the questions he/she needs for the achievement of his/her 
objectives. I will identify those agendas as agenda of epistemic relevance, and agenda of 
epistemic arrival. While the latter aims to achieve knowledge, the former intends to provide 
relevant information. Testimonial knowledge combines these two agendas in such a way that the 
proper closure of the speaker’s agenda of epistemic relevance is one of the conditions for the 
proper closure of the hearer’s agenda of epistemic arrival. Let me spell out this idea. 
From an agendivistic perspective, communicative interactions, such as testimony, are 
activities performed by agents in order to achieve specific objectives (i.e., agendas). This is 
illustrated by Greco’s cases of testimonial knowledge. In Case 1, the investigator wants to 
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advance his/her inquiry. In Case 2, the job recruiter looks for the better candidate for the job. In 
Case 3, you want to find the train station. In Case 4, you want to confirm the number of people 
attending to a party you are hosting. In Case 5, the third grader wants to learn some geographic 
information. Finally, in Case 6, the small child wants to find an object. Two important 
consequences follow from this. First, speakers’ agendas of epistemic relevance are properly 
closed when they facilitate the advancing or closing of the hearers’ agendas. In this sense, a 
witness neither confirming nor disconfirming the hypothesis of a legal inquiry, or a job applicant 
who does not provide the required information to properly be assessed for their candidacy for a 
job, or street indications that do not lead to the arrival point, or a friend lying about coming to a 
party in your house, or a geography teacher giving his/her third grade students wrong geographic 
information, or a mom lying to her child about an object he/she is looking for do not close 
properly their agendas of epistemic relevance. Second, testimony achieves the communicative 
objective assigned to it when the hearer uses it to advance or close his/her agendas of epistemic 
arrival. In this sense, an investigator disregarding relevant testimonial information because of 
racial profiling, or a job recruiter ignoring good qualified candidates for the job so that one of 
his/her family members can be hired, or a tourist who does not follow street directions in a city 
he/she does not know, or a party host making fewer drinks than the number of guests he/she 
knows he/she is having, or a distracted student, or a rebellious kid, do not close their agendas of 
epistemic arrival properly. 
How hard or easy is it to achieve knowledge by testimony? It depends on the agenda to 
be closed or advanced. As I mentioned it in Chapter 1, different agendas have different closure 
conditions. While the closure of some agendas calls for gross-performance, other agendas 
impose detailed tasks to be performed with great detail. Given the nature of the agendas to be 
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closed in Cases 1 and 2, testimonial knowledge is hard to obtain and, both, the investigator and 
the job recruiter are expected to use their background information and their experience to achieve 
testimonial knowledge. Alternatively, given the less stringent agendas of a third grader and a 
small kid, they can easily achieve knowledge from the testimony of their caretakers. 
In this sense, agendivism is not reductionist because it holds that the ways in which the 
information is conveyed in a testimony impacts the appropriate closure of the speaker’s agenda 
of epistemic relevance. However, agendivism is not antireductionist because it does not believe 
that the adequate closure of the testifier’s agenda is enough: the hearer has cognitive work to do. 
By the same token, agendivism holds neither transmission nor generation because the hearer 
cannot know without the information provided by the testifier, but this information in itself is not 
enough; the hearer has to properly close or advance his/her agenda of epistemic arrival. 
Agendivism, consequently, dissolves the dilemmas of epistemologies of testimony. 
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Chapter 4: Expert Testimony 
 
1. Introduction 
The epistemological problem of expert testimony arises from conflicting philosophical 
interpretations of specific legal rules, namely, Frye v. United States (1923), Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE) 702, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael (1999). To contextualize, these rules create a divided court where fact-finding tasks 
are split between the trial judge and the jury.1 While the latter is in charge of the ultimate 
decision of the facts under litigation, the former, beforehand, eliminates potentially confusing, 
unnecessary, or illegally obtained evidence from the jury’s deliberation. Prima facie, the jury is 
supposed to find the facts under litigation using the common knowledge obtained from the 
testimony of lay eyewitnesses. However, some cases call for the use of expert knowledge helping 
the jury to understand the legal evidence presented by the parties. The trial judge, then, has to 
decide whether the proposed expert has the knowledge to help the jury in its findings. If this is 
not the case, the trial judge keeps expert knowledge out of the jury’s deliberations declaring the 
requested expert testimony inadmissible. 
This gatekeeping role of the trial judge is clarified by the concept of epistemic 
paternalism (Goldman, 1991, p. 118). Broadly speaking, it seems epistemologically appropriate 
to state that the more relevant evidence a cognitive agent (X) can collect and use for his/her 
doxastic decisions, the better. This principle has a social counterpart regulating the activities of 
an agent (Y) having control of the evidence to be used by X: 
If agent X is going to make a doxastic decision concerning question Q, and agent 
Y has control over the evidence that is provided to X, then, from a purely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This terminology is borrowed from (Damaska, 2003, p. 120). 
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epistemic point of view, Y should make available to X all of the evidence relevant 
to Q, which is (at negligible cost) within Y’s control. (Goldman, 1991, p. 114)   
However, this principle seems to have rational restrictions. For instance, in the curriculum 
selection in education, especially in primary and secondary schools, some points of view and 
arguments are left out to facilitate learning processes of the core ideas in specific subject matters 
(p. 121). Another example is the ways in which the network news broadcastings offer relatively 
limited interpretations of an event so that it is understandable for their audience (p. 123). By the 
same token, trial judges do not provide some relevant information to the juries because it can be 
misleading. This is epistemic paternalism and “[t]he general idea is that the indicated rules of 
evidence are designed to protect jurors from their own ‘folly,’ just as parents might keep 
dangerous toys or other articles away from children, or might not expose them to certain facts.” 
The problem of expert testimony and knowledge attributions (ET&KA) is that the trial 
judge, ex hypothesi, does not have the specialized knowledge that he is supposed to attribute. The 
knowledge account of assertion, explained in the previous chapter, illuminates this point. To 
recall, according to this view: 
“One must: assert p only if one knows p” (Williamson, 2000, p. 241). 
To properly assert that “an expert knows that p”, the trial judge should know that “an expert 
knows that p.” Given that knowledge is factive, to know that “an expert knows that p,” a trial 
judge should know p (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 160). But, since p is a proposition from a field of 
expertise that the trial judge does not have, he/she does not know that p. A response to ET&KA 
completes the following formula: 
ET&KA: 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff … 
Strict Invariantism (SI) fixes high standards for knowledge attributions demanding from the trial 
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judge the same knowledge that he/she would attribute to an expert. Alternatively, EC, holding 
that the correctness of knowledge attributions varies with their contexts of enunciation, claims 
that the trial judge should be in a good enough epistemic position, given the legal purposes, to 
assert that an expert knows that p. 
In this chapter, I will evaluate these general approaches through the most elaborate legal 
epistemologies endorsing them, namely, the Deference-Education Account by Ronald Allen 
(1993; 1994; 2012),2 and the Epistemic Legal Contextualism by Alani Golanski (2001).3 My goal 
is to show that my agendivism proposes a better alternative for ET&KA. Briefly, SI makes 
attributions of specialized knowledge too hard to obtain because trial judges are required to have 
specialized knowledge before hearing experts. EC makes attributions of specialized knowledge 
too easy to obtain because it does not clarify the conditions under which a trial judge is supposed 
to attribute specialized knowledge. Agendivism, differently, studies the agenda to be closed by a 
trial judge determining the conditions under which his/her knowledge attribution is appropriate. I 
will accomplish the following itinerary. First, I will present the legal context from which ET&KA 
arises. Second, I am going to reconstruct the main accounts of ET&KA. Finally, I will evaluate 
those accounts and present my agendivistic view. 
 
2. The Legal Context of the Problem of Expert Testimony and Knowledge Attributions 
I believe the best way of explaining ET&KA is through the rules of admissibility of 
expert testimony. This section is devoted to the chronological reconstruction of them. My 
working hypothesis is that the legal criteria for admissibility of expert testimony do not provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Other SIst accounts of expert testimony in legal contexts are (Brewer, 1998; Haack, 2005; 
Leiter, 1997). 
3 Other ECst accounts of expert testimony in legal contexts are (Dale, 2003; Sanders, 2010). 
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any responses for ET&KA. In this section I will show so, as a preamble to the philosophical 
debate around it. 
In Frye v. United States (1923), the defendant, Frye, appealed the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia convicting him of murder in the second degree. From 
the appellant’s perspective, the Supreme Court erred when it excluded an expert testimony about 
the result of a sort of lie detection test taken by the defendant and referred to it as “the systolic 
blood pressure deception test.” Broadly speaking, the idea behind this test was that while to say 
the truth is a spontaneous act, to lie requires a conscious effort that is manifested in the 
increasing of blood pleasure. The response of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 
was to confirm the decision of the Supreme Court and, as a consequence, to exclude the 
requested expert testimony because, for the Court of Appeals, the systolic blood pressure 
deception test did not have a general scientific recognition. 
In this case, the admissibility of a specific expert testimony depends on two factors: 
whether the jury needs specialized knowledge to understand the facts under litigation, and 
whether the requested testimony is generally accepted by the knowledge community to which it 
belongs. The first element is ruled in the following fragment:  
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in 
evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced 
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for 
the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to 
require a previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a 
knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie within the range of 
common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or 
special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular 
science, art, or trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence. (p. 
1014) 
I interpret that this criterion for determining the necessity of an expert testimony is centered on 
the legal debate under consideration. To be sure, a trial judge is expected to evaluate the matter 
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of inquiry determining whether the jury would form a correct judgment about the facts under 
litigation. If, for the proper understanding of the factual dispute, the imagined jury should have a 
special habit, experience or study, then an expert testimony would be needed. Alternatively, if 
the common knowledge actually possessed by juries suffices for a correct judgment of the facts 
under litigation, the expert testimony is not needed. 
The second element for the acceptability of expert testimony comes from the General 
Acceptance Test: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this 
twilight zone, the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while 
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs. (p. 1014) 
Following this quote, a trial judge is expected to perform three different tasks. First, he/she has to 
identify the scientific principle from which the proposed testimony is inferred. Second, he/she 
should identify the scientific community to which that principle belongs. Finally, he/she is 
supposed to evaluate whether the scientific principle is generally accepted by the scientific 
community to which it belongs. Then, Frye v. United States’ response to ET&KA is:  
ET&KA-Frye v. United States: 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff 
(i) the principle from which the expert infers his/her testimony is generally 
accepted by the scientific community to which the expert belongs. 
I believe this response is unsatisfactory. The General Acceptance Test demands from the trial 
judge to identify three elements: the principle from which the expert testimony is inferred, the 
community to which that principle belongs and the acceptability of that principle in the relevant 
scientific community. But the trial judge, by definition, does not have specialized knowledge. 
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Therefore, he/she cannot determine those three elements. Deontic logic teaches that an obligation 
implies that the agent can perform the obligatory action, but ET&KA-Frye v. United States 
prescribes an action that the trial judge cannot execute. Additionally, even if the trial judge is 
able to identify both the relevant principle and scientific community, Frye v. United States does 
not define “acceptance.” Is it explicit acceptance of all and each of the members of the scientific 
community? It is the acceptance of some of its members? Does a scientific principle need a to 
fulfill a specific condition for being acceptable?, etc. One could interpret that Frye v. United 
States’ concept of acceptance is determined by peer review and publication processes, but this is 
not necessarily the case, as it is shown by the other legal cases.    
In 1975, the Congress of the United States passed into a law a set of explicitly formulated 
rules of evidence for federal courts: The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The rule for the 
admissibility of expert testimony (i.e., FRE 702) at that time stipulated:4 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
I interpret that the knowledge evaluations a trial judge is expected to execute under this 
regulation are substantially different form the ones prescribed by Frye v. United States. 
According to FRE 702 (1975), the admissibility of expert testimony does not depend on the 
nature of the matter at issue, as in Frye v. United States, but on the potential help or support that 
the specialized knowledge could give to the jury. In other words, while in Frye v. United States 
the admissibility of expert testimony is matter-dependent, for FRE 702 (1975) it is agent-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The current version of Rule 702 is different from the one quoted here because of its amendment 
in 2000. Given that such an amendment was a legislative reaction to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), I will explain these cases 
before working with the current version of Rule 702. To differentiate, I will refer to the former 
version as FRE 702 (1975). Otherwise, I will refer to the current version as FRE 702. 
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dependent. The practical consequence of this distinction is that under the FRE 702 (1975) a trial 
judge’s object of analysis is the knowledge that the jury possesses, or lacks, and not the matter at 
issue. The idea is that trial judges should determine whether the jury has the specialized 
knowledge that, according to the party requesting the expert testimony, is needed for the finding. 
If the jury possesses the type of knowledge under consideration, then the expert testimony would 
not give any help and, consequently, the expert testimony should not be admitted. 
FRE 702 (1975), unlike Frye v. United States, does not provide criteria for deciding if the 
expert has the knowledge needed by the jury. Instead, FRE 702 (1975) only defines experts as 
someone “qualified as [such] by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” This is 
potentially problematic because not all people qualified as an expert necessarily have the 
knowledge that the jury lacks. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) supplies the 
required criteria. Let me present the facts under litigation before relating this case to ET&KA. 
In this case, the petitioners, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, two children born with 
serious birth defects, and their parents sued the company Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
before the California State Court. The reason for their allegations were that Daubert’s and 
Schuller’s birth defects were caused by their mothers’ ingestions of Bendectin, a prescription 
antinausea drug marketed by the respondent. Arguing against these allegations, the respondent 
used an expert who, after reviewing all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects, 
concluded that no published study had found Bendectin to be a cause of fetuses’ malformations. 
The petitioners counter-attacked with the testimony of eight experts who using “in vitro” and “in 
vivo” animal studies, and pharmacological analysis of the chemical structure of Bendectin, found 
a link between this drug and fetuses’ malformations (p. 477). The California State Court, using 
the General Acceptance Test, denied the petitioners’ allegations because, given that the 
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aforementioned studies were not published or subject to a peer review process, they were not 
accepted by a scientific community. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed this decision. The petitioners, then, questioned the authority of the General Acceptance 
Test before the Supreme Court arguing that such a rule “was superseded by the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.” The Supreme Court agreed with the justification that nothing in 
FRE 702 (1975) includes the General Acceptance Test as a “necessary prerequisite to 
admissibility.” Therefore, the decisions of the California State Court and the Court of Appeals 
were cancelled. 
This case complements FRE 702 (1975) ruling that an expert testimony is helpful for the 
fact-finding if it is relevant and reliable. First, the Court’s concept of relevance is an 
interpretation of FRE 401 (1975). There, “relevant evidence” is defined as “that which has any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” According to the 
Court, this is a “liberal” standard of relevance whose core is the connection between the evidence 
and the legal inquiry (p. 587). Consequently, for the admissibility of expert testimony, reliability 
is the “valid scientific connection” between the requested testimony and the inquiry to be 
advanced by the jury (p. 592). The justification for this interpretation is that expert testimony that 
does not relate with the issue to be considered by the jury, does not give any help (p. 591). 
Second, the Court believes that recognizing the jury’s lack of specialized knowledge and the 
relevance of the knowledge that expert testimony could supply is not enough. In its words, “the 
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable” (p. 589). For the evaluation of reliability, the Court suggests a list of non-
restrictive criteria (pp. 593-594). The first criterion is “testability.” According to the Court, the 
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main feature of scientific endeavors is that they formulate hypotheses that are evaluated in 
different ways. This is why “a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or 
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and 
has been) tested.” The second criterion is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication. However, this is not a rigid rule, as in Frye v. United States, 
because, for the Court, not all novel scientific ideas are necessarily published.  Rather, this 
criterion should be complemented with the others. A third element is the low potential rate of 
error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the operation of the scientific 
technique under evaluation. A fourth factor to be taken into account is the general acceptance, or 
disapproval, that the supposed expert knowledge has produced in the relevant scientific 
community. Finally, the trial judge should not focus on the conclusions of the assessed scientific 
knowledge, but on the general principles and methods leading to it. 
With these elements, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals would suggest the 
following response for ET&KA: 
ET&KA-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff 
(i) The expert’s knowledge should have a “valid scientific connection” to 
inquiry advanced by the jury. 
(ii) The expert’s theory or technique is testable, or has been subjected to 
peer review and publication, or has a potentially low rate of error, and 
has and maintains standards of operation controlling, or is accepted by 
the relevant scientific community. 
Even though Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals provide a flexible test for the acceptability 
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of expert testimony, ET&KA remains unanswered. The trial judge lacks the scientific knowledge 
the expert testimony is supposed to provide, and without this knowledge he/she would not be 
able to find a “valid scientific connection” between the testimony and the issue under account. 
Maybe the trial judge would be able to find it if the testimony is evidentially relevant for the 
inquiry to be advanced by the jury, but ET&KA-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
demands something stronger that the trial judge, given his/her lack of specialized knowledge, 
will not be able to provide. To this objection, the Court would ambiguously respond: “We are 
confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will 
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test” (p. 593). 
As I mentioned before, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals only refers to scientific 
knowledge, but how can FRE 702 (1975) be applied to non-scientific specialized knowledge? 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) answers this question. In this case, a group of people, 
after surviving a car accident in which one of the tires of a minivan blew out overturning the 
vehicle, sued the tire maker before the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. 
Justifying their allegations, the plaintiffs used the expert testimony of an engineer, Dennis 
Carlson, Jr., who was supposed to testify that a defect in the tire’s manufacturer caused the blow 
out. The justification for this came from his visual and tactile inspection of the tire and “the 
theory that in the absence of at least two of four specific, physical symptoms indicating tire 
abuse, the tire failure of the sort that occurred here was caused by a defect.” The tire maker’s 
response was to remove this expert testimony because, allegedly, it did not satisfy FRE 702 
(1975). The District Court evaluated Carlson’s testimony using the reliability criteria from 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. For the District Court, there were no records of other 
tire experts using Carlson’s methodology of combining a tactile and visual inspection with the 
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theory of the two indicators of tire abuse. As a consequence, the District Court did not find 
evidence for testability and rate of error. Furthermore, the Court did not identify references to 
articles or papers validating Carlson’s approach. Therefore, Carlson’s testimony was excluded. 
The District Court, responding to the petitions of the plaintiffs, reviewed its decision recognizing 
that the Daubert factors are flexible, but its ultimate decision about Carlson’s testimony remained 
the same. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, reversing the District Court’s decision, 
clarified that the District Court erred as a matter of law applying Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals to Carlson’s testimony because it was not a scientific testimony, but a technical 
one, and the Daubert factors refer exclusively to scientific testimony. Finally, the Supreme 
Court, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision, stated that the Daubert factors of reliability 
apply to all types of expert testimony, whether it is scientific or not. 
Two ideas from this case are relevant for my project. First, according to the Supreme 
Court, since FRE 702 (1975) includes the expressions “scientific” and “technical” in referring to 
expert testimony, it does not make sense to differentiate between one and the other in the task 
entrusted to the trial judge. Consequently, the Daubert factors are applicable to scientific-based 
testimony, but also to technical-, skill- and experience-based testimony (p. 147). Second, the 
Court makes explicit the role of the knowledge attributor of the trial judge, as follows: 
“[N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of 
observations based on extensive and specialized experience. … [T]he question 
before the trial court [is] specific, not general. The trial court [has] to decide 
whether this particular expert [has] sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the 
jurors ‘in deciding the particular issues in the case.’” (p. 156) 
To emphasize, the function of the trial judge is not to evaluate the justificatory status of the 
experts proposed by the parties, and neither is it to assess the experts’ reasoning or 
argumentation. Rather, once the trial judge has identified that an expert testimony is required for 
the fact-finding, he/she has to decide whether the expert proposed by the parties has the 
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knowledge that is required. As I take it, the rules of admissibility provide criteria for allowing, or 
not, the introduction of expert knowledge in trial, but they do not say anything about the 
correctness of the attributions of expert knowledge. This hypothesis is confirmed by the current 
version of FRE 702.  
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case. 
However, deciding whether an expert has “sufficient facts or data,” or if his/her technical or 
scientific “principles or methods” are reliable and correctly apply to a legal case requires 
scientific and technical knowledge that, ex hypothesi, the trial judge lacks. SIst and ECst have 
competing solutions for this problem. In the next two sections I will explore these alternatives. 
 
3. Strict Invariantism and Expert Testimony 
Strict invariantism (SI) is the view that knowledge attributions do not vary from context 
to context because the standard for knowledge is only one, and it is high. I believe the most 
elaborate theory endorsing this position is Allen’s Deference-Education Account. For this view, 
the problem of expert testimony arises in legal systems including three statements that, although 
generally accepted, are individually problematic, and collectively poisonous for the cognitive 
aspirations of legal proceedings (Allen, 2012, p. 2). Such statements are: 
(1) There are different forms of knowledge. 
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(2) The different forms of knowledge can be accommodated for trial purposes by 
taking an internal perspective on the evidence being offered. 
(3) Experts can opine about the relationship between their field of expertise and 
the issues under litigation. 
A good example of the combination of (1) – (3) is FRE 702. This piece of legislation 
differentiates between “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” and common 
knowledge. The latter is possessed by the trier of facts (i.e., judge + jury) and the second one by 
witnesses qualified as experts. According to FRE 702, a person becomes an expert via the 
acquisition of expert “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Finally, such 
expertise may “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.”  
The trouble of combining (1) – (3) comes from the conflict between the fundamental 
cognitive aspirations of modern legal proceedings and the role that experts play in them. On one 
hand, legal proceedings want fact-finders to be able to process and deliberate upon the evidence 
presented at trial to reach a rational judgment about the facts under litigation (Allen, 2012, p. 11; 
Allen & Miller, 1993, pp. 1131-1132). On the other hand, experts can present their opinion about 
the field of expertise and the litigated facts (Allen, 2012, p. 19; Allen & Miller, 1993, pp. 1132-
1133). This puts the trier of facts in situations in which his/her knowledge is exceeded by the 
expert’s knowledge. For the problem of knowledge attributions faced by the trial judge, this 
means that the knowledge that trial judge is supposed to attribute “can only be understood with 
knowledge or experience that [he/she] lacks so that the chances are virtually zero that [he/she] 
will understand what the spoken words are intended to convey, or at least will be unable to 
intelligently appraise the truth of what is spoken” (Allen, 2012, p. 12). 
Allen’s justification for his solution to the ET&KA takes the form of a disjunctive 
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syllogism: 
(4) There are only two possible solutions to ET&KA. Either the trial judge defers 
his/her decision to the judgment of others or the trial judge is educated in the 
matters of his/her decision (Allen, 2012, p. 11; Allen & Miller, 1993, p. 1133).  
(5) A trial judge should not defer his/her decision to the judgment of others. 
(6) Therefore, a trial judge should be educated in the matter of his/her decision. 
“To defer,” in (4)’s first disjunct, “means to adopt someone else’s views as correct, not because 
you understand and agree, but because you are simply delegating that decision to someone else” 
(Allen, 2012, p. 11). Practically, if the trial judge defers his/her decision of determining whether 
the expert has the knowledge the jury needs, then it delegates such decision to the party 
requesting the expert testimony. With regards to (4)’s second disjunct, Allen claims that there are 
two ways of interpreting the trial judge’s lack of specialized knowledge. Either it is a cognitive 
limitation, or it is lack of information (Allen, 2013, p. 12). But it is not lack of information 
because, in normal conditions, judges and jurors know a vast variety of things. They do not have 
specialized or technical knowledge, but it does not mean they are not able to learn the scientific 
and technical matters relevant for their decisions.  
There are several reasons for which trial judges should not defer their decision. First, it 
goes against the cognitive aspirations of legal proceedings (Allen, 2013, p. 15). If modern legal 
systems want fact-finders to accurately determine the facts under litigation after rationally 
examining the evidence, then when the trier of facts delegates his/her decision, the cognitive goal 
of legal proceedings is not satisfied. A second argument against deference is that it allows for the 
introduction of “junk science” (Allen, 2013, p. 15). That is, false accounts that are presented as 
scientific truths in trial. If the trial judge delegates the decision of evaluating the expert’s 
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testimony to the party requesting it, there is no guarantee of impartial evaluation because the 
parties could validate a testimony that, although false, favors their interests.    
Even though from Allen’s disjunctive syllogism follows that trial judges should be 
educated in the matter of their decision, Allen also provides positive arguments for this 
conclusion. First, from his perspective, the only way of realizing the cognitive aspirations of 
legal proceedings is if the evidence is presented in an “educational mode” (Allen, 2012, p. 1). To 
be sure, legal proceedings want fact-finders to make rational decisions. For him, a decision is 
rational “if a fact finder could see clearly that one side was right and the other wrong” (Allen, 
2012, p. 16). A fact-finder cannot see clearly, if he/she does not have all the relevant 
information. Therefore, the fact-finders should be educated in the matters of their decisions. 
Second, the education alternative avoids the problem of junk science because the explanations 
required to educate fact-finders in the matters under litigation will eliminate false propositions 
(Allen, 2013, p. 14). Finally, with education, the problem of expert testimony is dissolved. 
Remember that this problem arises from the assumption that there are different types of 
knowledge, namely, expert knowledge and common knowledge. Yet, if the trial judge has 
common knowledge and specialized knowledge, then the problem of expert testimony does not 
exist. In Allen’s words: 
Some may think [that deference is a better alternative] because of the 
incompatibility between “scientific” knowledge and lay knowledge, but that is not 
the cause of the difficulties. Incompatibilities between forms of knowledge do not 
exist; there simply is or isn’t knowledge. (2012, p. 20) 
This quote, additionally, exemplifies Allen’s SI because for him there are not contextually-
dependent forms of knowledge. Instead, knowledge is just one: the scientific or technical one. 
This explains why he demands from trial judges to learn specialized knowledge, as it is shown 
by Allen’s response to the ET&KA: 
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ET&KA-Allen: 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff 
(i) The trial judge has the expert knowledge to verify that the expert meets 
the standards of knowledge fixed in the expert’s field of expertise. 
 
4. Epistemic Contextualism and Expert Testimony 
I believe that the most complete contextualist response to the ET&KA is the Epistemic 
Legal Contextualism of Golanski (2001). This is my reconstruction of his position: 
(7) The law encourages and expects its fact-finders to know things. 
(8) Legal evidence is often technical or scientific. 
(9) Fact-finders are expected to know some science. 
(10) Fact-finders are mostly non-experts. 
(11) No one could reasonably expect triers of fact to know technical and scientific 
things the way experts in their respective disciplines do. 
(12) “The evidence needed to know a proposition may differ in amount or kind 
depending on the circumstances in which we make our knowledge claims” 
(Golanski p. 566) 
The concept of knowledge that Golanski has in mind is the traditional concept of knowledge 
understood as justified truth belief (p. 565). As it is generally accepted, modern legal systems not 
only want fact-finders to have true beliefs of the facts under litigation, but they also require the 
fact-finders to be justified in believing. The reason for this is that, as is defended for most 
theories of epistemic justification, a belief could be accidentally true. Legal systems avoid 
accidental true beliefs and privilege epistemic justification. Propositions (7) and (8) are facts 
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that, given the previous sections of this paper, do not require extra clarification. (9) is inferred 
from (7) and (8), and although it is clear that the fact-finders are expected to have some sort of 
knowledge about the science or technique contained in expert testimony, the problem is the sort 
of knowledge which is expected for the fact-finders to have. (10), ex hypothesi, states that fact-
finders are not experts in the terms defined by FRE 702. If (10) is right, (11) would be correct, 
too. However, according to (9), fact-finders are expected to have some sort of scientific 
knowledge. For Golanski, from these last three propositions it is inferred that the knowledge the 
fact-finders are supposed to have should be different from the knowledge possessed by scientists 
and technicians, which is the conclusion of the argument in (12). 
Which type of knowledge are fact-finders expected to have and how does this knowledge 
differ from scientific and technical knowledge? Golanski states that “courts … ‘know’ things, the 
very thing courts do have expertise about” (p. 707). This claim is supported by the idea that 
knowledge is context-sensitive and, consequently, the scientific and technical knowledge that 
fact-finders should have is the kind appropriate for legal scenarios. To justify this position, 
Golanski uses Annis’s case that I referred to in Chapter 1 as JONES, and accommodates it to 
expert testimony. To recall, JONES shows that it is possible to attribute and deny knowledge to 
two different putative knowers, even when they satisfy the same epistemic condition. In that 
case, the putative knowers are Jones, a non-medically trained person having an ordinary 
conversation, and Smith, an MD student in one of his qualification exams. The epistemic 
condition that both satisfy is that they have the same evidence for the proposition “polio is 
produced by a virus,” namely, both read in a newspaper that Jonas Salk stated that polio is 
produced by a virus. However, given the different “issue-contexts” that Jones and Smith 
respectively have, it is right to attribute knowledge to Jones, but not to Smith. For Golanski, the 
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reason for this difference is that given the MD student’s issue-context, he would be expected to 
rule out alternatives to p that Jones is not expected to. Some of the alternatives suggested by 
Golanski that might be relevant to Smith, but not to Jones are: “[a] medical article may have 
challenged the integrity of Salk’s electron microscope; perhaps Dr. X in New Zealand has an 
obscure, contrasting theory; maybe Dr. Y claims Salk has mischaracterized the virus’s nucleic 
acid or the structure of its capsid” (Golanski, 2001, p. 703). According to Golanski, this is just an 
application of  DeRose’s principle that “the ability to rule out such alternatives would only be 
relevant if one were after a strong form of knowledge” (DeRose, 1992, p. 922). Given that Jones, 
unlike Smith, does not have a strong form of knowledge, he should not be expected to rule out 
the possibilities that an MD student is expected to. 
To illuminate the problem of expert testimony with these ideas, Golanski proposes the 
following version of JONES:  
JONES (EXPERT TESTIMONY) 
Let us give the polio/virus personae courtroom roles, Smith being an expert 
witness, Jones a lay juror. Smith testifies that she has studied a lot, has so many 
degrees and holds so many professional positions. Based on all her expertise, she 
opines that Company X's toxic product could not have caused L's polio because Y 
polio is caused by a virus. Believing Smith, Jones now also knows at least that 
much—that polio is caused by a virus. (pp. 704-705) 
As in the original case, in Golanski’s version of JONES, it is not right to expect Jones, a lay 
juror, to rule out the possibilities that Smith, an expert witness, is able to rule out. However, it 
does not mean that Jones does not have knowledge. Instead, Jones knows according to the legal 
standards. Applying this to the ET&KA, for Golanski, the expression “the expert knows that p” 
asserted by a trial judge implicates the shifting meaning of “knows.” A trial judge should not be 
expected to rule out the same counter-possibilities that an expert is expected to rule out. The 
“issue-context” of trial judges activities justify this distinction. In Golanski’s words, 
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[i]n its gatekeeping role, the court is making a knowledge claim about the expert’s 
approach and methodology and is saying that, in that context, “E knows P**,” or 
“E knows what it takes to know that P*” (by law’s standard, the Daubert criteria), 
and thus “E’s testimony will place the fact-finder in a better position for 
ascertaining truth,” that is, for acquiring JTB. (p. 714) 
If this is right, a trial judge does not need to possess the knowledge he/she is attributing to the 
expert, as it is required by SIsts. Rather, all that is required for the correction of the trial judge’s 
knowledge attribution is enough knowledge given his/her practical purposes. This is Golanski’s 
response to the ET&KA: 
ET&KA-Golanski 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff 
(i) The trial judge is in a good enough epistemic position to assert that the 
expert knows that p for the law’s purposes. 
 
5. Agendivism and Expert Testimony 
An agendivistic account of ET&KA starts by clarifying the agendas and sub-agendas 
involved. Broadly speaking, the main epistemic agenda of legal proceedings is the fact-finder’s 
responsibility of accurately determining the facts under litigation. Sometimes, the proper 
advancing of this agenda calls for specialized information that the fact-finder lacks. In these 
cases, three interrelated agendas arise. The agenda to be advanced by the fact-finder is split in 
two sub-agendas. First, a trial judge is in charge of admitting the expert’s testimony. For this, the 
trial judge has to decide whether the expert is a reliable source of specialized information. Which 
means, given the discussion I advanced in Chapter 2, the trial judge is in charge of attributing 
specialized knowledge to the expert. Second, once the expert’s testimony is admitted, the jury 
would have all the information for advancing its original agenda. Third, the expert is expected to 
provide the relevant specialized information for the fact-finders (i.e., trial judge + jury) to 
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properly close their respective agendas. If this interpretation is right, my object of study is the 
agenda that the trial judge is supposed to advance, along with the information that the expert is 
expected to provide him/her for that. To clarify, remember the difference between the problem of 
knowledge attribution and the problem of knowledge possession. In Chapter 1, I stated that while 
the former is whether A properly asserts that K knows that p, the latter is whether K knows that p. 
For ET&KA, this is the difference between the following propositions: 
(13) A trial judge asserts that the expert knows that p. 
(14) The expert knows that p. 
The problem is not whether the expert knows that p, but whether the trial judge correctly asserts 
that the expert knows that p.  
Going back to the theories accounting for ET&KA reconstructed in the previous sections, 
Allen incorrectly mixes the problem of knowledge attribution with the problem of knowledge 
possession because he expects the trial judge to have the expert knowledge he/she is supposed to 
attribute. This makes knowledge attributions of specialized knowledge too hard to obtain since it 
demands from the trial judge to acquire the specialized knowledge that he/she is attributing 
through an ad hoc education provided by the parties.5 Golanski seems to take the difference 
between the problems of knowledge possession and knowledge attribution into account. 
However, he does not establish clear criteria for the correctness of attributions of specialized 
knowledge. The expression “a good enough epistemic position … for law’s purposes” in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 An additional problem for this proposal is that it distorts the epistemic function of the parties 
under litigation. To be sure, adversarial legal proceedings are designed in such a way that the 
fact-finder comes to know the facts in dispute because the parties diligently collect and present 
the evidence that favors their respective positions (Goldman, 2005, p. 167). For Allen, on the 
contrary, “trials are educational events in which the fact finder is expected to comprehend, 
process, and deliberate on the evidence, and as a result to reach rational conclusions” (Allen, 
2012, p. 1). However, to demand from the parties the education of the trier of facts is to impose 
responsibilities beyond their epistemic ones.	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ET&KA-Golanski could be interpreted in two different ways: as the purposes of this trial at hand, 
at this specific time, or as the purposes of trials in general (Sanders, 2010, p. 1394). In the first 
interpretation, if the concern is the case at hand, then the trial judge would attribute knowledge 
when the expert has enough knowledge to answer the particular question under litigation. The 
problem with this is that expert knowledge such as scientific explanation is general, and the trial 
judge cannot always demand from experts to know the particularities responding to a particular 
case. Furthermore, the main worry of the case at hand is to decide within the procedural time-
constrains. This could press the trial judge to attribute knowledge just good enough to decide this 
case, setting the bar of knowledge attributions too low and allowing for junk science. In the 
second interpretation, if the concern is the general purposes of trial, then the issue is not to 
decide but to arrive to a factually correct outcome. Consequently, the trial judge would attribute 
knowledge to experts able to provide general explanations. The problem with this alternative is 
that the bar for correct knowledge attributions is set too high since general theories are not of too 
much help to lay jurors. 
I believe clear criteria for the correctness of knowledge attributions of specialized 
knowledge starts with an accurate diagnosis of ET&KA. To recall, Allen claims that the issue of 
ET&KA is that the knowledge that the trial judge is supposed to attribute “can only be 
understood with knowledge or experience that [he/she] lacks so that the chances are virtually 
zero that [he/she] will understand what the spoken words are intended to convey, or at least will 
be unable to intelligently appraise the truth of what is spoken” (Allen, 2012, p. 12). But this 
interpretation is too strong. Usually when a layperson listens to an expert, he/she understands 
some of the words conveyed by the expert. I will borrow Goldman’s distinction between esoteric 
and exoteric statements within an expert discourse to clarify my point (2001, p. 99). While the 
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former are an essential part of the specialized knowledge and are inaccessible for a lay person, 
the latter are outside the core of the domain of expertise and could be understood by a lay person 
either when they are conveyed or later. For instance, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
a description of the chemical structure of Bendectin is esoteric, but the concept of fetus 
malformation is exoteric. This distinction provides a more accurate picture of ET&KA because to 
say that the trial judge does not understand any of the words conveyed by the expert seems 
wrong. Instead, what they do not understand are the esoteric statements conveyed by the expert. 
My view is that the understanding of the exoteric statements of an expert testimony would 
suffice for properly attributing knowledge to the expert in legal contexts. Before developing this 
idea, let me make another point about Allen’s account. 
If my moderate interpretation of ET&KA seems to be right, why does Allen interpret 
ET&KA in such an extreme way? I believe this interpretation facilitates his argumentation. To be 
sure, I believe Allen incurs two types of fallacies: a false dilemma and a straw man fallacy. In 
bold terms, there is a false dilemma when the arguer justifies his/her point with an exclusive 
disjunction, yet there is at least one additional option. Practically, Allen states that “[t]here are 
only two possible solutions to [ET&KA]. Either the necessary background information must be 
provided somehow, or fact finders must defer to the judgment of others” (Allen, 2012, p. 11; 
Allen & Miller, 1993, p. 1133). This disjunction implies that either the trial judge understands 
the statements by the expert, or he/she does not. However, it is possible to imagine an 
intermediate position in which the trial judge understands the expert’s exoteric statements. 
Indeed, Allen would accept this alternative because, as I already stated, for him, judges and 
jurors are able to know a large variety of things. Moving to Allen’s second argumentative 
mistake, there is a straw man fallacy when the arguer presents his/her opponent in a weak way so 
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that the argumentative attack is easier. When Allen states that if the trial judge does not acquire 
the specialized knowledge that the expert has, then the trial judge defers his/her decision, he is 
underestimating the reasoning capacities of fact finders. They can learn specialized knowledge, 
even if it is not exactly the same knowledge that the expert possesses. If this is right, this would 
not be deference, in the terms stipulated by Allen. 
Going back to my theory, a crucial question for the trial judge is which type of 
specialized information is required for the jury to advance its cognitive agenda. In Chapter 2, I 
stated that the function of knowledge attributions is to flag out sources of information relevant to 
advance cognitive agendas. For ET&KA, the idea is that the trial judge must flag out the expert 
as a relevant source of information for the jury to advance its factual finding. Given that it is not 
part of the jury’s agenda to decide about matters of specialized knowledge, the trial judge does 
not need to scrutinize the expert’s esoteric propositions. Which of those propositions are relevant 
for the jury’s agenda? Given that the fact-finding cannot be accomplished because the jury does 
not have determined specialized information, the required information should be the one 
matching the jury’s lacking. But, how can the trial judge correctly attribute the specialized 
knowledge that the jury does not have to the expert if the trial judge him/herself does not have 
such knowledge?  
According to Goldman, esoteric statements are part of the premises and lemmas of the 
arguments presented by experts. This explains why it is difficult for a layperson to understand 
specialized arguments. However, it does not mean a layperson cannot be justified in accepting 
the conclusion of a specialized argument. Explaining this, Goldman differentiates between direct 
and indirect argumentative justification. On one hand, a hearer is directly justified in believing 
the conclusion of an argument if he is justified in believing its premises and understands the 
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inferential connections between them and the conclusion (Goldman, 2001, p. 94). On the other 
hand,  “[t]he idea of indirect argumentative justification arises from the idea that one speaker in a 
debate may demonstrate dialectical superiority over the other, and this dialectical superiority 
might be a plausible indicator for [a lay] of greater expertise” (p. 95). To clarify, Goldman’s 
concept of indirect argumentative justification is limited to situations where two experts argue 
defending two contrary propositions and a non-expert has to decide which them is right. If one of 
the experts has dialectical superiority over the other, it would reasonably seem to the layperson 
that the former has more expertise than the latter. Some of the signs of dialectical superiority 
providing indirect argumentative justification suggested for Goldman are the debate in which one 
expert presents an argument and his/her counterpart is not able to provide a rebuttal for it, or the 
comparative quickness or smoothness with which the experts respond. 
My intuition with ET&KA is that the correctness of a trial judge’s knowledge attribution 
comes from indirect justification as well. To recall, the advancement of the jury’s agenda 
requires specialized information that a trial judge is in charge of identifying in (i.e., attributing 
to) the expert witnesses presented by the parties. For this attribution, the trial judge does not need 
to have the information he/she is attributing to the expert, but to have an indication that the 
expert is the source of the required information. This indication comes from the relevance of the 
expert’s exoteric statements to the jury’s agenda. By relevance, I mean the information that the 
jury needs to pursue its finding. This is my proposal: 
ET&KA-Agendivism: 
A trial judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff 
(i) The finding of the facts requires the knowledge that p. 
(ii) The trial judge properly asserts that the jury does not know that p. 
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(iii) The trial judge is indirectly justified in believing that the expert knows 
that p. 
(i) determines the connection between the information the trial judge is expected to attribute and 
the agenda for which that information is relevant. (ii) shows that the agent in charge of 
advancing the agenda in account is not able to satisfy the role that was assigned to him/her. (iii) 
reveals the normative character of my proposal. This requirement of indirect justification here is 
less stringent than Allen’s demand of the trial judge knowing p to attribute p, and more specific 
than Golanski’s idea of a good enough epistemic position given the law’s purposes. This shows 
the superiority of Agendivism over SI and EC in ET&KA. 
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Chapter 5: Juries and Tribunals: Knowledge Attributions and Group Epistemology 
 
1. Introduction 
Knowledge can be attributed to individuals and groups. For instance, just as it would be 
proper to say that the suspect knows that it would be better to plead guilty, it would be proper to 
assert that the Supreme Court knows the implications of its last decision on affirmative action. 
Theories of group epistemology compete providing the best account for group knowledge 
attributions. Specially, they study group belief and group epistemic justification as important 
components of group knowledge. Two main approaches are important here, namely 
Summativism and Non-Summativism. The concept of Summativism (S) was a contribution of 
Anthony Quinton (1975-1976) to the social epistemology: 
Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions and attitudes and to make decisions and 
make promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe 
mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such 
predicates to its members. With such mental states as beliefs and attitudes, the 
ascriptions are of what I have called a summative kind. (p. 17) 
In this sense, S refers to a view taking into account everyday mental states attributed to groups. 
As a theory of group belief, S holds that: 
S-belief: A group (G) believes that p iff all or some of G’s members believe that 
p. 
And as a theory of epistemic justification, 
S-Epistemic Justification: G is justified in believing that p, iff all or some of G’s 
members are justified in believing that p. 
Non-summativism (NS) denies that group belief and epistemic justification depend on the 
epistemic status of G’s members. Therefore, 
NS-belief: G’s belief that p does not depend on G’s members’ beliefs that p. 
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And, 
NS-Epistemic Justification: G’s justified belief that p does not depend on G’s 
members’ justified belief that p. 
In a positive way, they claim that it is possible to attribute knowledge to groups even when there 
is not knowledge recognition for their members. In other words, they consider groups as 
epistemic agents over and above their individual members. 
NSsts use the divergence argument to show that G’s justificatory status diverges from the 
status of its members. One version of this argument reveals that if G and its members have 
different evidence for p, then G’s and G’s members’ justificatory status might diverge. In making 
this case, NSsts turn to legal scenarios where, given the exclusionary rules of evidence (i.e., rules 
that forbid the introduction of irrelevant, potentially confusing, or illegally obtained evidence in 
a criminal trial), the jury is asked to ignore relevant information in its deliberations. However, it 
is always possible for the jurors to take the supposed suppressed information into account in their 
personal consideration. As a part of her criticism against NS, Lackey (2013) captures the issue in 
the following way: 
DIFFERENT EVIDENCE 
A jury is deliberating about whether the defendant in a murder trial is innocent or 
guilty.  Each member of the jury is privy to evidence that the defendant was seen 
fleeing the scene of the crime with blood spattered on his clothes, but it is 
grounded in hearsay that, though reliable, was ruled as inadmissible by the judge. 
Given only the admissible evidence, the jury as a group justifiedly believes that 
the defendant is innocent, but not a single juror justifiedly believes this 
proposition because it is defeated by the relevant reliable hearsay evidence. (p. 3) 
I will devote the first part of this chapter to the study of the main interpretations around 
DIFFERENT EVIDENCE. First, I will present the most elaborate argument for this case: 
Frederick Schmitt’s notion of chartered groups (1994). Second, I will reconstruct and evaluate 
the arguments that have lead Lackey to suspect that DIFFERENT EVIDENCE is not a threat for 
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S (2013). Finally, departing from Lackey, I will show that DIFFERENT EVIDENCE represents 
a serious objection for S. For the sake of discussion, assume that justified belief is a necessary 
condition for knowledge. Then, accounts of DIFERENT EVIDENCE would endorse one of the 
following possibilities of knowledge attributions: 
(1) The jury knows that the defendant is innocent, and the jurors do not know that 
the defendant is innocent. 
(2) The jury does not know that the defendant is innocent, and the jurors do not 
know that the defendant is innocent. 
(3) The jury does not know that the defendant is innocent, and the jurors know 
that the defendant is innocent. 
(4) The jury knows that the defendant is innocent, and the jurors know that the 
defendant is innocent. 
To clarify, the justification of the proposition “the defendant is innocent” depends on the lack of 
defeaters for p. The defeater of p, ex hypothesi, is the hearsay evidence that “the defendant was 
seen fleeing the scene of the crime with blood spattered on his clothes.” With this in mind, I 
interpret that Schmitt would endorse (1) and Lackey (2). My view is that (1) is the best 
alternative too, but, I disagree with Schmitt’s reasons. Broadly speaking, Schmitt claims that to 
attribute knowledge to the jury is right because given that the jury is a group created to perform a 
particular action, it has special epistemic standards such as the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
For Schmitt, to deny knowledge to the jurors is also right because they have a defeater for p. 
Even though Lackey would accept that the knowledge denial to the jurors is right, she would not 
tolerate the knowledge attribution to a jury because, for her, the hearsay rule obeys practical 
concerns, but not necessarily epistemic ones. Additionally, she points out that to state that the 
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jury only exists under its constitutive rules, as Schmitt does, leads to the absurd consequence that 
a jury which breaks the law is not a jury. Departing from Lackey, I will justify that the hearsay 
rule makes epistemic sense. Second, I will replace the notion of a chartered group with the notion 
of an agenda to explain how it is right to attribute knowledge to the jury, but wrong to attribute 
knowledge to the jurors. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will confirm my agendivistic conclusions on 
DIFFERENT EVIDENCE providing a response for THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX (List & 
Pettit, 2002, p. 93; 2011, pp. 45-46). Without entering in specific details here, some collective 
courts adopt majoritarian procedures for making their decisions. That is, they make decisions 
given the majority of votes from their members. The problem is that majoritarian procedures do 
not necessarily lead to rational group decisions. Then, courts could face a dilemma: either respect 
the votes of their individual members and sacrifice group rationality, or ignore the judgments of 
their members and satisfy group rationality. Agendivism proposes a solution for THE 
DOCTRINAL PARADOX in which the beliefs of the individual judges are respected without 
sacrificing collective rationality. 
 
2. On Different Evidence 
I want to start re-formulating DIFFERENT EVIDENCE because Lackey’s version has 
some terminological imprecisions begging for correction. I believe Lackey overlooks two 
important elements of adversarial criminal proceedings: the burden of proof and the presumption 
of innocence. Shortly, the burden of proof is the obligation of prosecutors to justify, according to 
the appropriate standard of proof, that the accused is guilty. The presumption of innocence 
requires the juries to assume that the defendant is innocent until and unless the prosecutor has 
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satisfied his/her obligation (Laudan, 2006, p. 89). One important epistemological consequence is 
that the fact-finder does not have to know whether the defendant is innocent. Instead, the jury is 
supposed to know whether the defendant is guilty, or they assume that the defendant is innocent. 
This explains why the main plea possibilities in a criminal procedure are “guilty” and “non-
guilty.” Lackey uses the expression “innocent” for “not guilty.” I think this is an imprecision 
because to know that the defendant is “innocent” implies an argument showing that the 
defendant did not perform the alleged crime. Differently, when a defendant is “not guilty” all 
that is said is that the argument for “guilty” did not reach the standard required. 
A version of DIFFERENT EVIDENCE sensitive to these terminological precisions could 
be: 
DIFFERENT EVIDENCE* 
A jury is deliberating about whether the defendant in a murder trial is guilty or not 
guilty. Each member of the jury is privy to evidence that the defendant was seen 
fleeing the scene of the crime with blood spattered on his clothes, but it is 
grounded in hearsay that, though reliable, was ruled as inadmissible by the judge.  
Given only the admissible evidence, the jury, as a group, justifiedly believes that 
the defendant is not guilty, but not a single juror justifiedly believes this 
proposition because it is defeated by the relevant reliable hearsay evidence. 
In this version the expression “justifiedly believe that the defendant is not guilty” is to believe, 
given the available evidence, that the prosecutor did not satisfy the burden of proof. In this sense, 
the jury would not believe that the defendant is “innocent,” as stated by Lackey. Rather, the jury 
would fail to justifiedly believe that the defendant is guilty. If this new version of DIFFERENT 
EVIDENCE is right, knowledge attributions (1) – (4) should be modified as follows: 
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(1)* The jury knows that the defendant is not guilty, and the jurors do not know 
that the defendant is not guilty. 
(2)* The jury does not know that the defendant is not guilty, and the jurors do not 
know that the defendant is not guilty. 
(3)* The jury does not know that the defendant is not guilty, and the jurors know 
that the defendant is not guilty. 
(4)* The jury knows that the defendant is not guilty, and the jurors know that the 
defendant is not guilty. 
Given that the debate Schmitt-Lackey is in terms of DIFFERENT EVIDENCE and propositions 
(1) – (4), I am going to work with this version, but allow me to first clarify that a more accurate 
version of the case would be DIFFERENT EVIDENCE* and propositions (1)* – (4)*. 
 
2.1 An Interpretation of Different Evidence Against Summativism 
Schmitt’s endorsement of (1) is a consequence of his interpretation of JONES. To recall, 
JONES is supposed to capture our intuitions about knowledge attributions and denials when 
Jones, a non-medically trained person in an ordinary conversation, and Smith, an MD student 
taking one exam, respectively state that they know that “polio is produced by a virus” because 
they read so in a newspaper. Accounting for this case, its creator, Annis, claims that social or 
occupational roles impose special epistemic standards that are different from the ordinary ones 
(1978, p. 215). As a consequence, knowledge attributions to individuals playing a social or 
occupational role are different from the ones to common individuals. Practically, although Jones 
and Smith have the same evidence for p, it is right to attribute knowledge to the former but not to 
the latter. 
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Schmitt interprets JONES differently. In his words, “I would agree that the doctor would 
not be medically justified in stating the proposition, nor in acting in her medical practice … But 
it hardly follows that the doctor is not epistemically justified in belief” (1994, p. 269, italics in 
the original). To be sure, for Schmitt, there is no reason for thinking that Smith is not justified in 
believing that polio is caused by a virus after reading a newspaper reporting that Jonas Salk 
discovered so. However, Schmitt does not deny that Smith’s belief is questionable, yet this does 
not have to do with epistemic standards, but with the standards for social and occupational roles 
such as the ones required for medical statements and actions. Why should we accept knowledge 
attributions that fall short in standards for social and occupational roles? Schmitt’s response is 
that specialists have a life beyond their social and occupational roles. We should allow for 
ordinary epistemic standards for specialists because when they are not performing their special 
activities, they have to rely on common knowledge (p. 271). 
Once Schmitt has shown that ordinary epistemic standards are independent from social 
and occupational roles in this fashion, he wonders if ordinary epistemic standards are also 
independent from the social role of groups. His answer is negative, at least for a special type of 
group which he refers to as a chartered group, and defines as a group  “founded to perform a 
particular action or actions of a certain kind” (p. 272). The reason for this distinction between 
individual and group knowledge attributions is that whereas specialists have a life beyond the 
performance of their occupational roles, chartered groups only exist because of the role assigned 
to them. To clarify, according to Schmitt, “a set of individuals forms a group just in case the 
members of the set each openly expresses his or her willingness to act jointly with the other 
members of the set” (p. 260). While for most groups individuals do not need to express the 
activity they are disposed to jointly perform, for charter groups such activity might be openly 
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indicated. Two consequences follow from this. First, given the member’s will that is expressed in 
the establishment of the group, chartered groups can only perform the action for which they were 
created. Second, since chartered groups do not have a life beyond their constitutive office, there 
is no reason for allowing ordinary epistemic standards for them. Therefore, a correct knowledge 
attribution to a chartered group depends on the special epistemic standards fixing the 
admissibility and strength of the reasons required for the performance of its constitutive action. 
This explains why, in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE, it is right to attribute knowledge to the jury and 
not to its members. In Schmitt’s words, “[a] court … would not lose its justification merely 
because a member possesses [hearsay evidence]. And this is because in his legal capacity, the 
court rightly excludes hearsay, and its legal capacity is the only capacity in which it operates” (p. 
274). 
2.2 An Interpretation of Different Evidence Favoring Summativism 
A standard argument for DIFFERENT EVIDENCE, such as Schmitt’s, endorses (1). That 
is, it attributes knowledge to the jury and denies knowledge to the jurors. The usual reason for 
this option is that while the latter has a defeater for p, the former does not. If this is right, an 
argument against DIFFERENT EVIDENCE has the burden of providing reasons against (1). 
Lackey accepts this challenge showing that the assumption leading to (1) is wrong. To be sure, 
for her, to hold (1) presupposes that both the knowledge attribution to the jury and the 
knowledge denial to the jurors are motivated on epistemic reasons. “But why should we think the 
notion of justification is epistemic in both evaluations?” (p. 15), Lackey inquires. Specifically, 
she claims that the notion of justification in the knowledge attribution to the jury is not 
epistemic. The reason for this is that “the central motivation for ruling out hearsay evidence is 
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practical or procedural rather than epistemic” (p. 15). Two independent arguments support this 
claim. 
The first argument points out that that the problem of excluding hearsay evidence does 
not have to do with the determination of the truth but with the rights of the parties under 
litigation. To clarify, if it were allowed for one of the parties under litigation to include hearsay 
evidence, the counterpart would not be able of examining and cross-examining the original 
source of information. This unfairly favors the party using the hearsay. Lackey supports this 
point with the Ohio State Bar Association statement that “hearsay evidence is generally not 
admissible because it may place crucial evidence before the court without allowing the other side 
to confront the person who is being quoted to challenge the accuracy of the statement or the 
credibility of the person who made it” (as cited in Lackey, 2013, p. 15). The second argument 
invites us to imagine two pieces of evidence. One piece is hearsay produced by a highly reliable 
process. Another piece is first hand evidence that is not so reliable, for instance, a confession 
obtained after several exhausting hours of practicing harsh interrogation on the suspect. 
Disregarding its truth conduciveness, the former would be inadmissible, and the latter could be 
legitimately taken into consideration. 
Putting all this together in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE, if the jury would have included the 
hearsay that the defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the crime with blood spattered on his 
clothes in its deliberations, it would have not known that the defendant is innocent because it 
would have had a reliable defeater for its belief. However, given that the jury followed the 
exclusionary rules of evidence zealously, it excluded the just mentioned hearsay, and it does not 
have a defeater for p. Now, given that the reason for excluding the defeater is not epistemic, but 
procedural, the jury is not epistemically justified. In Lackey’s words, “this shows only that while 
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both the jury and the individual jurors epistemically justifiedly believe that the defendant is 
guilty, the jury is legally justified in believing that the defendant is innocent” (pp. 15-16). 
According to Lackey, a possible objection to her view comes from Schmitt’s concept of 
chartered group. Avoiding unnecessary repetition, for Schmitt, it does not make sense to say that 
if the jury would have taken the hearsay under account, it would have been epistemically 
justified because this is not a possibility for the jury. In his words, “the court rightly excludes 
hearsay, and its legal capacity is the only capacity in which it operates” (Schmitt 1995, p. 274). 
Lackey responds to this objection with a reductio ad absurdum. Assume that the only capacity in 
which the jury operates is its legal capacity. Then, the jury only is a jury when it follows the law. 
But, “a jury might consider hearsay evidence when forming its belief about a defendant’s 
innocence or guilt.” Therefore, that jury is not a jury! But this conclusion is wrong, “juries can 
make mistakes or break the rules and still remain a jury” (Lackey, 2013, p. 16). 
Another way of squelching Schmitt’s objection is showing that to defend DIFFERENT 
EVIDENCE with the notion of chartered group makes DIFFERENT EVIDENCE vulnerable to 
the Illegitimate Manipulation of Evidence Problem. This problem is defined by Lackey in the 
following terms: “[A]ny account of the justification of group beliefs that permits group epistemic 
justification to be achieved through the illegitimate manipulation of evidence should be rejected” 
(p. 13). To clarify, this problem was originally posed for the most popular NS account of group 
justification: the Joint Acceptance Account (Gilbert, 1989, p. 306; Schmitt, 1994, p. 265; Halki, 
2011; 150). Without referring to any particular theory, this approach states that an attributor, A, 
correctly states that a group, G, knows that p, when G’s members jointly accept that p. 
A fragment of one of Lackey’s multiple counter-examples against this principle suffices 
to illustrate the Illegitimate Manipulation of Evidence Problem. 
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FABRICATING EVIDENCE 
Phillip Morris is one of the largest tobacco companies in the world, and each of its 
operative members is individually aware of the massive amounts of scientific 
evidence revealing not only the addictiveness of smoking, but also the links it has 
with lung cancer and heart disease.  Entirely because of what is at stake 
financially and legally, however, each of these members decides to jointly accept 
that all of the scientists working on the relationship between smoking and health 
problems are liars. (p. 12) 
This case shows how the joint account enables attributions of knowledge on the basis of 
manipulation and fabrication of evidence. For Lackey, Schmitt’s defense of DIFFERENT 
EVIDENCE allows for illegitimate manipulation of evidence too. Given that the jury is 
catalogued as a chartered group, and that there is no constrains for chartered groups, then there is 
no constrains on the evidence the jury is authorized to exclude. As a consequence, for Lackey, 
the jury could exclude all the evidence contrary to its view, and at the end it would be justified in 
believing because, given the illegitimate manipulation of evidence, the jury would not have any 
defeater against its view. In this sense, the jury could unacceptably behave as, to use Lackey’s 
example, a “group … whose primary charter is to exclude any evidence that conflicts with their 
belief that aliens have visited Roswell, New Mexico? In such a case, the group could end up 
justifiedly believing that aliens have visited Roswell simply because they are illegitimately 
restricting the evidence available to them” (p. 17). 
 
2.3 Different Evidence Reloaded   
I believe the best way of introducing my interpretation of DIFFERENT EVIDENCE is 
contrasting it with the views studied until now. Firstly, Schmitt endorses (1). For one thing, he 
approves the knowledge attribution to the jury because given the jury’s legal capacity, it 
correctly excludes the hearsay evidence that “the defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the 
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crime with blood spattered on his clothes” defeating the proposition that “the defendant was 
innocent.” For the other, Schmitt also favors the knowledge denial to the jurors because they 
have a defeater against p. Secondly, Lackey prefers (2). To recall, this is the knowledge 
attribution claiming that “The jury does not know that the defendant is innocent, and the jurors 
do not know that the defendant is innocent.” On one hand, she, unlike Schmitt, advocates for the 
knowledge denial to the jury, for it is not epistemically justified. On the other, she, as Schmitt, 
likes the knowledge denial to the jurors because of the defeater they posses. Finally, I find (1) 
more compelling than the other alternatives. On one side, unlike Lackey, I give my thumbs up to 
attributing knowledge to the jury, but I disagree with Schmitt’s justification for it. On the other 
side, I give my thumbs down to attributing knowledge to the jurors; yet, it is not because they 
have a defeater against p, as Schmitt and Lackey suggest, but because I do not believe it is proper 
to attribute knowledge to a juror qua juror, when he/she uses hearsay evidence. 
From my view, neither Lackey nor Schmitt properly respond to the problem of 
knowledge attributions in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE. Given that I defend that it is appropriate to 
attribute knowledge to the jury, I have to defend this position from Lackey’s attack. I am not 
going to defend Schmitt’s argumentation for the knowledge attribution to the jury because I 
believe Lackey is right in her criticisms against the concept of a chartered group. Rather, I will 
propose a new justification for the knowledge attribution to the jury. From my perspective, 
knowledge attributions have the purpose of stating that a cognitive agenda has been properly 
closed. Given that the object of knowledge attributions is cognitive agendas, the conditions under 
which a knowledge attribution is properly closed or advanced depends on the nature of the 
cognitive agenda claimed to have been properly closed or advanced. I am going to defend 
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attributing knowledge to the jury against Lackey’s argumentation, before bravely presenting my 
own view. 
 
2.3.1 The Correctness of Knowledge Attributions to the Jury in Different Evidence: A 
Negative Justification 
My contention is that the notion of justification used in the knowledge attribution to the 
jury is epistemic. Arguing for this, I have the burden of showing that Lackey’s position is wrong. 
As I take it, Lackey’s central point is that “The central motivation for ruling out hearsay 
evidence is practical or procedural rather than epistemic” (Lackey, 2013, p. 15). To explain my 
strategy attacking this claim, I want to clarify the concept of “epistemic” because its scope 
changes depending on the definition used. To clarify, “epistemic” is an adjective qualifying 
something with the normative dimensions of knowledge. For what matters in this paper, there is 
a narrow and a broad concept of epistemic. Lackey uses the narrow one. She understands 
“epistemic” in terms of “reliability,” as it is shown in the following quote referring to Schmitt’s 
account of group beliefs: “the epistemic goodness or badness … can … be fleshed out in terms 
of traditional justification-conferring features, such as being produced by a reliable process, 
being grounded in adequate evidence, and so on” (p. 6). Now, “reliability,” for her, is truth-
conduciveness. This is instantiated in the fragment where she differentiates “inadmissibility” 
from “unreliability.” This is the relevant quote: “[B]eing inadmissible is clearly not the same as 
being unreliable or otherwise non-truth-conducive” (p. 15). To conclude, for Lackey, something 
is qualified as epistemic when it is, or it is not, truth-conducive. Given that the motivation for 
ruling out hearsay evidence is not truth-conducive, then it is not epistemic.  
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From my perspective, truth-conduciveness is not the only epistemic goal. My intuition is 
that if the hearsay rule is justified for any other epistemic end, then such rule is epistemically 
justified. To illustrate, I want to focus on one end that has special importance for legal contexts, 
namely, error avoidance. The notion of reliability also provides some insight for my proposal. 
Truth conduciveness in the sense of reliability is just error avoidance. A comparison between 
two pairs of Goldman’s concepts, “reliability” and “error,” and “power” and “ignorance” justify 
this point. For Goldman, reliability is “a tendency to produce a high truth ratio of beliefs,” and 
error is “false belief” (1986, p. 27). The correlation between these two concepts is inversely 
proportional. That is, the more reliable a cognitive procedure is, the smaller the proportion of 
errors admitted. Conversely, unreliable cognitive processes such as “confused reasoning, wishful 
thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization 
… tend to produce error a large proportion of the time” (1976, p. 10). Now, contrast the second 
pair of concepts. Power is “the capacity to produce true beliefs in answer to a high ratio of 
questions one wants to answer or problems one wants to solve,” and ignorance is “the absence of 
true belief” (1986, p. 27). In this sense, the more powerful the cognitive agent is, the less 
ignorance he suffers from.  If this is right, from this, I infer that we value reliable cognitive 
processes because we want true beliefs, but also because we want to avoid error. My intuition is 
confirmed by Goldman in the following lines: “A reliable process, method, or procedure is an 
antidote to error. The greater the reliability of one's methods, the smaller one's proportion of 
errors” (1986, p. 27). This proves that truth-conduciveness and error avoidance are two different 
epistemic goals. It is clear that obtaining truth implies avoiding error, but we can imagine a 
cognitive agent with the aim of obtaining truth and another cognitive agent with the goal of 
avoiding error. While the first would be, prima facie, prone to accept a vast set of propositions 
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than later can be proven to be false, the second would consider a generous number of 
propositions unacceptable until they are proven to be true. Going back to my main concern here, 
if the motivation for the hearsay rule is error avoidance, then it is epistemic. This is my main 
justification for refusing Lackey’s claim that “The central motivation for ruling out hearsay 
evidence is practical or procedural rather than epistemic.” I will attack this proposition 
undermining the arguments leading to it.  
Two independent sub-arguments provide support for the claim that “[t]he central 
motivation for ruling out hearsay evidence is practical or procedural rather than epistemic.” First, 
(5) Legal proceedings are motivated either for practical (i.e., procedural) or for 
epistemic concerns. 
(6) “Hearsay evidence is excluded because with it the opposing side is denied the 
possibility of confronting the source of the information” (Lackey, 2013, p. 
15). 
Therefore, 
(7) This is a practical or procedural concern, but not necessarily an epistemic one. 
According to Lackey, this argument is confirmed by the following one: 
(8) “Imagine a piece of hearsay evidence that has been produced by a far more 
reliable process and is better grounded in evidence than a piece of firsthand 
evidence.  Nevertheless, the former would be inadmissible in a court of law, 
while the latter would not be” (Lackey, 2013, p. 15). 
Therefore, 
(9) “The mere fact that something is ruled inadmissible does not necessarily 
reveal anything about its epistemic status” (Lackey, 2013, p. 15). 
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(5) understands legal proceedings as having one exclusive rationale. On one hand, legal 
proceedings are designed to achieve practical, or procedural, purposes related to the fair 
application of due process such as the right of confrontation of the defendant which is an 
interpretation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution providing that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.” On the other hand, legal proceedings aim to find the truth of the facts under 
litigation. 
This dichotomy is not necessarily right. Goldman, in “Legal Evidence” (2005), classifies 
theories of legal proceedings in two groups: either they are pluralistic or unified. Pluralistic 
accounts hold that legal processes have different aims, not one of which is prior to the other (e.g., 
justice, impartiality, allowing coexistence, seeking the truth, protection of civil rights, etc.). 
Unified theories, in contrast, explain proceedings with reference to one main end. They do not 
hold that legal proceedings actually achieve the selected goal; better yet, they use it as an 
explanatory resource to clarify the main activities performed in legal proceedings. Within this 
second alternative, one can find pure unified theories and impure unified theories. Pure unified 
theories hold that the legal practices taken into account are subsumable in one exclusive 
desideratum. Impure unified theories hold that although the aim of legal procedures is such an 
exclusive aim, it is possible to recognize alternative goals coexisting with the dominant rationale. 
Lackey’s account is a pure unified about the epistemic goal of legal proceedings. For her, legal 
proceedings either obey exclusively a practical or an epistemic rationale, and it is not the case 
that legal proceedings obey both a practical and an epistemic objective. But, this is not 
necessarily the case; legal proceedings follow epistemic values along with other practical ones. 
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This idea allows Goldman, for instance, to defend that although the main goal of the law is not 
the determination of the truth; it is truth-oriented. These are his words: 
The aim [of legal procedures] is securing substantively just treatment of 
individuals. This depends on (1) the content of the law and (2) the genuine, or 
true, facts concerning the actions they (and others) performed and the 
circumstances of those actions. Thus, determining the truth about a person’s 
actions is a crucial means to just treatment. (Goldman, 2005, p. 164) 
As I already stated, (6) rationalizes the exclusion of hearsay evidence through a practical 
or procedural rationale, namely, through the right of confrontation of the defendant against 
whom the hearsay would be used if it were admissible. However, I believe this is a reductionist 
interpretation of the hearsay rule because it also makes epistemic sense. Without defending a 
particular theory, these are some of the epistemic interpretations. First, Brian Leiter in 
“Prospectus and Problems for the Social Epistemology of the Evidence Law” claims that 
“[a]lthough on its face, the hearsay doctrine is a rule of exclusion, in reality it is a rule of 
admission” (2001, p. 323). His idea is to interpret the hearsay rule using the multiple exceptions 
to it. Adopting this perspective, the problem is not that hearsay is not truth-conducive, but how 
could it be so. Second, Nance Dale in “The Best Evidence Principle” suggests that the hearsay 
rule creates an epistemic incentive for the parties to produce the best evidence possible. Having 
two paths of evidence for finding the facts under litigation, one leading straight to the facts, and 
other being mediated by different circumstances, it seems the best path is the one providing 
information without mediation. For Dale, this is the objective of the hearsay rule (1998, p. 272). 
Finally, Larry Laudan in Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay on Legal Epistemology 
suggests that when relevant evidence, such as hearsay, tends to be overestimated by the juries, it 
is a source of error, and, then, it is epistemically appropriate to exclude it (2006, p. 120). 
Epistemic interpretations of the hearsay rule such as these also provide a criticism against (9) 
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because, for them, when hearsay evidence is ruled inadmissible, something about its epistemic 
status is revealed. 
Even if the only motive for excluding hearsay evidence is the right of the litigant against 
whom this evidence is used, I believe that this is not only a practical concern, as stated in (7). 
The reason for this is that the adversarial controls of legal proceedings can be understood as 
epistemic as well. Remember that the adversarial systems of adjudication allocate the 
responsibility of handling evidence in the parties. Adopting the fact-finder’s perspective, the 
parties under litigation provide to the trier of facts the relevant information for confirming or 
defeating the information conveyed by the witnesses, but if the opportunity of cross-examination 
is omitted, as in hearsay evidence, we deprive the trier of facts of this way of fortifying or 
defeating his/her beliefs (Ho, 2008, p. 270). 
 
2.3.2 The Correctness of Knowledge Attributions to the Jury in Different Evidence: A 
Positive Justification 
As I briefly stated before, knowledge attributions have the purpose of stating that a 
cognitive agenda has been properly closed. Given that the object of knowledge attributions is 
cognitive agendas, the conditions under which a knowledge attribution is properly closed or 
advanced depends on the nature of the cognitive agenda claimed to have been properly closed or 
advanced. In DIFFERENT EVIDENCE, the cognitive agendas under account are the jury’s and 
the jurors’. First, the jury is a collective agent with the agenda of rendering a verdict of 
acquitting or condemning the accused. For achieving this objective, juries have a set of 
conditions of resolution and time constraints. Broadly speaking, the jury has to hear the evidence 
as it is presented by the prosecutor and the defense in a trial, and, after receiving instructions 
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from the judge, the jurors have a deliberation to consider the verdict. If this is right, the objective 
of the cognitive sub-agenda of rendering a verdict is the finding of the facts under litigation. For 
this sub-agenda, juries also have conditions of resolution such as the standard of reasonable 
doubt imposed on the finding of the facts justifying a verdict in which the accused is declared 
guilty of committing a crime. Hearsay evidence, as I understand it, is one of the limitations 
imposed by the agendas of juries and jurors. That is why I believe that to attribute knowledge to 
the jury in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE is right. When the jury excludes hearsay evidence, it is 
properly following one of the limitations imposed by its cognitive agenda. This does not lead to 
the problem faced by Schmitt’s account because when a jury does not follow the limitations of 
its agenda, it does not cease to exist. Instead, it is just a jury, which does not close its agenda. 
With regards to the jurors, I propose that it is inappropriate to attribute knowledge to 
them in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE. The reason for this is that a juror plays a role determined by 
the agenda that the legal procedure imposes on him/her. If hearsay evidence is a cognitive 
limitation imposed on the jury, and the jurors are the constitutive parts of the jury, then hearsay 
evidence is also a limitation for them. This does not mean that jurors de facto do not take hearsay 
evidence into account. Instead, the idea is that a proper knowledge attribution has to take into 
account the cognitive agenda for which the recognition of knowledge is made. These intuitions 
seem to be confirmed by studies on empirical judicial psychology where simulated jurors are 
exposed to hearsay evidence to render a false verdict (Sevier, 2012). The experiments report that 
jurors prefer direct evidence to hearsay. Now, when the jurors do not resist the temptation and 
take hearsay evidence into account, they tend to disregard the hearsay evidence that is not 
accompanied by a justification explaining this sinful strategy. My hunch here is that the critical 
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attitude of jurors about hearsay evidence is an indication of the inappropriateness of knowledge 
attributions to the jurors in DIFFERENT EVIDENCE. 
 
 
3. The Doctrinal Paradox 
One argument for S is that it captures ordinary intuitions of group knowledge and belief, 
as Margaret Gilbert (1994) states: 
What is it for us to believe that such-and-such, according to our everyday 
understanding? It is common to answer this question with some form of 
‘summative’ account. For us to believe that p is for all or most of us to believe 
that p. Or perhaps a ‘common knowledge’ condition may be added: for us to 
believe that p is for all or most of us to believe that p, while this is common 
knowledge among us. Whatever the precise account given, the core of it is a 
number of individuals who personally believe that p. (p. 235) 
Aggregation procedures transform these ordinary intuitions into institutional designs providing 
social mechanisms to combine individual beliefs to obtain group beliefs. To be sure, “an 
aggregation procedure is a mechanism by which a group can generate collectively endorsed 
beliefs or judgments on the basis of the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments” (List, 
2005, p. 27). In this sense, an aggregation procedure is a procedure having individual judgments 
as inputs and collective judgments as outputs; for instance, a procedure of majority voting 
“whereby a group judges a given proposition to be true whenever a majority of group members 
judges it to be true” (List 2005, p. 27), or a unanimity procedure “whereby the group makes a 
judgment on a proposition if and only if the group members unanimously endorse that judgment” 
(List 2005, p. 30). While in the former the input is the individual votes of its members and the 
output is the position collecting more votes, in the latter the input is the opinion of each of its 
members and the output is the unanimous agreement of them. 
	   136 
Despite the support majoritarian procedures might receive from ordinary intuitions, they 
face problems of collective rationality, as it is shown in the following case:  
THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX 
Suppose a three-member court has to make a decision in a breach-of-contract 
case. The court seeks to make judgments on the following propositions: 
• The defendant was contractually obligated not to do a certain action (the 
first premise). 
• The defendant did that action (the second premise). 
• The defendant is liable for breach of contract (the conclusion). 
According to legal doctrine, obligation and action are jointly necessary and 
sufficient for liability; that is, the conclusion is true if and only if both premises 
are true. Suppose, as shown in Table 1 [below], judge 1 believes both premises to 
be true; judge 2 believes the first but not the second to be true; and judge 3 
believes the second but not the first to be true. Then each premise is accepted by a 
majority of judges, yet only a minority, that is, judge 1, individually considers the 
defendant liable. 
Table 1: The doctrinal paradox 
 Obligation? Action? Liable? 
Judge 1 True True True 
Judge 2 True False False 
Judge 3 False True False 
Majority True True False 
The “doctrinal paradox” consists of the fact that the court’s verdict depends on 
whether it votes on the conclusions or on the two premises: a majority vote on the 
issue of the defendant’s liability alone would support a “not liable” verdict, 
whereas majority votes on the two premises would support a “liable” verdict. This 
shows that, even for a single given combination of individual judgments, the 
court’s verdict is highly sensitive to its method of decision making. If the court 
wishes to respect the judges’ majority opinion on the premises of the case, this 
can lead to a different verdict that if it wishes to respect the majority opinion on 
the case’s overall conclusions. (List & Pettit, 2011, pp. 45-46) 
According to List and Pettit, the procedure followed by the tribunal in THE 
DOCTRINAL PARADOX, as all majoritarian procedures, follow three principles (2011, pp. 49-
50): 
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(10) Universal domain: All the judges’ individual judgments are admissible inputs 
if they are complete (i.e., they include a judgment for each of the doctrinal 
elements of liability), and consistent (i.e., liability follows from the judges’ 
judgments on obligation and action). 
(11) Anonymity: The judgments of all the judges have equal weight in determining 
the tribunal’s judgment. 
(12) Systematicity: The court’s judgment on each proposition depends only on the 
judges’ judgments on that proposition, and the same pattern of dependence 
holds for all propositions. 
The problem is that (10) – (12) go against the principle of collective rationality. 
(13) Collective rationality: The aggregation function produces a court’s judgment 
that is complete (i.e., includes all the doctrinal elements of liability) and 
consistent (i.e., liability follows from obligation and action). 
However, (13) is false in THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX because, given the aggregation of the 
judges’ individual judgments, the court holds a valid argument whose two premises (i.e., action 
and obligation) are true, but whose conclusion (i.e., liability) is false. If this is right, the problem 
of THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX is a conflict between individual rationality and group 
rationality. If one favors individual rationality, then one denies (13). If one favors collective 
rationality, then one denies individual rationality. This is why List and Pettit also formulate THE 
DOCTRINAL PARADOX as a dilemma:  
(14) Either the court allows the votes of the judges to determine the view of the 
collectivity, or the court may take steps to ensure that the collective view 
will be rational.  
(15) If the court allows the votes of the judges to determine the view of the 
collectivity, then there is a risk of the court holding an irrational set of 
views. 
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(16) If the court takes steps to ensure that the collective view will be rational, 
then it may be necessary for the court to ignore the vote of its judges. 
(17) Either there is a risk of the court holding an irrational set of views or it is 
necessary for the court to ignore the vote of its judges (List & Pettit, 2002, 
p. 95) 
For List and Pettit, the moral of THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX is that if one wants to 
preserve collective rationality, one has to give up one of the principles from (10) – (12). In their 
words, “if a group seeks to form intentional attitudes, it must relax at least one of the four 
conditions. As we now demonstrate, any three of them can be satisfied together. The question 
therefore is which one, or which ones, to relax” (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 50). First, to relax (10) 
implies making the judgments of the individual judges uniform in such a way that all the judges 
have the same judgments. However, this is a bad solution because “there is no guarantee that the 
intentional attitudes of several individuals … will fall in a [uniform] pattern” (p. 52). Second, to 
relax (11) implies giving more importance to the decision of one of the judges, yet given the non-
hierarchical orientation of the court, this is not a good solution (p. 53). Finally, to relax (12) 
implies breaking the same pattern of dependence held for all propositions. Either the court 
prioritizes the premises (i.e., action and obligation) making its decision from the judges’ votes on 
these propositions and ignoring the votes on the conclusion, or the court prioritizes the 
conclusion ignoring the premises (p. 56). For List and Pettit, this is “the best way to avoid the 
impossibility of rational attitude aggregation” (p. 58). 
I interpret that the reason for the approval of relaxing (12) is justified because it respects 
the diversity of judges’ judgments threatened by the denial of (10). Giving up (12) also keeps the 
democratic structure of the court intact, eroded by the relaxation of (11). If this is right, the 
question is which of the propositions should be prioritized, the premises or the conclusion? 
Agendivism justifies a premise-driven approach. To be sure, the agenda of the court is to render 
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a verdict on the liability for a breaching of contract. Such agenda is closed by the aggregation of 
judges’ votes and advanced by the votes of each judge individually considered. This means that 
each judge’s vote is a sub-agenda for the court’s collective judgment. How do the judges, 
individually considered, close their agendas? Each of them is expected to decide the liability 
given the evidence presented by the parties. What do the parties have to prove? According to the 
nature of liability, they have to provide evidence for the alleged fact that the defendant was 
contractually obligated not to do a certain action, and for the argued fact that the defendant did 
that action. Once the parties present their evidence to the judges, each of the judges makes 
his/her judgment on each of these elements. Given that THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX 
describes the liability for breaching a contract as the conclusion of a valid argument whose 
premises are the two elements that the parties are supposed to prove, the judges individual votes 
are the consequence of their personal evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. For 
instance, if Judge 1 considers that the parties presented enough evidence for the fact that the 
defendant was contractually obligated not to do a certain action, and the fact that the defendant 
did that action, then the liability follows. By the same token, if Judge 2 does not see enough 
evidence for the obligation that the defendant allegedly had to do, but enough evidence 
corroborating the defendant performed the aforementioned action, then the liability does not 
follow. If this is right, agendivism provides an argument for the court to form its decision 
aggregating the judges’ votes on the premises and to ignore the votes in the conclusion: having a 
majoritarian decision on the conclusion necessarily follows. 
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Conclusions 
I believe it is worth finishing my dissertation putting together the main conclusions of my 
arguments. This dissertation was devoted to the study of knowledge and knowledge attributions 
in legal contexts. The inspiration for this was the Contextualist Suggestion (CS) that “courtroom 
proceedings provide a context that show the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascription truth-
conditions.” I disagree with CS, but before showing my points of contention, I want to recall the 
main terminology used. 
As I take it, there is a knowledge attribution when an agent, the attributor (A), asserts that 
another agent, the putative knower (K), knows that p. The problem of knowledge attributions is, 
then, whether A correctly asserts that K knows that p. Traditional theories of knowledge (TTK) 
claim that the correctness of knowledge attributions only depends on traditional factors for 
knowledge such as such as whether K believes that p, whether p is true, whether K has good 
evidence for p, the strength of K’s epistemic position, and so on. Against TTK, shifty 
epistemologies argue that the correction of knowledge attributions depend on non-traditional, or 
contextual, factors such as the salience of error possibilities or the practical stakes. The most 
important shifty epistemologies are Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism (SSI). While EC claims that the correctness of knowledge attributions depends on 
the salience of error possibilities or the practical states of A’s context of utterance, SSI states that 
the correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the salience of error possibilities or the 
practical states of K’s contexts. 
With this terminology in mind, I interpret CS implies that the context of utterance is the 
context of litigation in which A is at the moment of the attribution. This explains, for example, 
why a knowledge attribution to a presumptive witness by a police officer just starting a criminal 
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investigation is less demanding than the one by an attorney to the same witness in a cross-
examination at trial. A counter-example for CS is EVERYONE KNOWS. To recall, in that case 
the conviction of the defendant would meet the epistemic standards of all the knowledge 
attributors within and without the courtroom (e.g., the cops, the prosecutor, the judge, the jury, 
and so on). However, in EVERYONES KNOWS conviction is not guaranteed because from the 
fact that it meets the epistemic standards of the knowledge attributors does not follow that it 
meets the invariant epistemic standards of proof fixed in criminal legal procedures for 
conviction. Therefore, the correction of knowledge attributions in legal contexts does not depend 
on the context of the litigation the attributor is in. 
I account for the correctness of knowledge attributions in legal contexts with an 
agendivistic view. The conceptual background of my account comes from the notions of agent 
and agenda. An agent is an entity doing something. Agendas and sub-agendas are plans of action 
agents are disposed to close or advance. In this sense, agendas are like networks of actions to be 
discharged. Agendas and sub-agendas have conditions of closure determining both the actions an 
agent is expected to perform in order to achieve his/her objective, and the time range in which 
he/she should do it. An agenda in course is properly closed when agents deploy their resources in 
such a way that its conditions of closure are obtained, but agendas are not closed simpliciter. 
Instead, the agent’s matching of the conditions of resolution comes in degrees. An agenda in 
course is properly advanced when some of its closure conditions have been obtained, but not all 
of them yet. Some agendas include things an agent desires or needs to know for the achievement 
of his/her objectives. I refer to this as cognitive agenda, defined as a set of questions that a 
cognitive agent wants, or needs, to answer for the achievement of his/her objectives. 
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For my agendivistic view, knowledge attributions have the purpose of stating that a 
cognitive agenda has been properly closed. Given that the object of knowledge attributions is 
cognitive agendas, the conditions under which knowledge is properly attributed depends on the 
nature of the cognitive agenda claimed to have been properly closed or advanced. This explains 
why in EVERYONE KNOWS conviction cannot be secure, even if everyone within and without 
the court knows that the defendant is guilty. One of the closure conditions of conviction is the 
finding of the facts supporting conviction according to one specific standard of proof: beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Knowledge is not properly attributed to the trier of facts, and conviction is not 
secured, until such requirement is satisfied.  With all of this alleged knowledge, conviction is not 
secure because the closure conditions of conviction demand the trier of facts to find the facts 
under litigation beyond a reasonable doubt. This confirms that knowledge attributions in legal 
contexts depend on the closure conditions of cognitive agendas they impose on legal agents and 
not on their context of utterance, as is stated by CS. 
These general remarks on agendivism and knowledge attributions in legal contexts 
allowed me to deal with particularly different problems. The first issue I dealt with was the 
problem of the function of knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies. The most 
important antecedent to this issue is found in Craig’s Knowledge in the State of Nature. In this 
book, he claims that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to flag approved informants (Craig, 
1990, p. 11). I showed how this account has been attacked by alternative accounts showing that it 
is possible to find cases of knowledge attributions without approved informants, and approved 
informants without knowledge attributions.  My disagreement with Craig is in the way he 
executes his methodological program. He correctly states that knowledge attributions respond to 
the need of having true beliefs, and that true beliefs matter because they serve to guide human 
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actions to a successful outcome. However, Craig does not explain how knowledge attributions 
serve to guide human actions to a successful outcome. I submit that a theory of the function of 
knowledge attributions in our cognitive economies should account for the ways in which 
knowledge attributions serve to guide our cognitive endeavors to a successful outcome. With my 
agendivistic view, I claim that the function of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag 
relevant information to close or advance an epistemic agenda. This is confirmed by criminal 
investigators who only attribute knowledge to witnesses, victims, undercover agents, and the 
like, when they provide relevant information allowing to advance the agenda of a criminal 
investigation: to determine if a crime occurred and who did it. 
A second concern for the problem of knowledge attributions in legal context is the 
attributions of testimonial knowledge. In dealing with this problem, I showed that EC and SSI 
allow for easy testimonial knowledge. That is to say, in some cases EC and SSI incorrectly 
attribute testimonial knowledge. My path of argumentation was the following. First, I showed 
that EC and SSI endorse the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA), which is the claim that one 
should assert that p only if one knows that p. The relevant literature of EC (Cohen, 2004; 
DeRose 2002; 2009), SSI (e.g., Hawthorne, 2004; Stanley, 2005) and KAA (Williamson, 2000) 
confirmed this premise. Second, I claimed that KAA leads to antireductionism (i.e., the epistemic 
status of testimony comes from testimony as a source of knowledge in its own right) and 
transmission (i.e., the knowledge that p is transmitted, via testimony, from the speaker to the 
hearer). The evidence for this was shown by the fact that important versions of KAA 
(Williamson, 2000) endorse antireductionism and transmission. Additionally, some reputable 
theories of testimony (Lackey, 2008) also recognize the link between KAA, antireductionism and 
transmission. My third premise was to show that antireductionism and transmission allow for 
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easy testimonial knowledge. That is, these theories of testimonial knowledge “[allow] that one 
can come to know by simply believing what one is told” (Greco, forthcoming, p. 8). For 
instance, under antireductionism and transmission, a criminal investigator comes to know that p 
because an uncooperative witness states the p. However, this attribution of testimonial 
knowledge is wrong because the information the uncooperative witness could give could be 
inaccurate, false or incomplete. Therefore, EC and SSI allow for easy testimonial knowledge.  
My agendivistic view, differently, claims that a hearer properly closes his/her cognitive 
agenda when receiving relevant information from the speaker, and answers the questions 
required for the advancing or closure of his/her agendas. Consequently, there are two sub-
cognitive agendas in testimonial knowledge: the speaker’s agenda for providing relevant 
information, and the hearer’s agenda of properly answering the questions he/she needs for the 
achievement of his/her objectives. Agendivism is not antireductionist because it does not believe 
that the adequate closure of the testifier’s agenda is enough: the hearer has cognitive work to do. 
By the same token, agendivism does not hold transmission because the hearer cannot know 
without the information provided by the testifier. But this information in itself is not enough; the 
hearer has to properly close or advance his/her agenda. 
A third problem studied in my dissertation was the problem of expert testimony and legal 
knowledge. Given that in American law of evidence, for expert testimony to be heard by the 
jury, the trial judge has to decide if the expert has the required specialized knowledge. As a 
consequence, the trial judge is an attributor of specialized knowledge. The problem is that the 
trial judge, ex hypothesi, does not have the specialized knowledge that he is supposed to 
attribute. Strict Invariantism (i.e., the view that knowledge attributions do not vary from context 
to context because the standard for knowledge is only one, and it is high) suggests that a trial 
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judge correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff the trial judge has the expert knowledge to 
verify that the expert meets the standards of knowledge fixed in the expert’s field of expertise. 
However, this view is too strong because it demands from the trial judge to have specialized 
knowledge to correctly attribute specialized knowledge. Legal EC claims that a trial judge 
correctly asserts that an expert knows that p iff the trial judge is in a good enough epistemic 
position to assert that the expert knows that p for law’s purposes. However, the expression “good 
enough epistemic position … for law’s purposes” is ambiguous and, consequently, does not 
provide criteria for the evaluation of attributions of specialized knowledge in legal contexts. 
Agendivism departs from these views claiming that a trial judge correctly asserts that an 
expert knows that p iff the finding of the facts requires the knowledge that p, the trial judge 
properly asserts that the jury does not know that p, and the trial judge is indirectly justified in 
believing that the expert knows that p. The first condition determines the connection between the 
information the trial judge is expected to attribute and the agenda for which that information is 
relevant. The second requirement shows that the agent in charge of advancing the agenda in 
account is not able to satisfy the role that was assigned to him/her. And the third criterion reveals 
the normative character of agendivism. It is less stringent than Strict Invariantism and more 
specific than Legal EC. 
My dissertation concludes providing agendivistic responses for two problems of 
knowledge attributions to groups in legal contexts: DIFFERENT EVIDENCE and THE 
DOCTRINAL PARADOX. To recall, non-summativists use DIFFERENT EVIDENCE to show 
that if a jury and its juror have different evidence for p, their justificatory status might diverge. 
This could occur because with the exclusionary rules of evidence the jury is asked to ignore 
relevant information in its deliberations that the jurors can take into account in their personal 
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consideration. In my agendivistic view, there is not conflict between the jury and its juror, qua 
jurors. The reason for this is that a juror plays a role determined by the agenda that the legal 
procedure imposes on him/her. If hearsay evidence is a cognitive limitation imposed on the jury, 
and the jurors are the constitutive parts of the jury, then hearsay evidence is also a limitation for 
them. THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX shows that a multi-agent court with a procedure of 
majority voting for fixing its collective beliefs could face a dilemma. “Either there is a risk of the 
court holding an irrational set of views, or it is necessary for the court to ignore the vote of its 
judges adopting a conflict between individual rationality and group rationality” (List & Pettit, 
2002, p. 95). Agendivism dissolves such dilemma prioritizing some of the propositions that the 
judges can vote for according to the court’s agenda of rendering a verdict. The idea of this is to 
guarantee group rationality respecting the individual judgments of the court’s members. 
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